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INTRODUCTION 
It appears that no other branch of trade is as 
much concerned with Fair Trade as the drug field. 
Fair Trade in the United States is not more than 
twenty years old. It dates from the early 1930's when un-
regulated competition and loss-leader selling hurt thousands 
of small drug stores. Sharing the druggists' grief were many 
manufacturers of identified commodities who had spent a for-
tune on advertising to build good Will for their trade-marked 
products. Manufacturers stood by helplessly while price 
cutters jeopardized the reputation for quality which manufac-
turers had cultivated for years. 
The National Association of Retail Druggists formed 
the vanguard in the struggle for relief from such practices 
in the form of Fair Trade Acts. Druggists today continue to 
ask for the preservation of the Fair Trade Laws so that they 
may continue to have fair competition. Manufacturers in the 
drug industry continue to argue that they have an inherent 
right to control the price of a proprietary article. Fair 
Trade protects his product from the debasing price cutting of 
unscrupulous retailers. 
The anti-fair-traders reply that the Fair Trade 
Acts encourage monopoly; and insist that Fair Trade is not 
necessary to preserve competition in the retail field. 
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What are the basic issues underlying the fair trade 
controversy as applied to the Drug Industry? 
It is the purpose of this study to attempt to 
define the issues and present both sides of this controver-
sial subject. 
To accomplish the above the thesis will set forth 
the nature of fair trade, examine its background and develop-
ment. Part I examines the evolution of fair trade in state 
and federal law-making bodies; its evolution in the courts; 
and issues inherent in the controversy. The purposes of fair 
trade are scrutinized, and terminology used in fair trade 
practice is defined. The thesis traces the origin of fair 
trade from its inception to the landmark decision of Roffman-
LaRoche· vs. Schwegmann in 1955. 
With the background of the operation of fair trade 
in the marketplace the thesis advances in Part II to the 
effect of fair trade on fifty-five thousand retail drug 
stores, and 321,250 drug store employees. The basic issues 
of fair trade and the retailer are presented with evidence 
pro and con. The issues of loss-leader selling, predatory 
price cutting, and "price juggling" are presented with testi-
mony for "fair" and "free" traders. Does Fair Trade protect 
the inefficient retailer? Why should a retailer be bound by 
a "non-signer" agreement? 
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After evaluating merchandising and service charac-
teristics of drug store products, and the objectives of fair 
trade in relation to the retailer, the study is in a better 
position to appraise Fair Trade and the consumer, which is 
attempted in Part III. In Part III the study examines the 
subjedts of "price behavior", competition, and monopoly. 
The "battle of the surveys" with statistical ammu-
nition on both sides presents an overwhelming amount of 
evidence to support price behavior of drug items in fair trade 
and non-fair trade areas. 
The last area of investigation of the thesis, Part 
IV, finds underlying issues of equal significance to the 
manufacturer and wholesaler. 
What is the value of a manufacturer's trademark? 
What are the advantages and disadvantages of Fair Trade to 
t he manufacturer? To the wholesaler? 
In summary, the thesis. attempts to answer these 
questions. This list is by no means complete, it attempts to 
outline the highlights of the study's scope and objective. 
1. What is Fair Trade? 
2. Why doesn't a manufacturer set his fair trade 
prices too high? 
3. Does Fair Trade eliminate competition? 
4. If price cutters lose money on "loss-leaders", 
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why do they offer them? 
5. Who takes the loss on "loss-leaders"? 
6. Why are retail druggists interested in Fair 
Trade? 
7. How has Fair Trade effected consumer prices of 
drug products? 
8. Doesn't the consumer benefit from "loss-
leaders"? 
9. Does Fair Trade lead to monopoly? 
10. Does Fair Trade give a national brand a 
monopoly? 
11. Is Fair Trade "price-fixing"? 
This study is indebted to the Bureau of Education 
on Fair Trade, and the American Fair Trade Council for the 
books, pamphlets, newsletters, and news releases. Government 
publications included an extensive bibliography of documents, 
testimony, and publications. Access to drug trade journals 
such as "NARD Journal", "Drug Topics", "American Druggist", 
and "Apothecary" were most helpful as an avenue of approach 
in the search for the issues. The National Wholesale Drug-
gists Association's book "The Basis and Development of Fair 
Trade" was most useful. The study acknowledges its thanks to 
the Eli Lilly Company for its correspondence. 
Of indeterminable value was the constant contact 
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with retail druggists in the field, contacts with whole-
salers' sales executives; wholesaler sales meetings; and 
working with wholesaler salesmen in the field, in developing 
the subject matter, the issues, objectives, and possible con-
clusions. 
The most involved statistical study was conducted 
by H. J. Vickland and C. R. Ostlund in an exhaustive study of 
"A Price Study of Leading Drug Store P-'roprietary Items under 
Minimum Price Contracts Permitted by Fair Trade Laws", in a 
book published by the Druggists' Research Bureau entitled 
"Fair Tr ade and The Retail Drug Stbre". 
The most current work on Fair Trade will be pub-
lished in 1956 by Dr. Siefkin, Dean of The Emory University 
Business School, and is entitled "Economic Aspects of Resale 
Price Maintenance". 
Attention is also di r ected to the findings of Harold 
J. Leavitt of The University of Chicago's School of Business, 
Journal of Business, July, 1954 and . his discussion of Consumer 
P'rices. 
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I. NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF FAIR TRADE 
Modern fair trade is an outgrowth of two basic 
developments in merchandising techniques that carne into being 
at the close of the nineteenth century. One such techn:l,que 
was the growing use of brand names and trade names to iden-
tify products. The other merchandising technique, of course, 
was advertising to secure consumer acceptance of the identi-
fied goods. It was inevitable that certain retailers would 
realize that a definite personal advantage would accrue to 
them if they, as retailers, cut .prices on these nationally 
known brands. 
The situation was aggravated by the local price 
cutting tactics of the huge trusts of that era. In self de-
fense, manufacturers and retailers who did not choose to cut 
prices, proceeded to enter into agreements relative to the 
maintenance of resale prices. 
The Sherman Act was passed in 1890. The Federal 
Trade Commission Act was passed in 1914. Both forms of 
legislation erected formidable legal barriers to price main-
tenance. Thereupon, a vigorous movement arose , to secure 
legislation that would exempt price maintenance agreements 
from the anti-trust laws. From 1914 to 1933 numerous bills 
to accomplish the above were introduced in congress. Efforts 
of Fair Traders were culminated with the enactment of The 
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Miller-Tydings Amendment which was passed as a rider to the 
District of Columbia Appropriation Bill. 
In the meantime, an equally determined drive was 
launched by Fair Traders to secure favorable legislation in 
the states. In 1916 New Jersey enacted a statute permitting 
resale price maintenance "by notice". In 1931 California 
enacted a fair trade statute without a "non-signer" clause, 
and added the non-signer provision in 1933. By 1941 all but 
three states and the District of Columbia had adopted Fair 
Trade · statutes. 
The fact that 45 states adopted fair trade laws 
does not necessarily mean that all commerce practices fair 
trade. The percentage of fair trade of all the retail trade 
is relatively small. Although estimates vary widely, for 
practical purposes reliable studies point to about ten per 
cent. 
Although Fair Trade started as a movement among 
manufacturers as a device to protect their brand names, many 
observers consider resale price maintenance today primarily 
a retailer movement. The most ardent supporters of fair 
trade are the retail druggists. 
A. FAIR TRADE DEFINED 
Fair Trade is defined as a system of price control 
by which the owner of an article identified by a trade-mark 
17 
sets a minimum below which the article may not subsequently 
be resold. Fair Trade is a form of resale price maintenance. 
1. Vertical Price Fixing 
Fair Trade is truly a resale price "control" -
(control is normally exercised by the manufacturer who owns 
the brand name) (and the one controlled is usually a retail-
er) - for the manufacturer is interested in vertically con-
trolling the pricing of the product as it descends from the 
plant through successive levels of distribution to the con-
sumer. Vertical price fixing is accomplished by agreements 
(contracts) between manufacturers and retailers, and manu-
facturers and wholesalers. 
2. Horizontal Price Fixing 
Horizontal price fixing by contrast is achieved 
through agreements among manufacturers, among wholesalers, or 
among retailers. Thus a pricing contract between manufac-
turer A and its own retail stores would constitute a VERTICAL 
agreement, while an understanding between manufacturer A and 
B, a competitor, would constitute a HORIZONTAL agreement. 
Fair Trade thus looks both down and across at the 
same time. It simply happens that the manufacturer as the 
price setting agent of his commodity by vertical controls 
actually at the same time accomplishes horizontal protection 
for his retailers and wholesalers. 
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B. PURPOSES OF FAIR TRADE 
1. Protect Property 
"It has been said that if you ask the 
average dealer what the fair trade laws are, he 
will say that they are laws to keep his competitor 
from selling at less than he does. This is not 
the fact of the matter at all. The laws are not 
designed to protect retailers or wholesalers. 
"Let us reduce our statement on the oper-
ation of the fair trade laws and .what they are to 
the barest fundamentals. Basically and simply the 
fair trade laws are now on the statute books of 
forty-five states which permit - and we must not 
forget the word permit the manufacturer of a brand-
ed trade~marked commodity which is in free and open 
competition with other similar commodities, to 
PROTECT the property value or name from the preda-
tory, destructive price cutting practices of dis-
tributors. If we go along in this country of ours 
with the principle of the right to own property 
and the right to protect that property which is 
the basic right of every American citizen, then · 
we must go along with the principle of fair trade 
laws. 
"---------Now then, the fair trade laws 
are merely extensions of the protection of the 
patent laws , and copyright laws - extension of 
protection to the property owner for the protec-
tion of his property through channels of distri-
bution."* 
The purpose for the existence of the Fair Trade Acts 
is well defined in the preamble found in most state fair tra~ 
acts as follows: 
"An act to protect trade-mark owners, distributors, 
and the public against injurious and uneconomic practices in 
*1, pp. 1-2. 
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the distribution of articles of standard quality under a 
distinguishing trade-mark, brand or name." 
2. Eliminate'~oss-Leade~'Selling 
By dictating the minimum retail price of his prod-
uct the manufacturer makes it impossible for a retailer to 
announce or advertise the sale of the product at an abnormally 
low price. Implied in the term "loss-leader" is that the re-
tailer exploits the good name of the product and sells it at 
a loss in order to attract customers to his store. To such a 
retailer the particular sale is regarded as an advertising 
technique and he simply regards his loss as simply a promo-
tional cost. The products which lend themselves best to 
"loss-leaders" are those with the best known, usually nation-
ally advertised brand names. It is the purpose of the Fair 
Trade Laws to eliminate the practice of "loss-leader" 
selling. 
C. RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE BEFORE FAIR TRADE 
Prior to the passage of the fair trade laws there 
were four principal methods employed by manufacturers for 
resale price maintenance with retailers. 
1. Restrictive Condition Attached to the Goods 
Efforts were made by some manufacturers to impose 
price control on retailers on the theory that the manufac-
turer had the inherent right to do so because he had produced 
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the product. The courts did not recognize this theory of 
property, saying that "once the producer of the goods had sold 
the product, he lost all control". The U. S. Supreme Court 
ruled in the Bobbs-Merrill case of 1908 and the Bauer case of 
1913 that even "copyright holders and patentees could not by 
virtue of their lawful monopolies dictate resale price once 
they had obtained their reward by selling them". These 
rulings have remained unchanged and manufacturers no longer 
try to control resale prices by "rule and notice". 
2. Ordinary Contract 
In the famous Miles Case (Dr. Miles Medical Company 
vs Park and Sons Co., 220 u.s~ 373, 1911) the question of 
resale price maintenance arose when the manufacturer attempted 
to contract with a retailer not to sell the former's products 
below certain price levels. The Supreme Court held that such 
price agreements were illegal under the Sherman Act if the 
products involved moved in interstate commerce. The case is 
significant today because it indicates the law in those 
states in which fair trade acts do not exist.* 
3. Agency 
To circumvent t .he decision in the "Miles Case" it 
has been suggested that the manufacturer distribute his 
product all the way to the consumer through the medium of 
*1, p. 17. 
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agents rather than independent retailers. Thus the retailer 
handling the article to ~ the consumer, as the manufacturer's 
agent must abide by the price dictated by the manufacturer. 
The Court in The "Miles Case" ruled that "wholesalers were 
not in fact legal agents with respect to all of the products 
of the manufacturer that they might handle, and that the 
retailers who had signed the contracts were in fact not legal 
agents at all."* 
4. Right of Refusal to Sell 
Manufacturers have had some measure of success in 
compelling retailers to observe announced resale prices by 
threatening or announcing in advance that it would refuse to 
sell price cutters. The Supreme Court ruled in 1919 in U. s. 
vs. Colgate and Company (250 U.S. 300, 1919): 
II th . 
--------In . e absence of any purpose 
to create a monopoly or maintain a monopoly, the 
act does not restrict the long recognized right 
of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely 
private business, freely to exercise his own inde-
pendent discretion as to parties with whom he will 
deal. And of course he may announce in advance 
the circumstances under which he will refuse to 
sell."** 
However, "The Beechnut System" (Federal Trade Com-
mission vs. Beechnut Co. U.S. 441, 1922) went beyond the 
principle of refusal to sell goods in the "Colgate Case". 
*1, p. 17. 
**1, p. 18. 
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If the retailer, under Beechnut's "voluntary stabilization 
policy", failed to maintain the prices suggested by the 
company - he was "subject to be reported by special agents, 
numerous and active in that behalf or by dealers whose aid is 
enlisted in maintaining the system and the prices fixed by 
it." Retailers who did not maintain the price were listed as 
"undesireable price-cutters and wholesalers were not permit-
ted to sell them Beechnut products. If wholesalers sold 
price-cutters they could not get the goods of the company. 
The Federal Trade Commission concluded: 
"The system here disclosed necessarily 
constitutes a scheme which restrains the natural 
flow of commerce and the freedom of competition in 
the channels of interstate commerce which it has 
been the purpose of all the anti-trust acts to 
maintain."* 
None of the above mentioned devices proved satis-
factory to many manufacturers. Efforts were made periodical-
ly in Congress to make it possible for manufacturers to con-
trol resale prices in interstate trade. The last attempts to 
overrule the "Dr. Miles" . decision prior to the enactment of 
the Miller-Tydings Amendment were the Capper-Kelly Bills of 
1929 and 1930. All the efforts in Congress were unsuccessful 
and with the advent of the NRA Codes, many of whose codes 
provided for resale price maintenance - attempts to amend the 
*1, pp. 18-19. 
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Sherman Anti-Trust Act halted. However, NRA was declared 
unconstitutional and the efforts of organized retailers, 
particularly the druggists, culminated in the passage of the 
Miller-Tydings Amendment.* 
D. HISTORY OF ENACTMENT OF STATE FAIR TRADE ACTS 
The first Fair Trade Act was passed in California 
in 1931. This act legalized voluntary agreements but was 
not effective. The National Association of Retail Druggists 
was responsible for the passage of The California Fair Trade 
Act of 1933 (with a non-signer provision). This act has 
served as a model for the forty-four other states which have 
enacted Fair Trade Statutes.** 
1. Essential Provisions of State Fair Trade Laws 
Resale Price Maintenance laws contain all or some 
of the following provisions: 
(a) The buyer will resell only in conformity 
with the price stipulations of the seller. 
(b) Famous Non-Signer Clause - Prices set by 
agreements binding upon all dealers having 
notice of the prices. "Selling at less than 
the contract price (even by one not a party to 
the contract) is unfair competition and action-
able by any one damaged thereby". 
{c) Products subject to price maintenance must be 
in free and open competition with other com-
modities of the same general class. 
*33, pp. 18-19. 
**33, pp. 23-24. 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
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Prohibitions against horizontal price agree-
ments between manufacturers or wholesalers or 
retailers. 
Restrictions against selling "Except at the 
stipulated price" (16 States) or "below a 
minimum price stipulated" (28 States). 
Provisions conferring power to establish 
prices upon the seller (25 States) or only 
upon the Trade-mark owner or his expressly 
authorized distributors (19 States). 
Provisions permitting sales at less than 
established prices in: 
l
l) Close o~t sales. 
2) Damaged or deteriorated goods. 
3) Sales under court order. 
(h) Provisions banning evasions through: 
( 1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
Giving anything of value in the sale 
of a fair traded article. 
Offering of concessions or coupons 
redeemable in cash or merchandise. 
Sale of a fair-traded product in com-
bination with another product.* 
2. Old Dearborn Case 
There were doubts as to the constitutionality of 
State Fair Trade Acts - especially with regard to the non-
signer clause. On December 7, 1936, in the landmark decision 
of Old Dearborn Distributing Company vs. Seagram Distillers 
Corporation, (299 U.S. 183) the u.S. Supreme Court upheld 
the Illinois Supreme Court Decision sustaining the constitu-
tional validity of the Illinois Fair Trade Act. 
*33, pp. 33-34. 
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The principle contention made was that the non-
signer clause in the Illinois State Law violated the due-
process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution. The Court said that this 
was not the case. The Supreme Court said that the use of 
State power to force retailers to observe set prices on trade-
marked goods does not deprive the retailer or dealer of due 
process of law, since such price control serves as a valid 
protection of producers' valuable trade-marks and good will. 
3. What the States Have Done on Fair Trade 
The above decision in the "Dearborn Case" signalled 
a victory for the Fair Trade movement. The legislatures of 
forty-five states have enacted Fair Trade Laws since Calif-
ornia passed the first law in 1931. Today the District of 
Columbia, Missouri, Texas, and Vermont are without such laws. 
Fair Trade agreements are positively illegal in Texas, Mis-
souri, and the District of Columbia. 
Not a single fair trade law has ever been .repealed 
although there have been numerous attempts along these lines. 
Fair Trade has been upheld in judicial decisions by 
the highest courts in the following fifteen states: 1. Calif-
ornia, 2. Connecticut, 3. Illinois, 4. Louisiana, 5. Maryland, 
6. Mississippi, 7. New Jersey, 8. New York, 9.North Carolina, 
10. Oregon, 11. Rhode Island, 12. South Carolina, 13. South 
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Dakota, 14, Washington, 15. Wisconsin.* 
Two State Supreme Courts have ruled adversely in 
Michigan and Florida. The Florida Supreme Court declared 
the State's Act unconstitutional, largely on the ground that 
its interference with the freedom of retailers to price as 
they pleased was justified only as "depression emergency 
legislation", the need for which had passed. In 1949 the 
Florida State Legislature re-enacted a new fair trade act to 
overcome the Court's objection. In Michigan in 1952 prior 
to the passage of the McGuire Act, the State Supreme Court 
held the State Fair Trade Law unconstitutional. 
Three recent high state court rulings in Arkansas, 
Georgia, and Nebraska, together with two earlier decisions in 
Michigan and Florida, have held that their state fair trade 
laws violate their respective state constitutions. Thus, 
Fair Trade laws are alive and operating in forty out of the 
forty-five states which originally passed them.** 
E. ENACTMENT OF MILLER-TYDINGS AMENDMENT 
The state laws did not provide a complete and final 
answer to the problems of fair trade. The Sherman Anti-Trust 
Act and the Federal Trade Commission Acts still stood to make 
resale price maintenance contracts unlawful where interstate 
*4, pp. 8-9. 
**13, p. 1. 
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commerce was effected, which was most of the time since most 
manufacturers interested in fair trade were nationally adver-
tised brands sold in a national market. 
The historical background of the Miller-Tydings 
Amendment is not without controversy. Fair trade opponents 
have insisted that the amendment was passed because of the 
business conditions of the depression period. In the thirtiffi 
retailers were faced with .a spiral of falling prices and 
mounting business failures. Opponents contend that the law 
was passed to steady the p~ice structure of the depression 
era.* 
Other opponents have pinned a stigma on the Miller-
Tydings Amendment characterizing it as "second class" legis-
lation because the Act was passed as a rider to a District of 
Columbia Appropriation Bill. 
1. Enabling Legislation of Miller-Tydings Act. 
The Miller-Tydings Amendment was merely an 
"enabling" act leaving the states free to determine their own 
policy in the matter. The Miller-Tydings Amendment was ·geared 
to the State Laws and p~ovided for Federal exemption only in 
states where resale price agreements were lawful. The Mille~ 
Tydings Amendment "ENABLED" states to have their own system of 
Fair Trade. Thus, the Act changed the Anti-Trust Laws to 
*14, pp. 339-342. 
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accommodate state laws which were in direct conflict with the 
Anti-Trust Laws. The Miller-Tydings Amendment amended 
section 1 of the Sherman-Anti-Trust Act which section says: 
"--------to protect trade and commerce against un-
lawful restraints and monopolies".* 
2. Provisions of The Miller-Tydings Act 
The Act was passed August 17, 1937, and provides: 
"That section 1 of the Sherman Act,as 
thus amended provides that nothing in the Act shall 
rend.er illegal any contract or agreement prescribing 
minimum prices for the resale of any commodity 
which bears, or the label or container of which 
bears, the trade-mark, brand or name of the pro-
ducer or distributor thereof and which is free and 
open competition of the same general class produced 
or distributed by others. This is operative, how-
ever, only when such contracts or agreements are 
lawful, as applied to intrastate transactions, 
under any statute law or public policy in effect 
in any state, district, or the District of Columbia 
in which the resale is to be made, or to which the 
commodity is to be transported for resale. 
"The section as amended also specifies 
that such contracts or agreements shall not be an 
unfair method of competition under the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. 
"Section 1, as amended above, further 
provides that none of the foregoing provisions 
shall make unlawful any contract or agreement 
providing for the establishment or maintenance of 
minimum resale prices between manufacturers, 
producers, wholesalers, brokers, or between per-
sons, firms, or corporations in competition with 
each other."** 
*33, pp. 31-32. 
**33, p. 32. 
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A most important observation of the Miller-Tydings 
Amendment is that while it copied largely the State Fair 
Trade Laws in most respects, it made no mention of the all 
important "non-signer" clause. 
F. ENACTMENT OF MCGUIRE BILL 
1. The Schwegmann Case (Schwegmann Bros. vs. Calvert 
Distillers Corporation, 341 
u.s. 384) 
The Calvert Distillers Corporation fair traded its 
products in the State of Louisiana. The fair traded price 
for a "fifth" (4/5 of a quart) was $4.37. Schwegmann Bros., 
operators of a large super-market, refused to agree to 
Calvert's system of maintained prices, and sold the above 
mentioned product at $3.25. The price-cutter defended his 
position on the fact that he had not signed a contract with 
any one as to resale prices. 
The Louisiana Fair Trade Act contained a "non-
signer" clause - once a price contract was negotiated with 
any retailer in the state, the minimum prices contained in 
the price schedule could be extended and applied to all re-
tailers whether or not they "signed" or accepted the contract. 
Calvert brought suit to enjoin Schwegmann Bros. 
from selling its products at less than minimum prices. 
Schwegmann contended that the effort of the manu-
facturer to invoke the non-signer clause was an e f fort by an 
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interstate seller to force price fixing upon him, thus a 
restraint of interstate trade and commerce. Such restraint 
unless exempted by the Miller-Tydings Amendment would be in 
violation of the Sherman Act. Since the Miller-Tydings 
Amendment was utterly silent on the question of non-signer 
control, Schwegrnann argued that Calvert's scheme was not 
exempt. 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals found 
for Calvert. 
In May, 1951, the Supreme Court held that: The 
non-signer, where interstate commerce was involved, could 
NOT be bound by state fair trade acts because the Miller-
Tydings Act in 1937 did not contain a specific non-signer 
clause. The Supreme Court upheld Schwegmann in its six to 
three decision. 
The Supreme Court's Schwegmann decision did not 
hold that the Fair Trade laws or the non-signer clause were 
unconstitutional. The Court's decision did not reverse the 
"Old Dearborn" decision. The Court simply said that . Congress 
did not provide for a non-signer clause in the Miller-
Tydings Act. The decision actually made valid the operation 
of signed fair trade contracts under the Miller-Tydings Act. 
The decision weakened the effectiveness of the fair trade 
acts. In brief, it meant that only voluntary, SIGNED resale 
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price contracts were exempted from the Sherman Act. 
2. Wentling Decision (Sunbeam Corporation vs. S. A. 
Wentling, 185 F. 2d 903) 
Sunbeam Corporation maintained a schedule of resale 
prices with its dealers. Wentling, a mail order house, and a 
non-signer shipped Sunbeam products into other states below 
the locally maintained price. 
In 1951 the Third U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that a fair trade price established in one state was NOT 
binding on a non-signing retailer within that state - if the 
retailer chose to sell goods to customers in another state, 
even if the latter state had a fair trade law. 
The effect of the decision was another blow to Fair 
Trade. The ruling allowed fair trade to be by-passed by mail 
order houses through the simple expedient of selling across 
state borders. 
3. The McGuire Bill (Public Law 542) 
The McGuire Act was passed by the 82nd Congress. 
(House 196 to 10, Senate 64 to 16). The Act was signed into 
law on July 14, 1952. The bill accomplishes the following: 
(a) Makes permissible the use of non-signer 
c~ause within a given state in accordance 
with the legislation of the state. 
(b) Reverses the Schwegmann and Wentling 
decisions. 
{c) Enables states which have fair trade to 
make the laws fully effective. 
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(d) Authorizes the fixing of minimum or stip-
ulated (actual) resale prices. 
(e) Manufacturer able to require ALL retailern 
to observe minimum or actual prices which 
are fixed in a written contract made in 
that state. 
(f) . Neither the authorized agreements or the 
non-signer arrangements constitutes an 
unlawful burden or restraint upon or 
interference with interstate commerce.* 
G. RECENT "LANDMARK" DECISIONS 
1. Eli Lilly and Company vs. Schwegmann Bros. (205 F 2nd 
188, June 30, 1953) 
The F.T.M. ("Fair Trade Minimum") of Insulin as 
fixed by Eli Lilly and Company was $2.83. Schwegmann Bros., 
owners of a giant supermarket in New Orleans sold Lilly 
Insulin at $2.08. Schwegmann contended that inasmuch as 
their chain had not signed a fair trade contract, they were 
not bound to uphold the price. 
Judge J. Skelly Wright of the Federal District 
Court in New Orleans ruled in favor of Eli Lilly. Justice 
Wright upheld the constitutionality of the McGuire . Act and 
the Louisiana Fair Trade Act. He ruled that the Federal 
Courts were bound to uphold the principles laid down by the 
Supreme Court in the 1936 "Old Dearborn" decision: The right 
of the manufacturer to protect the property value of his 
trade-mark through fair trade. 
*34, p, 9123 and p. 9138. 
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On October 19, 1953, the U. s. Supreme Court denied 
the supermarket's petition by refusing to rule on the valid-
ity of the Fair Trade Laws. In effect, the highest tribunal 
ruled that it considered constitutional both the Louisiana 
Fair Trade Law and the McGuire Act. 
In brief: Schwegmann had again challenged the 
validity of Congress' power to impose Fair Trade on non-
signers in transactions that involve interstate commerce -
and lost in the courts.* 
2. Eastman Kodak Case 
The ruling of the Federal Trade Commission involved 
the question of vertical and horizontal price fixing. East-
man, a manufacturer, .also owned and operated its own retail 
stores. Could Eastman enter into price maintenance agree-
ments with other retailers when the law specifically states 
that the exemption from the prohibition against price fixing 
shall extend only to vertical price maint enance? Did East-
man's contracts fall in the non-exempt classifications of the 
statute- a horizontal agreement between~-------retailers or 
between persons, firms or corporations in competition with 
each other"? 
The ruling by J. Earl Cox of the Federal Trade Com-
~ission was that "Eastman entered into these contracts as a 
*15, p. 36. 
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manufacturer, and NOT as a retailer". 
"--------that the contracts are vertical 
rather than horizontal and are protected by the 
McGuire Act. 
"--------A manufacturer could establish 
retail selling prices on his branded products -
even though he might be engaged in selling those 
same products at retail."* 
3. Hoffman-LaRoche vs Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super-
markets 
One of Schwegmann's drug departments in a super-
market dispensed products manufactured by Roffman-LaRoche. 
In filling prescriptions Schwegmann removed the latter's 
label and substituted Schwegmann labels. 
Roffman-LaRoche obtained an injunction in the u. S. 
District Court in New Orleans compelling Schwegmann to sell 
its products under the Louisiana Fair Trade Law. The Circuit 
Court upheld the injunction. 
The District Court held that: 
"A manufacturer has the legal right to 
enforce F.T.M. prices on prescription specialties 
from which all evidence of trade-mark or brand 
name had been removed by the retailer." 
In his decision Judge J. Skelly Wright of the u. S. 
District court ~aid: 
"Upon specific request for a named fair-
traded, trade-marked product, the trade-marked 
*16, p. 41. 
35 
owner's good-will is involved, and a retail seller 
may not THEN remove the trade-mark and thereby avoid 
liability under the fair trade laws. 
11The mere removal at the time of sale to 
a consumer of the trade-marks, labels, brands, or 
name of the manufacturer is no defense where the 
sale is made at less than the legally established 
fair trade price - after receipt of an order for 
the product by specific trade name."* 
(A retailer may remove a trade-mark or brand name, 
and sell the item at any price - PROVIDED HE DOES SO WITHOUT 
MAKING USE OF THE MANUFACTURER'S GOOD WILL). 
Judge Wright made. the following points in his 
decision: 
(a) The trade-mark owner's good will is in-
volved when a customer specifically re-
quests a named product which is trade-
marked and fair traded. 
(b) The retailer selling a drug available 
only on a physician's prescription can-
not avoid liability under Fair Trade 
Laws by removing the trade-mark or label 
from the container or product. 
(c) In determining whether the trade name of 
the manufacturer is utilized in selling 
a fair t raded proquct which is available 
on a physician's prescription only, it is 
not essential for the customer to be aware 
of the name of the drug in his prescrip-
tion. The good will established in pre-
scription drug trade-marks, names, and 
brands is "inseparably bound" with the 
prescription written by the physician.** 
Schwegmann appealed the decision of the Circuit 
*17, p. 17. 
**29, p. 11. 
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Court to the U. S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in 
October, 1955 simply refused to hear the case. Its action 
lets the lower court's decision stand. The Court's refusal 
to hear the case again upheld the principle of fair trade and 
its constitutionality. 
It is of great importance that the Court's deci-
sion establishes the principle that the good will of trade-
marked goods also applies to drugs sold oh prescription. * 
The decision of Judge Wright is of special impor-
tance in view of the large number of drugs used in modern 
medical practice which are sold only on a doctor's prescrip-
tion. This decision is truly a "landmark" case in Fair Trade 
because the ruling protects the pharmacist in one of the most 
important aspects of his profession - the filling of pre-
scriptions. The pharmacist dispenses trade-marked, fair 
traded drugs.** 
H. SUMMARY: THE PRACTICE OF FAIR TRADE IN 
THE MARKET PLACE 
1. The laws permit but do not require a manufac-
turer of a trade-marked product to enter into a contract 
wherein he establishes the minimum resale price of his pro-
duct in order to protect the property value of his trade- . 
mark. 
*27, p. 17. 
**27, p. 11. 
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2. The product must be in free and open competi-
tion with other similar items produced by others. 
3. Only "vertical" contracts are permitted. 
"Horizontal" agreements are prohibited. 
4. Manufacturers can make fair trade contracts 
with retailers whether they sell direct or through whole-
salers. 
5. Many manufacturers have fair trade wholesale 
prices as well as fair trade retail minimums. 
6. While the law requires technically only one 
fair trade contract signed in each state : in which the manu-
facturer fair trades his products, experience has shown that 
it is most advisable to get a substantial number of contracts 
signed. 
7. Retailers who haven't signed contracts must 
observe fair trade prices if they are located in states with 
fair trade laws. 
8. A manufacturer must notify al l of his retailers 
of his fair trade prices by: 
(a) Direct mail announcement. 
(b) Publishing a copy of the fair trade con-
tract and an announcement respecting the 
fair-trading of the manufacturer's pro-
ducts in advertisements placed in trade 
journals reaching the retailer. 
(c) Distribution of fair trade contracts by a 
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manufacturer's salesmen to retailers. 
(d) Copy and announcement of fair trade con-
tract and price schedule in dealer cata-
logues, e.g. "The Red Book" in the drug 
trade. 
9. Fair trade is enforced by the manufacturer. 
Anyone who feels himself injured can sue the violator of a 
fair trade contract. When warnings to violators prove use-
less, the manufacturer may resort to an injunction issued by 
a Court of Equity to restrain the violator from violating the 
manufacturer's price. 
10. The manufacturer should enforce his fair trade 
price structure. If he doesn't enforce his price structure 
he stands to lose his fair trade price structure by default. 
11. Retailer is not bound to handle goods covered 
by fair trade contract. Nor must he observe a minimum fair 
trade price if he removes the trade-mark, and identifying 
labels or brand names. 
12. The following industries use fair trade: 
proprietary drugs, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, toiletries, 
books, jewelry, silverware, auto accessories, household 
products, some packaged foods, electrical appliances, sport-
ing goods, hardware, office equipment, stationery, cameras, 
photo supplies, tobacco (exclusive of cigarettes), and 
alcoholic beverages. 
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II. FAIR TRADE AND THE DRUG RETAILER 
The retail druggist has a dual personality. By 
training he is a professional man - a pharmacist, but he is 
also a businessman. His academic training places heavy 
emphasis on the professional side of pharmacy. The pharma-
cist forms an important link between the physician, drug 
manufacturer, and patient. 
Society relies upon the druggist to furnish 
pharmaceutical service. However, the druggist finds that 
the sales of prescriptions and related drugs alone are not 
always enough to support his business. He is forced to rely 
upon many less strictly professional items to operate profit-
ably. It is often his margin in these other items such as 
cosmetics, toothpaste, patent medicines, home remedies, etc. 
which make possible his very existence in business. 
The retail druggist is a strong supporter of fair 
trade. Price wars, ''price juggling", and "jungle" tactics in 
the market place injure his prestige and reputation. He 
naturally supports any legislation that would prevent the 
appearance of a major threat to his professionalism. 
If, in the absence of fair trade protection, the 
druggist is forced to sell merchandise at reduced prices he 
does so at the risk of injuring his potential profits. He 
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may be forced to effect economies of operation. He may re-
duce overhead by decreasing the number of employees, or cur-
tailing the number of traditional free services to his 
customers. More often, he is forced to adjust to the loss 
by raising the price on other items. 
Retail druggists are essentially "small business". 
If the fair trade laws are destroyed, the American public 
may well be faced with a choice between providing special 
measures to keep small business in being or facing the pros-
pect of losing the social and economic contributions of small 
business. 
From an economic standpoint, the retail druggist as 
a healthy small business is indispensable to our free enter-
prise system. The retail druggist provides the innumerable 
retail outlets which are so necessary to secure the mass 
distribution of national brands and the economies of large-
scale production which such sales volume makes possible. 
Can the price cutter fill this economic vacuum 
which would be left by the liquidation of small business? 
A. MERCHANDISING AND SERVICE CHARACTERISTICS 
OF DRUG STORE PRODUCTS 
Much is said about the comparatively high percent-
age of fair trade products in the Drug Trade. Critics point 
to the low percentage of fair trade products in other 
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industries. In determining whether a product should be fair 
traded -an examination of the product's merchandising and 
service characteristics should yield affirmative answers to 
the following questions: 
1. Trade-mark 
Is product trade-marked, branded? In the drug 
trade both the quality of the product, and the integrity of 
the manufacturer are of great importance to the consumer. 
The consumer of a medicinal product recogniz~s the trade-
mark, identifys the brand and the product as to its source. 
He wants to feel that he knows the integrity of the manu-
facturer behind the brand. 
2. Competition 
Is product in free and open competition with other 
products of the same general class? The following is a par-
tial tabulation of consumer drug store products taken from 
Consumer Reports, 1952 Buying Guide Issue: (The chart 
illustrates that drug products fulfill this second require-
ment.)* 
*5, p. 11. 
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CONSUMER FREEDOM OF CHOICE 
COMMODITY NUMBER OF BRANDS PRICE RANGE 
Cleansing Creams 
Cold Creams 45 .06 to .60 an oz . 
Emollient Creams 19 .05 to . 64 an oz • 
Hand Creams 17 .07 to . 60 an oz. 
Hand Lotions 8 • 09 to .38 an oz. 
Face Powders 5 .10 to .23 an oz. 
Lipsticks 31 .075 to .72 a gm. 
Salitary Pads & Tampons 
Sanitary Pads 15 
6 
. 24 to 1. 63 per doz • 
Tampons • 25 to .45 per doz • 
Source: Consumer Reports 1952 Buying Guide Issue 
The consumer can exercise complete freedom of 
choice as to product, price, and quality. The chart above 
indicates that drug store products are in free and open com-
petition with other products of the same general class and 
for the same purpose. 
3. stability 
Is product sufficiently stable and free from 
deterioration? 
Drug store products for the most part are suffi-
ciently stable and free from deterioration to permit its 
maintaining a substantially uniform value during the period 
required for storage, and consumption or acquisition by the 
consumer. This is not true in the food industry where 
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perishable food products may deteriorate from day to day -
in condition and prices they may command. In the field of 
food production and marketing the available supply may depend 
upon uncontrollable seasonal and climatic conditions, and 
hence the relatively low percentage of fair trade products 
in the food industry. 
High style products and seasonal products may not 
lend themselvea to fair trading. 
4. Unity of Price 
Is product sold without "trade-in"? High ticket 
consumer goods, e.g. autos, television sets, are usually sold 
with "tr~de-ins". The trade-in allowance is completely at 
the discretion of the dealer and the advertised or suggested 
price becomes lost.* 
Conclusion: Some types of products either cannot 
or should not be fair traded. Drug store products are 
f 
heavily fair traded because of their merchandising and ser-
vice characteristics. 
*5, p. 11. 
B. "THIS IS THE RETAIL DRUG STORE II 
-- --- ------
• 
---
I Drug stores without rountalllll Proprietary stores 
l Sales per Total Statel I Number Number Payroll . sales Sales per Rank in paid Poyroll as Numbor ""per-or Bales store United workars per percent ol Bales 1 store oont all stores States a !tore' store of sales storos drug store 
sales • 
--- -i - ----- - ----- - -----
····----- ---------- ---.I If>!! $7, 281, 00') $46, 082 ' i7 3. 0 $•1, 918 10.7 198 $5, 158. 000 $26,051 11 .4 
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183 12,654, 000 ~9,H8 26 3. 8 7, ol9 1ry, 9 2·1R 8, 220, ()()() 3-1, 8;!7 7. 7 
173 10, 466, 000 . . f>O, 497 35 2. g 5, 035 8. 3 23ti 10, 5.'>1, 000 44,7'l0 111. 0 
79 5, 662,000 il, 671 21 a. 7 7, 291 10.2 230 6, 770, 000 20, 435 14. 0 
1411 9, 357,000 62,700 33 3. 3 6, 242 9. 9 118 4, &97, ()()() 39,805 8. 7 
822 13, 2ll7, 000 (1, 264 49 3.0 4, Oti5 9. 9 146 5,U9,000 37, 116 10.-1 
31 1, 534,000 49, 48i 45 3. 2 5,800 11.7 10-1 3. 4W, 000 3-1,644 22.0 
106 6,453, 000 60,877 34 3. 7 6, 170 10.1 124 ~. 976, 000 48, lUi 10. 4 
-· ·· - · -- ·! 97 6, 807,000 70, 175 24 4. 6 9, 247 13. 2 438 2l, &l9,000 411,1161 111.5 
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58 4, 977, 000 85. 810 13 6 . ~ 12,672 14. 8 17(1 5, 8.'iP, 000 ~4. 41;5 . 9.6 
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Sour ce: "Drug Topics" , Feb. 26, 1951 -I= 
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B. "THIS IS THE RETAIL DRUG STORE" (Continued) 
I 
I Drug stores without fountains 
------
Proprietaey" st;;>m~ 
~------~~----~---r------.------.------
Payr ·n P &yroll Num'""-r I I I = Statos I Number ' 
I Stg~es 
---------- --- 1 1---·---·---
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13, 276 11. 2 228 10, 210,0011 "-11118 16. 3 
10, 526 11. 7 107 3, 461,000 32, 202 i.;; 
~ 1.3,000 11.11 J.JI_ 8.0111!_, 000 f7, '110 2!-! 
~ 6,41111 JO. O . 110 4,820.000 43,864 ~- ~ 
6, 661 r... ., lll 977. 000 42, 4711 11. 3 
3-~ -------m:8 :-~ 336, '1'811, 0011 37, 8611 11.1 
Bales 
, I Number 
· !tank in paid 
Sales per I United workers 
store States a store 
$134,fm 3 7. 
611,422 26 .. 
77, 8JO J7 3. 
50, lOti 4a 3. 
58,848 38 3. 
!44, 742 2 8. 
80, 632 16 3. 
1!8, (161 .5 7. 
811,7113 10 .. 
93, 870 » 8. 
66, 234 :. . 3. 
70, 778 :&1 i . 
t Includes both full-time and p11rt-tlme paid workers. 
• Each figure in this column represents the rntlo of total p roprietary store salee to total drug-store sales iD tbe partleular Btata. 
Source: "Drug Topics", Feb. 26, 1951 
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B. "THIS IS THE RETAIL DRUG STORE" (Continued) 
. 
• llt.1tes 
Sales 
[From Drug Topics, Feb. 26, 19S1] 
All drug stores Drug stores with fountains 
Payroll Sales 
Number 
of drug 
stores 
Percent 
State 
sal"s to 
total 
Num-
ber of 
all 
work-
ers 1 
Num-
ber of 
paid 
work-
ers' 
Payroll! Num-
as per-~ ber of 
cent of stores 
sales 
Sales 
per 
sto~e 
Rank 
in 
Unitffi 
Staws 
Num-
ber of 
paid 
work-
Payro,PayroU per uper-
store cent of 
8llies I 
- 1---1 ers a · I 1~1--1----1--1--1 1--1--1 store• 1--
AlabamlL ...... . . . .... •.•. ... ...... . . . 
Arizona . ..... .... .. . . . . .. •. . - .. . .. .... . 
Arkansas . . ........ . . ........... . .. ... . 
Californla . . .. . .. . . .. .. .. . ...... . . . .... . 
Colorado ---- ····· ··· · · -- ··· · · · · ··· ··· · Connecticut. . . .•... . . .. ••••••.• •• .• . .. 
Delaware . . .. . .. .. . . .. . .... . . .. •.•.•... 
Dl•trlct of Columbia . . . .. •.. . .. . .. .. . . . 
Florida ........ .••. ..... . . . ... •....... . 
Georgia . ........ . . . .... .• .•. . ••..... ... 
Idaho . . . .. . . . .. . . . . ... .. ... . .. ... .. . . . 
Illinois . ........... . . . ...... .... . . . . . .. . 
Indiana ..... . •• .... . . ..... •..... .. ..... 
Iowa ... .. .... . .... . .... . .............. . 
Kansas ... . . . . . ........ .. . . . . . . . . ..... . 
Kentucky . _ 
Louisiana . . ... .. .. .•..•. .. . •.. .. .• . . ... 
Maine .. . .. . . .. . . . . . . ..... . . . . .... . ... . 
Maryland. _ . . . . ... .. . . . •. ••.•.• . .... . . 
Massachusetts . . .. .. .. .. . . . . . . .. .. . ... . 
Michigan . . . .. . .. ... . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . 
Minnesota. __ _ . .. .•... .. . •.. •. .. . . . .. . . 
='!r.~~: . :: .. :::::::::::::::::::::: 
Montana ... .. ... . .. . . ... •• •. . •• .. .... . 
Nobrnska . . . . . . . ... . .. . . . . ... . . ... . . . . . 
Nevada .. . . . .• . . . . 
New H ampshire . . . .. . . . . . .. .. .. . . . . .. • 
New Jersey . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . ...... . . .. . 
New Mrxlco . .. . . . . . . .. ... . . .. .. . . ... . . 
New York .. . .. . . . ... . . . . ....• . . . . ... . . 
North Cnro!irm . . . . . • •• •• . •• •. . . . . .. . . . 
North Dakota _ .. ..• .. 
Ohio ..... . ... . .. .. ... .... ...... .. ..... . 
Oklahoma .. . . ... .. . . ..... . • . . . .. . . •. .. 
Oregon • ... ... ...... . . . .. . .. . . ... .•. . .. 
!!ee footnotes ·at end ot table. 
669 
228 
S32 
3, 049 
523 
793 
95 
200 
766 
915 
181 
2,927 
1, 215 
856 
702 
676 
745 
269 
631 
I, 640 
I, 973 
915 
505 
l ,liBG 
199 
6114 
74 
1 6,~ 
1, [J88 
178 
5, 897 
MI3 
!Git 
2,~-
468 
Source: 
$45, 395, (Y)() 
25, 00~. 000 
29 IUS 00J 
350: ,'ifo8: ()()() 
. 48, 5.19, ()()() 
57, 009, ()()() 
7, MO,OOO 
51 , 359, ()()() 
83, 127, ()()() 
65.545, ()(){) 
14, 122. ()()() 
240, 655, ()()() 
100, 132, ()()() 
65,486, ()()() 
48, Wi, ()()() 
sa. 817, ooo 
63. 759, ()()() 
15, 1111!1, ()()() 
67, St8, 000 
117, II();;, ()()() 
2H,HlS, OOO 
74, 848, 001~ 
27, 098. ()()() : 
126, 2S8, 000 
13, 759. ()(){) 
35, 839,000 
9, 666, ()()() 
10, 5f,(), 000 
IO!l,6bfi,IXJO 
lft, 19ti, 000 
362, 199. ()()() 
61.000,000 
12,171\000 
199, 0SO, 000 
55,787. 000 
36,917,000 
Uj •,785 
, 7 1 2, (}48 
. 8 3, 173 
9. 6 2·i,l08 
l. 3 4, 089 
I. 5 4, 455 
'2 760 
1.4 4, 263 
2. 3 7, 659 
1.8 6,680 
. 4 1, 012 
6. 5 20, 859 
2. 9 9, 728 
l. 5 5, 427 
1. 3 5, 191 
I , 5 5, 059 
1. s 5, 710 
.4 I, Mil 
1. 6 6, 3b7 
3, 2 10, 231 
5. 8 14, 736 
2. 0 ti, ti26 
. 8 2,!132 
3. 4 ll , 807 
. 4 1,052 
l. () 3, 501 
.3 6:!1 
.3 007 
a. u 7, 939 
. 4 1, 500 
9. 8 28,039 
1.7 5,b.'i6 
. 3 911 
5. 4 18, 006 
1. 6 5, 930 
1.0 2, 608 I 
a. ~ 
1, t6<.) 
2, ~<!. 1 i 
20,081 
3,360 
3, 527 
650 
3 946 
6:693 
5,301 
739 
17, 170 
8, 211 
4, 046 
4, 011 
4,108 
4, 708 
J, 214 
4, 51 9 ' 
8,M21 
11,972 
Hili 
2: 079 
9, 685 
781 
2, b3t) 
564 
773 
6,017 
I, 215 
2(, 855 
4:894 
670 
15,146 
·1, 542 
1, !lli2 
$5, 673, ()()() 
3, 292. OlXl 
3,2I3, um 
45, 1il6, ()()I) 
-~- 503, ()(X) 
6, 238. ouo 
9tH, 000 
7, 827, ()()() 
12,574, ()(){) 
7, 933, ()()() 
1, 382,000 
31 , 251,000 
12, 105, 000 
5, 746,000 
5, 416, ()()() 
6, 210.000 
6, 567,000 
l,Ml7,000 
tl, 070, ()()() 
14,475,000 
19, 757, ()()() 
~- 476,000 
3, 00..~. 000 
14,962,000 
1, -!06, 000 
3, 739,000 
1, 137,000 
I, 275.000 
Jr. &11, 000 
1, 92'!, 000 
43,3SS,OOO 
8, 4110,000 
1,1113,000 ,. 
2:l. 72:! ,000 
G, 505, OUO 
3, 978, ()()() 
12.3 
13. 2 
11. () 
13. 0 
II. 3 
10.9 
12. 8 
15.2 
15. 1 
12. I 
9.8 
13. 0 
11.4 
10.4 
11. 2 
IJ . .I 
12. 2 
11.4 
11.6 
12.3 
9. 2 
11 . 3 
j ~ . ! 
11.9 
10. 2 
10.4 
11 . 8 
12. 1 
10.7 
11.9 
12.0 
13.9 
9. 1 
11.9 
II. 7 
11.1 
511 
196 
392 
1, 541 
470 
720 
72 
256 
500 
805 
116 
2,172 
1, 032 
683 
683 
527 
424 
23b 
525 
1, 543 
1, 540 
666 
34b 
1, 191 
104 
450 
44 
163 
761 
155 
2, 2-4i 
765 
1 r.~ 
I, 736 
7it 
247 
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$38, 114. 000 
21,100,UIJO 
22, Y28. 000 
21 5, 278, 000 
44, 444,000 
52,342, 000 
G, 239, 000 
4-1, 477, ()()() 
72, 112, ()()() 
57,500, ()()() 
7, &19, 000 
192, 397, ()()() 
93,478, ()()() 
45, m,ooo 
42,794, ()()() 
44,460, 000 
40,472, 000 
14,3&1,()()() 
51 , 065, ()()() 
111.096,000 
170. 2.54,000 
57,00,000 
19, 7!15,000 
103, 7S7,000 
6.429,000 
29,1.12, 000 
5, 6:!7,000 
9, h75,()()() 
55, 40Q, 000 
H,297, 000 
181,fm,OOO 
50,023,000 
8, 322.000 
156, 5.11, 000 
49,487, ()()() 
16,831, ()()() 
$74,687 
lll7. 959 
5R, 400 
139, 700 
94,562 
72, 697 
86,653 
173,738 
120, gga 
71,548 
65940 
88:581 
00,579 
65,915 
62, 656 
84,364 
95,453 
60, 363 
U7,267 
72,000 
1011,912 
~5. 716 
56, 8S3 
!!7, liS 
61 , 817 
64, 7b2 
128, 114 
&1,542 
72, ~ll 
92, 23U 
n,408 
74, 203 
;~,3H5 
00, 168 
64,186 
68, 142 
25 
6 
u 
2 
II 
m 
17 
I 
4 
34 
u 
~ g 
v 
~ 
w 
w 
~ 
9 
~ 
6 
~ 
~ 
16 
46 
~ 
3 
40 
30 
u 
23 
27 
~ 
14 
" ~ 
6. 6 $9, 3116 
8. 1 14,592 
5. 0 6, 554 
9. 1 19,653 
6. 7 10,751 
4. 5 7, 776 
8. 0 11,514 
14.1 27,285 
10.1 18, ftl6 
6. () 8,83& 
4.0 6, '1111 
6. 7 11, 887 
7. 3 10,396 
5. 2 7, 188 
6. 4 7, 0118 
6. 9 10,019 
8. 8 12,401 
4. M -6,1!'78 
7. 9 II, 4611 
5.4 11,800 
6. 6 10,287 
6. g 10,167 
4.6 6,:!611 
6. 9 10, 2(13 4.o 6,un 
5.0 6, 973 
~- 6 i6, loll 
4. 8 7,m 
4. 7 8, :l92 
7. 2 1.,;()(1 
6.3 10,3111 
6.0 lO,liM 
4, ~ 6, 417 
7. 31 t<l.873 6. 6 7,585 
4. 5 8,316 
12.6 
13.5 
lUI 
14. 1 
11.4 
10. 7 
13. 3 
15.7 
16.4 
12.3 
10. 2 
13.4 
11.6 
10.8 
11.3 
11. 9 
13. 0 
11. 4 
11. 8 
12.2 
11.3 
ll.ll 
11.0 
11.7 
11.11 
10.8 
12.6 
12.1 
11. 4 
12.4 
I!. I 
13.8 
8.11 
1.2. I 
11.8 
12.2 
~ 
0\ 
B. "THIS IS THE RETAIL DRUG STORE 11 (Continued) 
[From Droc Topics, Feb. 26,-11151) 
·---
All drug !tore.~ Drug storee witb fountalna 
Num- Num- Num-States Number Percent ber of berof Pay roll Num- Salea Rank berof Payroll 
of drug Sales ~tate all paid Payron as per- ber of Saks per in paid sales to cent of United work· per stores total work· work· sales stores store States r.rs a store 
ers' ers • store • 
---
--5_-;-j $6, ?trl Pennsylvania ......... •.... . .......... • 3,444 $'.!01, 371. 000 I 5. 5 20, 83.1 15,946 $21. 525, 000 10. 7 2, 500 $1 57, 314,000 62,700 43 
Rhode Island ................ .. . ....... 282 22, 132,000 .6 1, 870 1, 492 2,371,000 10. 7 263 19,574, 000 74, ~26 26 5.1 8.103 
South Carolina .... .... .. ... .. . ... . ..... .'i(\5 s.~. 210,000 .9 3,355 2,7ft6 .. 256, 000 12.8 4&• 30,086, 000 G5, rot 38 · 5.6 8,385 
lll~ll~!l!• :;[;.:[::!!•• 216 14, 21-t, GOO . 4 1, 276 933 1, 273,000 ll. O 169 10, 5M,OOO 62,462 44 4. 5 5, 704 828 57, 7<Xl, 000 1.6 6, 895 4, 708 6, 790,000 11. 8 700 61,296,000 73,279 29 6.1 8, 6111 2. 447 192. 022, 000 5. 2 19,588 15,811 :14,450, 000 12.7 I, 9:!6 1~2. -104,000 84,322 20 7.3 10, 003 185 17. 185,000 . 5 1, 613 1, 349 2, 256,000 13.1 1M 12, 5(!8, 000 82,455 21 7.1 10,1174 104 6.300,000 .2 5411 420 617,000 9. 7 86 4, 851l, 000 57, 163 48 4.1 5, 847 6U 00, 827, 000 1.8 6,069 5, 364 9, 323,000 H . O 500 60. 775,000 103,008 7 R.4 1~o54 740 i 6.1, 229,000 1.7 4, i07 3, 735 7, 930, 000 12. 5 416 31, 131l. 000 R2, 058 22 5. 5 ! f<, 965 350 27, 121, 000 . 7 2, fi\5 2. 2(1.~ 3, 575,000 13.2 304 22,82\i, 000 75,086 24 6.4 9, 793 1, 081 77, 770,000 2.1 6, 994 5. 529 8, 37ft, 000 10.8 880 e4, tl58, 000 73, 475 28 5. 5 8, 035 
88 8, 6-!4,000 . 2 767 fi37 11&.1,000 11.2 79 8, 007,000 1()1,364 8 7.2 11,508 
--- - --------
Totalll ... . ..................... . . 46,1155 3, 678, 403, 000 100.0 321,250 259, 234 438,1539,000 11.11 33,429 2, 797, 225. 000 83,677 ~- - - - --- 6. -4 10,282 
a Each ftgure in thb column represents ihe ratio of total proprietary store sales to total drug-store IO&les In the particular Stste. 
Source: "Drug Topics" , Feb. 26, 1951 
l 
Payroll 
as per-
cent of 
:<ales ' 
---
10. 8 
10.9 
12. 8 
9.1 
11. 8 
13.0 
13.3 
10. 2 
14. 2 
13.2 
13. 0 
10. 9 
11.4 
---
12.3 
...f::" 
--...:] 
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B. "THIS IS THE RETAIL DRUG STORE" 
To properly evaluate fair trade in the drug store 
it is expedient to examine in summary the retail drug opera-
tion. 
"Represent'ing original 1948 Census dat a 
plus "Drug Topics" compilations based on that data, 
the tables above enable every druggist to (1) com-
pare his store as to sales, employees, payroll -
with the average drug store in -his state. 
"The figures on proprietary stores 
(packaged medicine stores) is of interest because 
they reveal the actual extent to which these out-
lets are cutting into drug store sales." 
1. Consumers Served 
Based on a total ·population (1948 Census) of 
146,113,000 the average drug store served 3,112 people. 
2. Per Capita Sales 
The average drug store's sales per capita amounted 
to $25.18. 
3. Sales Volume 
Average drug store · sales totaled $78,340. Aver-
age drug store in the District of Columbia did $171,769 -
higher than the average in any state. Next highest average -
Nevada, $130,622. Third highest - California, $114,978. 
4. Stores with Fountains 
71.2% had fountains. These stores accounted for 
76% of total drug stores. Volume sales of the average drug 
store with fountains totaled $83,677. 
5. Employees 
49 
Total number of people working in drug stores was 
321.,250. 
195.,192 - full-time workers 
64,042 - part-time workers 
43,227 - active proprietors 
18,789 - unpaid family workers 
6. Sales Per Employee 
Average sales per paid full-time employee, $18,845. 
7. Payroll 
The payroll of the nation's drug stores totaled 
$~38,639,000. or 11.9% of sales. 
8. Proprietary Stores 
(Medicine Stores - no prescriptions) 
Total number: 8,841. 
Volume: $334,768,000. 
Average Sales: $37,865~ 
Payroll: 8.9% of sales~ 
Average full-time employee represented $19,931. of 
sales volume. 
C. DRUG STORE SALES TRENDS - 1956 
1. Sal es Forecast 1956 
"American Druggist" estimates that drug store sales 
in 1955 totaled $4,810,000,000, a 6.3% increase over the 
1954 record of $4,523,000,000. In 1955 independent drug 
stores showed a better gain in sales compared with 1954 than 
was shown by chain stores. Independent sales t otaled 
50 
$3,862,000,000 - 7.2% above the 1954 volume of $3,604,000,000. 
Chain sales totaled $948,000,000, 3.3% above the 1954 volume 
of $918,ooo,ooo. 
"American Druggist ·" forecasts that drug st-ore sales 
will be up 2% in 1956. 
Drug Store prices · will be-------UP 
Overhead will be----------------UP 
Profit Ratios will be-----------DOWN 
Drug Store Sales Forecast - 1956 
merican Druggist e s timate s- tllat drug store safes 
or 1955 come to o record $4,810,000,000- o 6 .3"/o 
increase over the 1954 record toto/ ol $4,523,000,000. 
Source: "American Druggist" - January 2, 1956 
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D. THE OBJECTIVES OF . FAIR TRADE AND THE RETAILER 
1. Prevent Unrestrained Price Cutting 
If the evils that result from price cutting at the 
retail level can be prevented, the basis of control over 
resale prices is justified. Without fair trade there is an 
inevitable tendency for prices of trade-marked, branded mer-
chandise to fall to undersirable low levels. This condition 
results in serious injury to manufacturers, retailers, and 
consumers. "Predatory" - unrestrained price cutting - is not 
a legitimate expression of true competition, but in reality 
an unfair practice. 
The following statement by a representative of the 
National Association of Retail Druggists at the time of 
debate on the Miller-Tydings ·Bill described the evil which 
fair trade is designed toaiminate: 
"Serious minded · students of the social 
and economic problems in the field of distribution 
have been greatly disturbed by the destructive trade 
practices which have demoralized and undermined the 
retail system. These practices have been particularly 
hurtful to the small businessman who has clung to the 
traditional American Principle that he had a right 
to engage in business on his own account, if he de-
sired to do so. 
'Those unfair trade practices have, on 
the other hand been particularly helpful to those 
large distributors who have been willing to lend 
themselves to thiS type of commercial piracy and 
deception. Thus the large concerns become larger, 
and smaller concerns have e.ither given up or else 
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reduced to competitive impotence."* 
Predatory price cutting is not based upon bona 
fide economies of operation and rarely can be justified in 
terms of profit-making possibilities. The REAL motive be-
hind price cutting is to impress the public that the retailer 
is a low priced store. R'rice cutting obtains the advertising 
appeal and aims at luring customers into the store. The re-
tailer knows that. a Jarge percentage of the customers who enter 
the store to purchase the "loss-leader" will make other pur-
chases upon which the retailer may realize large profits. 
I ' 
This point is well expressed in a NARD booklet: 
"Under the system of free pricing, mer-
chants cut a few advertised items, sometimes below 
cost, in order to get customers into ' the store; and 
then make up the loss by raising prices on other 
merchandise."** 
The following is an excellent example as illustrated 
in a booklet entitled "Fair Trade Or Phony Bargains". 
"How Bargain Baiters Operate 
"Some years ago there was on the market 
a cheap but very serviceable timepiece known as 
the Ingersoll Dollar Watch. It was so good ·a 
watch for a dollar that .it came ~o be in great 
demand. Everybody knew what . the price was - it was 
a part of the name of the watch. 
"Then some sharp retailers here and there 
got what they thought was a bright idea. They began 
*19, p. 4. 
**6, p. 5. 
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advertising and selling the watch for less than a 
dollar, pushing the price down and down until it 
reached 57¢ - which ' was considerably less than the 
watch cost at wholesale. 
"Now, how could it be that selling cheap 
watches below actual cost was a bright idea? 
"Well, from the standpoint of the retailers 
in question it was. It brought a lot of people into 
their stores. While there, those people bought many 
other things, the prices of which they did not know -
unbranded of uncertain quality on which these dealers 
had a high mark-up. 
"Selling watches at 57¢ made the customer 
unwary. It made him think that this was a low-price 
store, and that everything else in the place was an 
unusual bargain. The bait worked. It caught a lot 
of fish - poor fish. 
"To show how it worked, let us cite the 
instance of a New York department store which 
always advertises that it never allows itself to 
be undersold. In a congressional investigation it 
was disclosed that this store which always insisted 
on the right to use nationally advertised brands as 
customer bait, marked up its unbranded merchandise 
as follows: 
"Article COST RETAIL PRICE % MARK UP 
Pie plate 
.$ .103 $ .29 18 
Glass lamp dome .458 1.74 280 
Glass lamp chimney .0641 .23 258 
Sa+ad set 1.64 4.75 189 
Marcel iron .1251 1.39 1012 
Sauce pot .40 1.29 210 
Dinner set 35.30 134.00 279 
Dinner plate . 327 .98 199 
Aluminum teaspoon . 0059 .04 580 
Sewing basket 2.01 7.54 274 
Scrub cloth .0666 • 26 290 
castile soap .92 2.34 250 
Steamer rug 6.32 14.89 136 
Bridge set 2.92 6.94 138 
Barometer 1.40 7.94 467 
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"Now, of course it is poor business for 
the customer to buy a dollar watch for 57¢ if at the 
same time he is induced to purchase a 12-1/2¢ marcel 
iron for $1.39; a sewing basket for $7.54. 
"It is poor business for the consumer we 
say - but it has been good business for SOME retailers. 
It has enabled them to earn huge profits, to multiply 
their capital a thousand fold, to build enormous in-
ventories and PUT THEIR COMPETITORS OUT OF BUSINESS. 
Some merchants have used phony bargains to build 
monopoly. n* 
2. Prevent Pr ic e Manipulation and Loss Leader Selling 
The retailer does not sell a dollar bill for fifty 
cents because he is in love with the consumer. The retailer 
takes a planned loss of f ifty cents to attract store traffic 
and ensnare the customer. His loss is made up many times 
through the sale of over-priced unknown quality merchandise. 
The price manipulator baits the consumer by employ-
ing a well-known, consumer-preferred, fair-priced product of 
quality, utility, and integrity and uses it as the "loss 
leader''. 
Through price manipulation the retailer hopes to 
achieve the following: 
(a) Increase store traffic with the hope that 
customers entering into the store will avail themselves of a 
bargain and at the same time purchase unrelated items yielding 
a good margin of profit. 
(b) Avoid the selling of well-known brand name 
*7, pp. 2-4. 
products although advertised by him at reduced prices by 
switching customers to unknown substitutes or private brands 
upon which the retailer will realize a high profit. 
(c) To persuade the buying public to believe that 
all products carried by him are similarly low priced. 
The price manipulator loses a little on a handful 
of "leaders" while making up this planned loss on less-
known over-priced merchandise. In effect, the "loss-leader" 
is a "mis-leader". 
3. Prevent "Price Juggling" 
"Nobody likes to be treated as a "sucker". 
And nobody likes businessman who juggles his figures, 
his books or his prices. In loss-leader selling, 
the familiar prices of a few well known brands go 
down to bankruptcy levels to fool the customers -
and a host of unfamiliar prices go up. ~his is the 
juggling act, the essence of the unfair competition 
that Fair Trade prevents."* 
The following statement by Maurice Mermey, Director, 
Bureau of Education on Fair Trade, is comprehensive as to 
price juggling. (The Bureau is established under the auspices 
of The National Association of Retail Druggists.) 
"--------These bargains, so called, were 
nothing less than loss-leaders designed to lure 
customers into a store. The retailer who uses 
loss-leader tactics builds his bait around national 
brand products whose value is as familiar to the 
consumer as the worth of a dollar bill. In fact, 
he selects precisely those National brands which 
have been most successful in achieving wide 
*20, p. 1786. 
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consumer popularity. The retailer advertises these 
selected and well known products at a cut price. 
Dazzled by the bargain, the customers flock in. 
"In many, many, cases the loss l eader is 
nothing more than a decoy. It is very frequently 
not meant to be sold at all. Many merchants will 
go to great lengths to deprive customers of the 
very 'advertised bargain' that brought them into 
the store. They will hide it. They will 'run out 
of it' in the morning. They will switch the cus-
tomer to something 'just as good'. 
"Now, then, has the retailer really cut 
prices? The answer is 'no'. What he has done is 
to juggle prices. He knows human nature well 
enough to know that the instinct to shop particu-
larly in a store which has given the impression of 
offering merchandise at low prices is very great. 
He knows from experience that most customers, once 
lured into the store will not be able to resist the 
urge to buy other things on which the retailer 
realizes a substantial profit. 
"--------to compensate for a few price 
cuts he charges more for other things. He can't 
do otherwise, because he has fixed costs, and 
operating costs, and he buys his goods at about the 
same price as his competitors. An examination 
of his books will readily show that the store mar-
gin on all things he sells - that is the differ-
ence between what he pays for all his merchandise 
and what he sells it for - is as high or higher 
than the margin of his competitors. 
"Why don't small retailers resort to 
price juggling, too, when their bigger competitors 
start price wars? Some do. But most do not have 
the dollar power to take the risks in a price war. 
Nor do they have the widely varied assortment of 
products, which a department store, for example · 
has. A druggist cannot take higher mark-ups on 
dresses or yard goods when he is forced to sell 
national brands of drug products below cost in a 
price war. --------in fact most small retailers 
with limited storage and display space, tend to 
concentrate on their particular lines. Thus, price 
juggling is very difficult and often impossible 
for them. Furthermore, they rely heavily on the 
sale of national brands, for they do not have 
the resources or institutional reputation which 
permit giant retailers to develop private 
brands."* 
4. Non-Price-Manipulating Stores 
Straightforward retailers who normally account for 
about 90 per cent of a product's distribution do not attempt 
to deceive the customer through price manipulation. These 
retailers find that trice comparisons on the "bait product" 
favor their competitors. 
The above retailers may stop featuring the bait-
product or in some cases may even discontinue stocking it. 
Some retailers instead of co-operating with the 
manufacturer to push the sale of his goods reach the point of 
urging a customer to accept another brand. 
The retailer's resentment is intensified because 
some of his customers are attracted to a price manipulating 
store by bait of a well-known product at a deceptive price, 
and in the process may transfer all of their patronage to the 
price manipulating store, on the assumption that the price 
manipulator sells all products at bargain prices. 
E. EFFECTS OF PRICE CUTTING ON THE INDEPENDENT RETAILER 
The strongest support for Fair Trade has come from 
#36, pp. 782-783. 
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organized groups of retailers such as the NARD. Their case 
rests on the premise that without fair trade unrestrained 
price cutting threatens their very existence. Their dilemma 
is well illustrated by the following example: Suppose a cut-
price store reduces the price of a well-known and nationally 
distributed brand of aspirin. The heavily advertised "bait" 
attracts many customers away from its competitors. It soon 
obtains the bulk of the trade in this brand of aspirin and 
by implication establishes a reputation for cheap selling on 
all items. Competing druggists are compelled to either lower 
their prices or to discontinue selling the item. If they 
choose to lower the price the price cutter slashes his price 
further until the product is handled at a loss by all retail-
ers. If the retailer discontinues the cut price item, the 
price cutter simply shifts to other products they do not 
handle. 
Expanding this type of operation to the complete 
list of products carried by a drug store one recognizes the 
real danger of price cutting. While one store is cutting on 
toothpaste, another is cutting on vitamins, another is cutting 
on shampoos. The total result is what happened in the aspirin 
case above. Each store casts its bait to convince the public 
of its low prices. Their efforts cancel each other out. 
Eventually all will suffer loss. Some retailers will be 
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forced out. 
Fair trade prevents the disastrous, ruinous and 
totally destructive competition at the retail level. Fair 
trade allows the same retailer who does not have the economic 
staying power to remain in business. Fair trade prevents the 
retailer from engaging in uneconomic practices. 
In summary, the following are quotations of an 
article by E. G. Shinner which appeared in the "New Leader" of 
June 6, 1955: 
"--------which is of greatest value (or 
stated inversely, least destructive) to our national 
economy - wide open unrestricted competition fol-
lowing the old jungle law of the 'survival of the 
fittest' or a program of cooperation between the 
manufacturer and retailer, intended to maintain a 
fair and equitable price at the retail level on 
articles which are and must remain always competitive 
in the market place? 
"--------they (big department stores like 
Macy's, N. Y.) can pound the life out of the inde-
pendent retailer or they can sell fair-traded 
articles at a loss and make up the difference else-
where, which because of the difference in volume, 
the average independent can't do. Result? When 
giant mercantile establishments ·sell fair-trade ,d 
items at a figure below even the markup needed to pay 
their operating expenses (much less make money) the 
inevitable result is that they put their sm~ller 
competitors behind the eight-ball. 
"--------Hence, the reputation of the 
merchants who pursue these predatory tactics re-
mains unchanged and unscathed, and their stature 
as merchants is greatly enhanced, as they pursue 
their uninterrupted and merry way, wearing a halo 
born of subterfuge and sharp practices, while they 
pose as the friend of the common man. 
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"--------Fair Trade laws are the only means 
so far devised to give a measure of protection to 
the retail industry, and to the manufacturer as well, 
against another form of misuse of economic power."* 
F. THE CASE AGAINST FAIR TRADE AND THE RETAILER 
1. False Concept of Price Cutting 
Opponents of fair trade generally agree that 
"predatory" price cutting is an evil, but they maintain that 
advocates of fair trade mislead ±n assuming that ALL price 
reducing tactics are alike and all equally bad. Critics of 
fair trade assert that price cutting in the broad sense is a 
normal function of any competitive market and is the only way 
a seller has of adjusting his inventories to the demand of 
the market. They contend that a competitive market cannot 
function without continual price adjustment, of which price 
cutting is one manifestation. Fair traders condemn all forms 
of price cutting. Critics maintain that not only is some 
price cutting good, but at times completely necessary. The 
retailer may be able to offer lower prices by improved mer-
chandising methods, curtailed services, and other legitimate 
cost-reducing devices. This type of price reduction is more 
common than the "loss-leader" type. Fair traders make no 
distinction between the predatory type of price cutting and 
* 21 , pp • s 3 -s 5 • 
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loss-leader selling with other price reducing practices. By 
price maintenance fair-traders would prohibit all price com-
petition. 
2. Fair Trade Injures Competitive Status of Independent 
Retail Druggist 
(a) Fair trade in many instances has substantially 
hurt the independent retail druggist to the advantage of his 
larger retail competitors. Dr. Corwin Edwards, economic con-
sultant to the Department of Justice described the benefits 
derived by the chain drug stores from fair trade in a memoran-
dum for the Assistant Attorney General, Re: Grounds for the 
repeal of the Miller-Tydings Amendment: 
"Resale price maintenance has served the 
chains in two ways: First it has relieved them from 
the competition of the 'pineboard' independent and 
thus protected them from the newest and most effec-
tive channel through which fast moving packaged drugs 
can reach the consumer at low prices. Second it has 
enabled the chains to organize a low price raid against 
any independent drug store without fear of retalia-
tion. This second effect is due to the recognition 
which chains have established for their own private 
brands. With national brands of drug products price-
controlled the chains can collect substantial margins 
upon such products while reducing the price of its own 
provate brands whenever it desires to use them as 
leaders to make a raid upon the national brands or 
business enjoyed by other stores. Since these other 
stores are bound not to cut prices upon the national 
brands and do not control provate brands which have 
acquired prestige through extensive advertising, 
retaliation by the victims is not possible. Thus, 
the most obvious effect of resale price maintenance 
is to deprive the independent of a price cutting 
weapon wtill available to the chain. The complacency 
with which chains have accepted the operation of the 
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state laws is no doubt partially due to this fact."* 
(b) Personal interviews with retail druggists 
indicate that they support fair trade because it offers them 
a measube of protection from supermarkets who also handle 
I drugs aj d toiletries. Druggists support fair trade because 
With price maintenance supermarkets cannot undersell the 
"front-l tore" items sold in drug stores.** 
It is indeed ironic tha~ fair trade and fair-traded 
prices ~ere in a measure responsible for the growth of drug 
distribution in leading food stores. Drugs and beauty aids 
were adf ed by supermarkets because the higher mark-ups on 
these pr oducts compensated them for the lower returns from 
food it ms. 
B. GR~WTH OF DRUG DISTRIBUTION IN LEADING FOOD STORES 
85% 
64% 
51% 
37% 
PER CENT OF STORES HANDLING 
So rce: "Progressive Grocer", February, 1952 
*36, PP.· 50-55. 
**42. 
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The preceding chart graphically shows the tremendous 
growth in the distribution of drug items by leading food 
stores J uring recent years. 
Highlights of Drug and Toiletry Survey of Stores 
Handling Drugs: 
1 . 85% of stores interviewed now handle drugs 
and toiletries compared with 37% in 1941. 
2. Drug and toiletry departments add about 
2% to total store sales, 4% to total store margin (gross 
profit) 
3. Food stores sold an estimated $340 million 
in selel ted drugs and toiletries in 1951 - promise to in-
crease sales sharply in period ahead. 
4. Leading drug and toiletry brands now 
readily available to food stores from many sources. 
5. Operators find it pays to give drug depart-
ment prj ferred high traffic location. 
6. Drug sales p~r square foot of floor space 
are dou Jle overall store average; dollar 'margin four times 
store a~erage. 
7. Fo6d stores support fair trade prices for 
drugs a1d toiletries. Average margin 30.5% on .sales. 
8. 64% of stores report drug sales up 22% 
over pr vious year - 47% plan to enlarge and improve drug 
department in 1952.* 
*22, 
SUPERMARKET IN THE DRUG FIELD 
PE~ CENT THAT HANDLE EACH OF 27 MAJOR COMMODITY 
Cli ssifications % of stores 
handling 
ToJ th paste 98 
Sai itary napkins 98 
Ra1' or blades 97 
Shampoos 96 
-Sh, ving cream 96 
~~t~~c~~dr:~~~i~:s §~ 
Laf ati ves 91 
To0th brushes 87 
~~~~, 1~~~~~ remedies ~~ 
HaJ.r tonic 84 
~~±~~ :~:~er ~ft 
Pe~sonal deodorants 83 
After shave lotions 81 
Ba' y powder 79 
Ba9y oil 79 
Talcum powder 75 
Fa~ e cream 75 
. Ho~e wave 69 
Li, iment 67 
Fa<l!e powder 63 
Nail polish 57 
Nut sing bottles 52 
For t care products 50 
J ource: "Progressive Grocer" February, 1952. 
I 11Many operators participating in this 
survey came out whole heartedly in favor of Fair 
Trade prices for drugs and toiletries. The mar-
gins on drugs are extremely generous when com-
pa~ed to tradit ional grocery margins, and leading 
me~chants are anxious to maintain them. --------
PP J 50-55. 
To some extent drugs are compensating for the ex-
tremely low margins on many regular food products 
an1 operators are not anxious to disturb Fair 
Tr de prices."* 
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There is little doubt that fair trade has been a 
boon to the supermarket in entering the retail market of his 
small independent drug store competitor. It is evident that 
high mat gins guaranteed by manufacturers under fair trade con-
tracts l re taken over by larger retail establishments who 
find hi~h profits on fast turn over items more than compen-
sating }or reduced margins on other products. 
It is paradoxical that fair trade caused the inde-
pendent druggist to fall victim to large and powerful opera-
tors against whom in the ~irst instance the fair trade 
I legisla ion was directed. 
High resale margins have encouraged dealers out-
side th drug trade to add fair-traded items to their regular 
lines. trade is partly responsible for the recent 
rapid g owth of drug and medicine counters in department, 
groceryl dime, and variety stores. 
G. FAIR TRADE AND EFFICIENCY 
1. The Case Against Fair Trade 
Opponents of fair trade maintain that fair trade is 
a detrr nt to efficiency in distribution. They further allege 
*22, pp. 50-55 
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that it places an "economic cushion" under those retailers 
who lack the initiative or ability to cut their cost of 
operatic . The public is influenced to believe that big 
operator[ are efficient and this results in passing on the 
benefits of their efficiency to the consumer in the form of 
lower p ices. The report of the Temporary National Economic 
Committee (TNEC) said: 
"Price maintenance protects the ineffi-
cient, the unprogressive, and those who have abandoned 
the hazardous struggle for profits in a preference 
fo security, while it penalizes the ambitious and 
resourceful merchants. It thus safeguards the 
li 
1
ing of one group, but reduces the opportunities 
fo~ the more progressive, and at the same time takes 
aw1y from consumers the advantages of low prices."* 
2. / The Case For - Fair Trade Does Not Protect the 
Ine ficient 
The following studies were compiled by and published 
by the raduate School of Business Administration of Harvard 
Univers ty; and by the Eli Lilly Company. Eli Lilly and 
Company publishes in their "Annual Lilly Digest" the average 
operati g costs of drug stores. 
*37, p. 195. 
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DR . G AND DEPAR'rMENT STORE OPERP.TING RAT I OS , 1950 
I 
Net Sal t s in Owned Department• 
Gro s s Mar gin 
Expense l : 
Payr~ ll 
Real !Estate Costs 
Adve:rtising 
Taxes (except Real Est a te & 
I Federal Income Taxes) 
Intet est 
Supplies 
Service Purchased 
All ~ther Expenses 
I Tota l 
Net Opel atlng Prorit 
I Net Othi r Income 
Net Gai* Before Federal 
Inco le Taxes 
1950 1950 
Depa rtment Drtlg 
S.t;ores Stores 
Percent 100 Percent 
36.5, 32.8 
--== 
17.65 18.6 
2.6 2.7 
2.55 .6 
1.0 .6 
1.2: .1 
1.7 
1.25 
4.25 4.6 
32 •. 2. 27 .2. 
4 .• 3 5.6 
2.6 
6.9 5.6 
100 
Source :. Bulletin #134 Operating Results of Department Stores 
and Sfacialty Stores, 1 950, Harvar d Graduat e School 
of Business. 
Sour ce: "Annual Lilly Di gest" - 1950 
In 1949 a study was directed and developed by 
WilliamS. Spurlack, Director of the economic research divi-
sion of Eli Lilly and Company. The figures were provided by 
1,222 d~ug stores. - (1,051 in fair trade states); (71 in the 
non-fai t rade states). 
They show that in 1948: 
1. The operating costs of drug stores in the 
fair t r i de states were 26.17% of sales - comparable cost for 
drug st res in the non-fair t rade states was 27.57% of sales. 
This is l evidence that the costs of operation are no higher 
under f ir trade than under "free trade". 
2. Gross Margin: 
32.54% - Fair Trade Drug Stores 
32.74% -Non-Fair Trade Area 
3. Operating costs and gross margins of drug 
stores I n both free and fair trade areas were lower than 
operati
0
[ g costs and gross margins of department stores. 
Table V shows that in 1950 in department stores 
32.2¢ every sales dollar went for rent, wages, light, 
heat, e c.; whereas operating costs of the drug stores of 
America averaged 27.2¢. 
The national comparison would indicate that the 
drug stores of the U.s. are NOT INEFFICIENT opevations. 
Bigness in and by itself does not mean efficiency. 
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Various types of retailers operate at different levels of 
efficiency We cannot conclude that big retailers pass on 
I • 
savings by taking lower margins - and by efficiency it is 
meant t at costs are kept low in relation to sales. 
The inefficient retail druggist becomes a failure 
just as quickly under fair trade .as the inefficient retailer 
does wi Competition under fair trade is restricted 
only to resale prices. Retailers still compete with each 
other o the basis of service, sales promotion, salesmanship, 
display, advertising, and personality. 
The fair trade price established by a manufacturer 
reflect the average of his distributors' efficiency. The 
fair tr1de price is not high enough for retailers whose oper-
ating cdsts are above average. Such retailers would have to 
marge m1re than the minimum resale price and in a highly 
competi~ ive area would run the risk of losing sales and going 
into bankruptcy. 
Fair trade results in uniform prices but NOT uniform 
profits Retailing remains a highly competitive business and 
fair trade does not weaken the retailer's incentive to in-
crease 11fficiency.* 
3. Survey of Drug Store Failures - Federal Trade 
Commission 
In order to determine whether or not retail drug 
*36, p. 785. 
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stores , uffered greater losses and incurred a higher rate of 
::n::::rw::c:t:::·t::i;:d::a:o:r:::ec:::.::::ei:a:4~han 
asked Dun and Bradstreet to prepare the following survey: 
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FA[LURES OF R~~AIL DRUG STORES I N SELECT ED l l STATES 1939, 1940, 1946, & 1947 . 
Sta tea rltho::
3
:air Trade Laws States Wit:g::ir Trade Laws 
Num- Liabil- Rate Per 
ber ities 1,000 
Concerns 
Vt. r - ;. -
W.ash., D.C. 1 
Texas 16 
Mo. 9 
_. ___ ..,. __ 
;. . . 
~ 4,000 
132,000 
77 ,000 
3.0 
4 . 8 
4.1 
1940 
Vt. 
Wash . , 
Texas 
Mo. 
D. C . 
D. C. 
Number Liabil-
ities 
3 ~ 29,000 
19 108,000 
11 49,000 
N. ·H. 
Maine 
Md. 
Okla .• 
Ill. 
Kansas 
N. H. 
Maine 
Md . 
N;-·R . -- --
Maine 
Md . 
Num- Lia.bil- Rate Per 
ber ities 1,000 
Concerns 
2 ~~ 
4 
3 
17 
52:-
8 
1940 
8,000 
30,000 
7,000 
119,000 
217,000 
72,000 
Number 
8.9 
10.1 
4 .1 
15 .o 
14 .1 . 
7.4 
Liabil-
iti es 
Vt . 
Wash., 
Texas 
Mo. 
- - ------ Okl a . 
Jan~ary - Oc tober 1947 
vt. --------
Wash ., D. C. 
Texas 
Mo. 
1 <'i· <W 
1 
13~, 000 
2,000 
Ill . 
Kansas 
JanuaFy 
N. H. 
Maine 
M:d . 
Okla . 
- Oc t ober 1947 
---- --------
Ill. 1 ~ 50 , 000 
----+--------------...;:K:::.;a:;.:.;n:.:.s;::.a=s---- _ __ 1_ 7, 000 
Sour ce:. Dun & Bradstreet Survey For F . T. C. 
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The preceding table reveals that stores in non-fair 
trade j /risdictions have frequently fared much better than 
their f i ir trading counterparts. 
4. Survey of Drug Store Bankruptcies - Bureau of Educa-
tion on Fair Trade 
In a brief submitted to the Commerce and Business 
Subcommi ttee of the u. S. Senate Committee for the District 
of Columbia on May 25 1954, Maurice Mermey, Director of the 
Bureau / f Education o: Fair Trade said: 
[ "--------The Bureau of Education on Fair 
Tr~de has just published its own studies of bankrupt-
ci~ s and closings using figures from Dun and Brad-
str eet and figures of "Drug Topics". The number of 
di ug stores in non-fair-trade areas declined by 
11.6% in the six year period, 1948-1953, while the 
n ber of drug stores in fair-trade stat~s declined 
b~ only 2.5% in these years. Drug store bankrupt-c ~es in the non-fair-trade areas during this period 
r epresented 3.2% of total retail bankruptcies, 
wHereas in the Fair-Trade states drug store bank-
r J pt cies represented 1.2% of total ·retail bankrupt-
c :IJes. ' 
I "During the same six year period, the num-
ber of drug stores in Washington, D. c., declined 
5.15% compared with a 2.5% decline in the fair-trade a ~eas. The number of drug stores bankruptcies in W~shington, D. C. represented 3.8% as compared to the 
112% found for fair-tfade states. 
"These findings certainly refute the asser-
t on that Fair Trade promotes bankruptcy of the small 
b~siness man. Analysis of the figures for the entire 
I c ~untry over the past six years show that over all, 
t~e picture respecting the closings and bankruptcies 
of drug stores is better for states with Fair Trade 
t !an for the non-fair-trade ~tates--------" 
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I "The results of this study show once again 
thdt the Fair Trade laws serve to restrain unfair 
~~J~:~!~i~~da~~h~~s~f~~~~=n~0b~!~~e~~!e~f~i~!~~tand 
I fighting chance to compete with those possessing 
su~erior dollar resources. At the same time, the 
fa dt that there are ·failures under Fair Trade indi-
cat es that these laws in no way act as a crutch to 
thJ inefficient."* 
I H. THE RETAILER AND THE NON-SIGNER CLAUSE 
1. / The Case For Fair Trade 
As was noted in Part I, section E, the issue was 
whether to amend the Miller-Tydings Act which would validate 
the pro/ isions in state laws which authorize sellers to en-
force f lair trade prices against retailers who refuse to sign 
volunta[ y contracts. 
Unless the non-signer clause is made applicable 
there ~s no such thing as fair trade. The manufacturer is 
not ab ~e to control the merchandise as it leaves the point of 
the prJmary purchaser. "When it goes to the secondary or 
third J urchaser or retailer or distributor of that merchan-
dise, J nd the manufacturer tries to control it, he becomes 
guilty of conspiracy under the anti-trust law."** 
The non-signer clause states briefly: 
"--------Willfully and knowingly adver-
tising , offering for sale or selling any commodity 
at less than the price stipulated in any contract 
*10, L 18. 
**4, pp. 50-51. 
Laws) 
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en l ered into pursuant to the provision of section 
I qf this act, whether the person so advertising, 
ofj ering for sale, or selling is or is not a party 
to such contract, is unfair competition and is 
ac ionable at the suit of any person damaged 
thdreby." 
(Uniform clause contained in 45 State Fair-Trade 
There are always some retailers who in the absence 
of comp1!1lsion will not observe the manufacturers' fair trade 
prices. The confirmed price-cutter will naturally refuse 
to sign a fair-trade agreement which deprives him of the bait 
he needs to engage in loss-leader selling. If price cutting 
is to bl made unfair the restriction must be pointed at re-
tailers who cut prices. In frief, the issue is fair trade 
itself nd not the non-signer clause. 
The non-signer clause is necessary to protect fair-
trade contracts. If the price cutters can sell the same goods 
at low r prices, fair-trade contracts, in 
Unless j these contracts are protected only 
trade s present, but not the substance. 
effect are nullified. 
the form of fair 
Advocates of fair trade do not concern themselves 
with tne "coercive features" of the non-signer clause. They 
contend that a retailer is not forced to carry products that 
are fa l r-traded. The retailer can se l l only "free goods" or 
develof his own private brands. If a retailer chooses to 
deal in fair-traded items, he is bound by the fair-trade 
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contract whether he signed it or not. Otherwise, fair trade 
would b1 as meaningless as "a criminal code which didn't 
apply t@ criminals". 
The charge was made in the Congressional debate on 
the McGuire Bill that only a handful of retailers in a state 
I 
sign a fair-trade contract and that they use this contract 
to "han~cuff" all other retailers in that state through the 
er clause. 
The charge was answered effectively by U. S. Senator 
as follows: 
"--------The fact of the matter is that 
is
1 
not the way the law would work • . That is nothing 
b9t theory. It has no relevancy in practice. When 
a .1manufacturer signs with a retailer he notifys every 
~~~~~~:!~~i~~~~i~~;i!~:~~~~~~=~~:i~~~~~~;s:~;~~h:f 
a /retailer does not have complete information presented 
t ~ him by the manufacturer he cannot be held account-
a91e under a fair trade law-------- --------There 
is nothing to compel the retailer to sell the com-
1 
m0dity at all-------- There are other products to 
b ~ sold. There is no compulsion what-soever on him, 
abd he is not subject to any prosecution if he cuts 
I . 
the price unless he has been fully informed as to 
the cont~actual relationship between manufacturer and 
s ~ ller." 
2/. Objections to the Non-signer Clause 
John Schwegmann, Jr. expressed his opposition to 
fair t ade and the "non-signer clause" when he said: 
"--------I cannot believe that two retail-
ers should be able to enter into a contract binding 
al; retailers in that state, .thereby fixing the 
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pr ce that other businessmen should charge. Espe-
ci lly when there may be great variance between 
th~ type of service rendered with the article or mer-
ch4ndise on whi ch the price is fixed. ------It is 
absurd to say that a can of baby formula that I 
hat e bought and paid for and put on my shelf for sale 
to my customers should be sold at a price fixed by 
the manufacturer. That's my merchandise but under 
th4 Fair Trade Laws the original manufacturer has 
th4 right to say at what price I must sell that can 
of baby formula."* 
Opponents to the non-signer clause claim that this 
comcept completely violates the doctrine of liberty of con-
tract a d makes such contracts applicable to retailers who 
are not immediate parties to the contract. 
They maintain that it violates the traditional con-
cepts of contracts under common law namely: "consent, con-
sideration, and mutuality". 
They further contend that not only does the non-
signer provision violate the principles of free contracts 
but it is unfair and undemocratic because of the coercive 
element inherent in the clause. They believe it is unfair 
to alli w manufacturers or groups of retailers to force other 
retailers to conform to c·ontracts which the latter have not 
signed /and the terms of which they have not accepted. 
To quote "Fortune" magazine, an opponent of fair 
trade: 
"A contract that depends on coercion for 
*25, p • 59-60. 
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Opponents object to forcing all retailers into 
its effectiveness is not a good contract. It is an 
un~easonable restraint and should be entirely void 
anr· unenforceable."* 
price: c ntracts regardless of their wishes and individual 
needs. Fair trade is inherently compulsory in nature. 
They claim that the "permissive" character of fair 
so described is completely imaginary. 
A small retailer does not have a free choice in 
de term whether or not he Will handle fair trade items. 
He is /requently forced to handle fair trade merchandise. 
The retailer may not have the market nor financial resources 
to devl/lop private brands. The retailer as a practical matter 
cannot remove the identifying trade-mark from the package of 
aspirin or. a tube of toothpaste as the courts once said he 
could. 
I. SUMMARY 
1~ Advantages of Fair Trade to the Retailer 
l (a) uality. A retailer can recommend products because of their 
(b) Predatory retailers cannot steel his business 
through loss leaders - causing the retailer heavy inventory 
losses and operating losses. 
(c) Larger inventories are practical because fair 
*26, R· 76. 
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trade re uces speculation. 
2. [Disadvantages of Fair Trade to the Retailer 
(a) Resale price maintenance injures the competi-
tive stat us of independent retailers. 
(b) Permits fair-trade contracts to be applied to 
rs. 
(c) Deprives retailer of right to reduce prices in 
a compet tive market and adjust inventories to supply and 
demand. 
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III. FAIR TRADE AND THE CONSUMER 
By far t he most enthusiastic advocate of fair trade 
::::::aJ:::p1:st::er:::::n::u:::::::::o:r::a:~:a::eD::::ists. 
The NARrl is ~rongly supported by other groups in the dru~ 
trade bJ th retail and wholesale, and on national and local 
levels. 
However, there is a noticeable lack of repre~enta-
tives of the general public in support of fair trade. No 
general labor union or farm group has appeared, at least in 
recent ears, in favor of fair trade. Reading over the lists 
of witnesse~ who have testified against various fair trade 
:::::i:f::::s:
0
:::::::r:n:e::::::: :::~, 0:~;~ :; ~:~·::erican 
Associa~ion of University Women, National Housewives League, 
America[ Farm Bure~u Federation and others. 
Re t ailers organize to protect their very existence 
from the practices of predatory price cutters. Manufacturers 
band to protect their trade-mark and good will. Although the 
consumes' stakes in the fair trade wrangle are high, the 
average consumer is not familiar with the basic issues involv-
ed. Nl r is the average consumer, or controller of the purse-
strings - the housewife - organized, and only in rare 
81 
instances a member of any consumer organization. 
The Boston Herald on October 28, 1954, in an 
editorial on fair trade speaks of a "referendum in the 
marketplace in which consumers could indicate a preference 
for or gainst Fair-Traded items by their purchases". 
Realizing that the average consumer is relatively 
uninformed on fair trade practices, the NARD Convention in 
October, 1955, advised druggists to "sell Fair Trade to the 
public". 
A. DO CONSUMERS WANT FAIR TRADE? 
1. Housewives' Survey 
To answer the above question, the firm of Ernst & 
Ernst, certified public accountants, prepared a survey for 
the Ame J ican Fair Trade Council to be presented to the Com-
mittee of the Judiciary House of Representatives, 82nd 
Congres]sl, on Resale Price Maintenance. 
The pollsters conducted a telephone survey of house-
wives w ose names were selected at random and who were un-
known t l l the pollsters. 
Although the housewives resided in selected trading 
areas i J widespread geographical areas, there was · no substan-
tial dil ference in the results of the survey. 
Reports from all territories showed substantially 
that 80%, or more of all housewives preferred that the 
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manufac urer set •..••. and lawfully enforce ••••.. the prices 
of favo] ite trade-marked products. 
The following tabulation 
reporte directly to Ernst & Ernst 
summarizes the responses 
by the pollsters: 
American Issues Press, Inc., Gary, Indiana, 
Released February 7, 1952. 
"TJ is is an opinion survey by .American Issues Press. We 
would like you Mrs. ---- to answer a few short questions im-
portant right now to all women shoppers." 
Question 
"No · 1. Are you the one in your home 
who buy~ most of the household appliances, 
food, ai d supplies? - _. .· . Yes 
No 
"No . 2. When you go shopping, do you 
buy mos ly those brands of products 
easiest / to see and reach or do you look 
for cer~ain well-known brands you may 
have traed and like? 
Easiest to see and reach 
Well-known 
"No. 3. Do you buy mostly the lowest-
priced products or do you consider both 
qualityJ and price in deciding upon the 
value o a product to you? 
Lowest Price 
Quality and Price 
"No. 4. When a product is priced too 
high fo
1 
its quality and does not sell very 
well, who do you think is hurt most, the storek~epers who are free to sell out their 
stock 9f that product and stop buying it and 
keep on selling other competing brands, or 
is it ~he manufacturer and his workers who 
may depend upon sales of that one product to 
Answers 
4,870 
128 
471 
4,507 
473 
4,573 
Percent 
97.4 
2.6 
9-5 
90.5 
9.4 
90.6 
Question 
Storekeeper 
Manufaeturer 
keep gol ng? 
"No. 5. Would you rather have the storeke~per fix, at any time to suit him-
self, a l l the prices you pay for all the 
I products he sells you, or would you 
~~~~e~a~~~~t;h~r:~~~~=~~~~e~r~~u~~~hs~{ 
and lawfully enforce the prices of those 
I products? 
Storekeeper 
Manufacturer 
Yes 
No 
Answers 
951 
4,077 
941 
4,021 
100 
4,895 
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Percent 
18.9 
81.1 
19.0 
81.0 
2.0 
98.0"* 
2. "Modern Industry"'s Vote on Resale Price Maintenance 
On December 15, 1941, "Modern Industry'·' asked its 
readers to vote on an interleaved post card in the issue. 
The summary of the results were sent to congressmen and 
governJ ent officials. The December 15th issue of "Modern 
Indust t " asked its subscribers and readers: "Does resale 
price claintenance benefit the consumer and industry?" 
*36, P ' • 718-719. 
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VOTE ON MAINTENANCE OF RESALE PRICES 
JANUARY 15, 1942 
YES NO YES NO 
% % % % 
Nelf England 34.1 65.9 West 42.2 57.8 
Mid-Atlantic 30.8 69.2 Pac'ific Coast 19.1 80.9 
S otltth 37.5 62.5 
Nof.th Central 35.7 64.3 Total U. s. 33.2 66.8 
I 
So rce: "Modern Industry": January 15th, 1942 
B. FAIR TRADE AND THE NATION'S HEALTH 
Personal interviews with many independent drug-
gists who recall their retail operations in the 1930's dis-
close gl nerally the following conditions. The independent 
retail druggists in the depression era were faced with 
growinl competition from chain drug stores who offered lower 
prices due to the economies of integration and large scale 
buying "Fly-by-nights" cut prices, offered little service 
and engaged in unethical practices of "substitution" and 
"palmil g off". Many druggists admit that in order to remain 
in bus l ness in highly competitive areas they were forced to 
resort to the unethical practice of "substitution" in filling 
prescriptions. With the advent of fair trade and the elimin-
ation br loss-leader selling, the druggist was able to fur-
nish t ' e consumer with a higher type of professional 
pharmace tical service.* 
The above is confirmed by R. 0. Clutter, Assistant 
and Manager, Legal Department, Eli Lilly and Company: 
/ "Fair Trade helps protect the nation's 
*42. 
hea~th because it assures the widespread dis-, 
tripution of drugs in a large number of small 
retail independent drug stores. 
"Without the aid of Fair Trade many small 
stores would be forced out of business because of 
the/ temporary price-cutting activities of large 
syqdicates. Thus, over a period of years a greater 
pr9portion of drugs sold at retail would be sold in 
la1 ge centrally located stores, rather than in small 
ne ghborhood drug stores. 
"The centrally located super-market type 
op~ration may be all right for the sale of food, 
. but the distribution of drugs, unlike the distribu-
ti1n of food, requires that they be readily available 
in all neighborhoods when needed. If drugs are not 
re dily available at all hours of the day and night 
in /neighborhood stores, the health of the people 
will suffer. Fair Trade protects this need. 
I "Fair Trade helps protect the nation's 
health because it tends to discourage the practice 
of / •substitution'. When large outlets use price 
compe tition as a means of attracting customers, . 
t h~y , naturally pick high-quality, well-known, 
anfi universally acceptable products to offe-r at cut 
rate prices. The small druggist must therefore 
ei her meet these prices or lose his customers. In 
ei her event, his profits decline and he starts 
looking for ways to recoup them. 
"The unethical druggist can make up some of 
loss by substituting .cheaper products on orders 
prescriptions. This poses a real health preble~ 
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use substituted products are seldom the same as 
products ordered. 
"One manufacturer has found that the .sub-
stituted products are sometimes much lower in 
st 
1
ength and potency; that some substitutes do not 
co~tain the specified medicament at all, and that 
the:iJ physical properties such as coatings, and 
fi lers are almost always different. 
"Fair Trade tends to minimize the desire 
to substitute because it assures every druggist of 
a flair profit on what he sells. 
r· "--------Fair Trade helps protect the 
nation's health because it assures every druggist 
of a fair profit on what he sells. 
"--------Fair Trade helps protect the na-
ti0n1s health because it promotes the manufacture 
of ihigh-quality products. Without Fair Trade there 
would be tremendous pressure placed upon manufac-
tu~ers by retail druggists to lower their prices so 
th~t they could have a greater margin of profit."* 
c. l FAIR TRADE AND PRICE BEHAVIOR: THE BATTLE 
OF THE SURVEYS 
A basic issue in the fair trade controversy is: 
What a r the effects of fair trade on retail prices which 
the col sumer must pay? A large mass of data has been col-
lected by opponents and proponents on the question. 
1. McKesson and Robbins Surve #I 
McKesson and Robbins, Inc., the leading and 
larges drug wholesaler in the U. S. made two surveys. 
In the first study McKesson classified drug store 
*8, pp 8-10. 
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products into these four categories: (1) Proprietaries, 
(2) Toiletries, (3) Sundries, (4) Pharmaceuticals. The four 
categories were subdivided into 45 products classifications. 
Under each classification were listed all of the leading 
products from the standpoint of sales volume. The wholesale 
prices of the leading products in each classification were 
obtained and analyzed; and products were then divided in 
t~rms of whether or not they were fair traded. The percent-
ages of change shown in the tables over January 1, 1947, 
reflect a careful weighting to take account of the relative 
sales volume of all component products in the study. Adjust-
ments were also made to cover such changes as size of 
package (e.g. if the same price were charged for a smaller 
amount of product). 
co 
co 
I 
I 
FAIR TRADE AND NON-FAIR TRADE PRICE PERFORMANCE 
IN FOUR BASIC CATEGORIES OF DRUG PRODUCTS 
JAN. 1, 1947 - JULY 1, 1950 - DEC. 1, 1950 
FA I R TRADE 
% Inc. % Inc. % Inc.* 
1/1/47- 7/1/50- l/l/47-
7/1/50 12/1/50 12/1/50 
.OPR IETARIES : 
toduots of 51 !jfrs. 5. ~ 4.3~ 9. 3% 
6.0 5.5 11.6 
SUIIHIBS: 
Products of 74 Mfrs. 7.2 1.4 9.4 
HIAIDIACW1T ICALS : 
ftoducts of 53 Mfrs. 3. 4 .5 3.9 
GRAND TOTAL : 
Products of 229 Mfrs. 4.8 2.5 7.4 
N 0 N - l!' A I R- T R_ A D- E 
% Inc. % Inc. ~ Inc.o 
1/1/47- 711/50- 1/1/47-
7/1/50 12/1/50 12/1/50 
6.8% 5.3% 12.~ 
3.6 5.8 9.6 
18.3 . 6.4 26.6 
-9.1** 2.7 -6.4 
7.0 5.1 13.3 
TO'l'AL 
~ · Inc. ~ Inc. '/, Inc. 
1/1/47- 7/1/50- i/1/47 · 
7/1/50 1~/1/50 12/1/50 
5.4:( 4.~ 9.~ 
5.1 5.6 10.8 
14.6 4.8 21.0 
... 7 1.1 .7 
5.6 3.5 9.7 
li 
I• !ota1 percenta~ changes for the period, January 1, 1947 - December 1, 1950, will not always be th exact sum of the figures given for the periods, January 1, 1947 - July 1, 1950, and July 1, 1950 --~December 1. 1950. becau.se the base used for each p~riod varies to _reflect shifts in sales volume., 
- Minus Sign Indicates Decrease 
Source: McKesson and Robbins, Inc. 
Findings: 
1. The study showed that from January 1, 1947 to 
July 1, 1950 (the start of the Korean Crisis) fair trade 
wholesale prices on representative drug store products of 
229 manufacturers rose 4.8% compared with a 7% increase on 
similar non-fair traded goods. 
2. From July 1, 1950 to December 1, 1950 under the 
pressures of expanding national defense - fair trade wholesale 
prices on this same range of products increased an additional 
2.5% compared with a further increase of 5.1% on similar non-
fair traded goods, according to the survey. 
3. During the entire period January 1, 1947 to 
December 1, 1950 - this representative group of fair traded 
products showed a total price increase at the wholesale level 
of 7.4% contrasted with a 13,3% rise in similar non-fair 
traded products. In the same period, the over-all consumer's 
price index, using 1935-1939 as the base period of 100, rose · 
from 159.2 in 1947 to 175.6 on November 15, 1950, according 
to the figures of the u. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
4. The following over-all price changes are shown 
for each Qf the four categories: 
(a) Proprietaries: The prices of fair traded 
proprietary products rose from 5 per cent from January 1, 
1947 to December 1, 1950; and 9 .3 per cent for the entire 
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period. The prices of comparable non-fair traded products 
rose 6.8 per cent, 5.3 per cent, and 12.2 per cent, respective-
ly for the same periods of time. 
(b) Toiletries: The prices of fair traded 
toiletry goods rose 6 per cent from January 1, 1947 to July 1, 
1950; 5.5 per cent from July 1, 1950 to December 1, 1950; and 
11.6 per cent for the whole period. On comparable non-fair 
traded products the price increases were 3.6 per cent, 5.8 
per cent, and 9.6 per cent for the same dates. 
(c) Sundries: This classification includes 
many non-drug items sold in drug stores including many small 
electrical appliances, paper products, etc. As a category it 
shows the greatest difference, over-all between fair trade and 
non-fair trade prices. In fair traded sundries - prices rose 
7.2 per cent between January 1, 1947 and July 1, 1950; 1.4 
per cent between July 1, 1950 and 9.4 per cent for the entire 
period. Prices of non-fair traded sundries rose 18.3 per 
cent, 6.4 per cent, and 26.6 per cent for these same dates. 
On the total period, the difference is one of 17.2 per cent 
in favor of the fair traded sundries. 
(d) Pharmaceuticals: This category does not 
include the new anti-biotics which have been developed since 
January 1, 1947. These products are almost all on fair trade 
and have shown substantial price decreases since they were 
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introduced. 
The following over-all price increases were 
found on fair traded pharmaceuticals. 3.4 per cent from 
January .~l947 to July 1, 1950; 0.5 per cent from July 1, 
1950 to December 1, 1950; 3.9 per cent for the entire period. 
Among non-fair traded products in this cate-
gory, there was a 9.7 per cent decrease from January 1, 1947 
. to July 1, 1950; a 2.7 per cent increase from July 1, 1950 to 
December 1, 1950; and a 6.4 per cent decrease for the whole 
period. 
5. The greatest single increase among fair traded 
products found in the whole survey was for sanitary napkins 
in the sundries category. This product classification showed 
a 26.5% price increase for the whole period from January 1, 
1947 to · December 1, 1950. Non-fair traded sanitary napkins, 
however, showed a price increase of 36.2% . for this same 
period. 
The highest single increase among all non-fair 
traded classifications was a rise of 59.8% for cameras and 
films in the sundries category. This product classification 
showed a 43.9% price increase for the whole period from 
January 1, 1947 to July 1, 1950; and a 10.4% increase from 
July 1, 1950 to December 1, 1950. Fair traded cameras and 
film showed no price change for the entire period. 
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6. The greatest single price decrease in the whole 
survey is shown by fair traded antibiotics in the pharmaceu-
tical category, which dropped 66.4% from January~l947 to 
July 1, 1950, and remained unchanged from the latter date to 
December 1, 1950. Other price decreases found among fair 
traded pharmaceuticals were: a 16.6% price decline in 
muscle stimulants products; from January 1, 1947 to July 1, 
1950, with prices remaining unchanged during the period, July 
to December 1950; a 4.8% drop in prices of vitamins from 
January 1, 1947 to July 1, 1950, with prices remaining the 
same up to December 1, 1950. 
Among non-fair traded products, the largest single 
price decrease occurred with hormones. Hormones dropped 
32.2% between January 1, 1947 and July 1, 1950, with prices 
remaining unchanged from July to December 1950. On non-fair 
traded vanity items in the sundries classification, prices 
dropped 6% from July 1, 1950 to December 1, 1950, after 
showing no change from January 1, 1947 to July 1, 1950. There 
were other small price decreases among non-fair traded hair 
preparations; miscellaneous sundries and cold medicines were 
cancelled out by subsequent price increases in the July to 
December 1950 period. 
7. From another source it is estimated that the 
number of price increa~es during 1950 totaled approximately 
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21,000 or roughly ten per cent of the industry's 200,000 
pricings (reflecting different product sizes, packings, etc.). 
For the large majority of these price changes during 1950, 
the increases are believed to be the first in twenty years 
or more.* 
2. A. C. Neilsen Study 
This study was prepared for the Bureau of Educa-
tion on Fair Trade by A. C. Neilsen Company, a recognized, 
independent market research organization with nation-wide 
facilities for gathering marketing data. The price study 
covered a six months' period in 1951, beginning in March 
before the Supreme Court's decision in the Schwegmann case, 
and ending in August, three months after that decision. The 
study compared prices paid in drug stores for 24 nationally 
advertised products by consumers in the 45 fair trade states 
taken as a whole, with those paid by consumers in the non-
fair trade area, comprising Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and the 
District of Columbia. Prices shown in the study represent 
over-all averages, weighted to reflect volume paid by all 
consumers in each area during the period under review. 
The 24 products covered in this survey included 
very popular brands of laxatives, dentrifrices, shampoos, and 
shaving creams. These fair traded brands have always been 
*9. 
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typically used as loss-leaders by price jugglers in non-fair 
trade states since the Supreme Court handed down its decision 
on May 21, 1951. To ma{ntain the sample in the two areas 
the survey was made from a sample of 770 carefully selected 
drug stores - 700 in the fair trade states - and 70 in the 
non-fair trade area. 
The results show: 
1. Consumers in the fair trade states paid less on 
the whole than consumers paid in the non-fair trade area for 
the 24 products taken as a group. The weighted composite of 
all the prices for the entire period indicates that consumers 
in the fair trade area paid lw4¢ less than did consumers in 
the non-fair trade area. 
2. 18 of the 24 items w~re sold at lower average 
prices in the fair trade area during the six month period. 
Six sold for slightly less in the non-fair trade area. 
3. On 10 of the products sold for less in the fair 
trade area, consumers paid 1.1¢ and 4.2¢ less in the non-fair 
trade region. 
4. On the six products selling for less in the non-
fair trade a~ea, the maximum difference in favor of the con-
sumer in that area was 0.7¢, and that was only on one product. 
5. On comparing prices at the beginning of the 
period with those at the end of the period, the survey found: 
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(a) In the fair trade area 10 products went 
up, 10 products went down, and prices of 4 remained the same. 
(b) In the non-fair trade area, prices of 12 
products went up, 7 went down and 5 remained the same. 
(c) The maximum price increase in the fair 
trade area was 0.2¢, shown on one product; 9 other items 
reflected price increases of 0.1¢ each. In the non-fair trade 
area the maximum price increase was 1.5¢, shown on one product; 
the 11 other products whose prices were higher showed price 
increases ranging from 0.1¢ to 1.1¢. 
(d) The maximum price decrease in the fair 
trade area was 0.3¢ shown on one product. In the non-fair 
trade area, the maximum price decrease was 1.7¢.* 
3. McKesson and Robbins Survey II 
McKesson and Robbins, Inc. studied the movement of 
wholesale prices from January 1, 1947 to January 1, 1952 of 
207 leading brands of drug store products in the same four 
categories used in their first study, namely: pharmaceuticals, 
proprietaries, toiletries, and sundries. McKesson listed the 
leading products, saleswise, for each of 44 classifications 
in the four drug store categories covered. 
The wholesale prices prevailing in each period under 
review were obtained and analyzed. From there, the products 
*9. 
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.. STUDY BY A. C. NEII.SEt4 co. ·;MI 7 r 
• CONSUMER PRICI& IN F.AlR TR4\DB .AND NON-F~IR 'l'RADE AREAS 
Jlaroh - August, 1951 
BRANDS Mar.-AEr• 151 Mat-June '51 Jul~-r.us. '51 6-Month Total 
----- Fair Non- Foh• - Pair ~ Fa r 1~on- non-
Lexot ives Trade F.T. Trade I•' • 'l' • Trade p "' ... . • .!. • Trade F.T • 
40.7i' 43 ._5¢' 41.4¢' 41.8¢' 40.5~ -;~ 40.9¢ 42.4¢ 
G 41.8 46.2 41.5 45.~ 41.7 45. 5 41.7 45.9 
3 33. 6 35.5 33.6 35.3 33.6 35.5 33.6 35.5 
4 38.8 42.3 38.8 42.2 38.9 42.4 38.9 42.3 
Weijhted Composite 
on bove Four Items 38.3¢ 41.0~ 38.5¢' 40.0¢ 38.2¢' 40.0</, 38.3¢ 4:0.4f. 
Dent1tr1oes 
47.0¢ 47.3~t- 47.0¢' 47.3~t 4:7.1~ 47.5¢ 47.0¢ 47.4¢ 
6 63.0 62.3 63.0 63.0 63.0 62.9 63.0 s.a.7 
7 47.3 46.8 47.1 47.2 47.2 4.7.2 47.2 47.1 
8 47.3 47.6 47.2 47.7 47.1 48.0 47.2 47.7 
9 53.1 53.4 ·53.0 54.1 53.2 52.9 53.1 53.5 
10 48.4 48.5 48.3 49.1 48.1 48.7 48.3 48.7 
Weighted Composite 
on Above Six Items 54.2~ 53.4¢ 54.2¢ 53.5¢ 54.0¢ 53.7¢ 54.2¢ d '.51 
head61obe Remedies 
57ob\l 59.0¢ 57.5¢ 58.6¢ 57.7¢ 58.5i 57.6¢ 58.7¢ \.0 
12 29.6 :n.o 29.6 30.5 29.7 30.9 29.6 30.8 0'1 
13 55.2 56.7 55.0 55.8 55.0 56.8 55.1 56.5 
14 21.0 23.4 .al.1 23.6 21.1 23.4 21.1 23.4 
15 60.2 63.6 so.o 62.8 60.3 62 .. 4 60.2 6!5.0 
16 20.9 23.6 20.8 23.1 21.0 23.2 20.9 23.~ 
We1gh'ed Composite 
10.8¢ 39.2¢ ou Above Six I~ems 39.5,z 
,, 
·' Sham2oos 
17 56.8¢ 57.l~t 56.8¢ 57.1- 5e.9f. 57.1¢ 66.9~ 57.1¢ 
18 89.2 89.4 ·89.2 89.6 89.1 89.5 88.2 89.5 
19 99.9 99.8 99.8 99.7 99.8 99.8 99.8 99.8 
a> 56.0 56.1 56.6 58.8 56.2 56.6 56.3 56.2 
Weighted Compoal.te 
on Above Four Items 
. . . 
73.3ri 74.5¢ 73.9¢ -7&.ot 73.9¢ 76.3¢ 73.7¢ 75.3-
Sluvins Crea!!• 
52.81' 52.9~ 52.5y.. 52.'1; 52.4¢ 62.8¢ 52 o1!t. 21 51.3¢ 
22 52.9 52.6 5~-lj.o 52.5 62.9 'f12 .s u.e &2.6 
23 4:G.4 42.1 -42.5 42.4 42.4 43.6 42 •• 42.7 
24 47.2 47.0 .cl:'1.2 4:7.7 47.1 47.5 4'7.8 4'7.4 
Weighted Composite 
48.8¢ 48.9¢ 49.3¢ on Above Four Items 49.3 v, 48.2¢ 49.4¢ 4:9~1¢ ,8.6~ 
WEIGHTED COMPOOITE ON ALL PRODUC."I'S LISTED ABOVE FOR SIX-~ONTH PERIOD 46.2¢ 4'7.6¢ 
SDIIIC.£ : /l.t. NUS•N t,. 
PIIAMAc:arriOALI 
10- Cb•1Hla 
a • An,aol .. 
1- Aatlblo'le 
1 • Aa'la~''-
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... 
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were broken down into two divisions: fair traded and non-
fair traded. The percentages shown in the study take account 
of the relative sales volume of all products within each 
classification, as well as of the four basic categories. 
The study shows: 
1. Over the five-year period January 1, 1947 to 
January 1, 1952, the fair trade prices of a wide range of 
drug store products r ose 13.3%, compared with a 24.3% in-
crease in the prices of similar 'non-fair traded products. 
These figures compare with an increase of 36.6 
index points in the consumer price index of the U. S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics; from 153.6 in January, 1947 to 190.2 in 
January, 1952. 
2. Among products showing price decreases, the 
maximum decrease for fair traded items was 58.4% on anti-
biotics; whereas the maximum decrease on non-fair traded 
goods was fl%, on vanity items. 
3. Among fair traded products the maximum increase 
in price was 50% on writing equipment; for non-fair trade 
products, the maximum price increase was 148.4% on commercial 
film. 
4. National Association of Chain Drug Stores Survey 
The study of the National Association of Chain Drug 
Stores involved an analysis of the retail price behavior of 
99 
7,334 drug store products of 250 different manufacturers. 
The study showed that the fair trade prices on these items, 
over-all, rose only 3-1% during the period from 1939 to 
April 1947; and that drug products as a whole, including both 
fair traded and non-fair traded items rose 15.4%. 
(Data from U. s. Bureau of Labor Statistics show 
that in the same period food prices rose 93%; household 
products, 81%; the over-all cost of living,59-3% and 
miscellaneous items increased 38.5%.)* 
The McKesson and Robbins study analyzed the whole-
sale prices of drug store products. The study conducted by 
the National Association of Chain Drug Stores analyzed the 
price behavior of drug store products • . The. movement of 
wholesale prices is closely paralleled at the retail price 
level. It is a reasonable assumption therefore to combine 
the results of the two studies. When this is done, it is 
found that the prices of fair traded drug store products in-
creased in price 16.4% between 1939 and the beginning of 
1952. (The Consumer Price Index of the U. S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics showed a rise of 90.2% over this thirteen-
year period.)* 
/ 
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Vitamins: Twenty-four manufacturers reported on 
455 fair trade vitamin products. There was no change in 
price on 93 of these vitamins; 269 showed price decreases; 
and 93 indicated price increases. Consumers buying one of 
each of these items in 1939 paid $2,495.53 and in 1947 they 
paid only $1,683.96 -an actual savings of $811.57. Vitamin 
prices dropped 32.52% from 1939 to 1947. 
Cosmetics: Of a total of 1,814 items, 1,213 showed 
no price changes; 61 were lower in 1947 than in 1939; and 540 
showed price increases. Consumers buying each of these items 
in 1939 paid $5,228.51 and in 1947 they paid $5,847.12 - an 
increase of only $618.62 or 11.83%. 
Toiletries: 541 fair traded toiletries were in-
cluded in the survey. 356 showed no price change; 22 prices 
actually decreased; and 163 prices increased. Consumers 
buying one of each of these items in 1939 paid $318.37 and in 
1947 they paid $332.72 - an increase of only $14.35 or 4.51%. 
Miscellaneous Group: This group consisted of a 
total of 225 items. There was no change in price of 41 of 
these items; 5 showed price decreases; and 179 showed price 
increases. Consumers buying one of each of these items in 
1939 paid $138.70 and in 1947 they paid $183.99 - an increase 
of $45.29 or 32.65%. 
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Summary: 
Chart #1. 250 manufacturers, 7,334 items, 
4,377 show no change in price; 697 show price decreases; 
2,260 show price increases. 
Customers buying one of each of these items in 
1939 paid $14,403.29 and in 1947 they paid $14,603.56 - an 
increase of only $200.27 or 1.39%. 
General cost of living increase in like period 
59-3%. 
Chart #2. The weighted study shows that the 
consumer spent 3.1% more in 1947 than he did for fair trade 
drugs and cosmetics in 1939. This means that on the actual 
purchases of fair traded drugs and cosmetics, weighted 
according to the manner in which they buy, consumers were 
paying three and one-tenth cents more on each dollar thanthey 
. spent for the identical merchandise in 1939. 
Chart #3. Survey included 94,719 actual sales 
in 84 stores. The chart shows how the average consumer's 
dollar is distributed among the various classes.of merchandise 
in drug stores. For example: Vitamins accounted for 7.1% of 
actual dollar sales while tooth brushes accounted for only 
seven-tenths of one per eent of actual dollar sales.* 
*36, p. 153. 
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5· Research Bureau - NARD Study 
The most detailed statistical study made in behalf 
of fair trade was conducted by Professor H. J. Ostlund of the 
School of Business Administration of the University of 
Minnesota under the sponsorship of the Research Bureau of 
the NARD. The study attempted to measure the movement of 
retail drug prices between the time that fair trade laws were 
passed and 1939. The general conclusions of the study were: 
(l) In the drug stores of the forty-two fair trade 
states, prices of leading fair trade items showed little 
change between the time they were placed under fair trade co~ 
t racts and 1939. Included in the survey list were fifty 
leading trade-marked items, and the weighted average of these 
articles declined about 1%. 
(2) Independent stores with from $20,000 to $30,000 
annual volume of sales showed the greatest average reduction 
in prices, the index declining 3.5 points. Small stores 
showed a slightly smaller reduction with stores in the lowest 
group (less than $10,000 annual volume of sales) recording a 
decline of 2.5 points. Stores with sales above $50,000 
showed a decrease of 0.4 points. 
(3) Prices in chain stores increased; the index 
rose 4.9 points. 
(4) In Missouri and Texas without fair trade laws 
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prices of the items in the survey, decreased slightly more 
fuan in fair trade states. Between 1936 and 1939, the period 
comparable to that surveyed in the majority of the fair trade 
states, the index fell 2.7 points in Missouri and 2.8 points 
in Texas. 
(5) The study concluded that inasmuch as price 
changes were too extensive to be attributed to ordinary 
market factors and could not be traced to other unusual 
factors, they must have been largely the result of fair trade~ 
Conclusions: 
The Bureau of Education on Fair Trade believes that 
the studies here reported reflect honest efforts to determine 
the facts of price behavior under fair trade. The surveys 
cover many items. They include long periods of time. These 
studies attempt to show what fair trade prices are to the 
American consumers as a whole. The Bureau feels that the 
studies demonstrate that over-all, consumers do not pay less 
for goods in areas where there is no fair trade than they do 
where fair trade prevails. Their contention is that on the 
whole the evidence indicates that consumers pay less with fair 
trade. They further assert that the studies prove that fair 
trade prices of drug store items have shown far greater 
resistance to the inflationary pressures of the past decade 
*2, Chapter II. 
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than has the general level of consumer prices. 
The Bureau of Education on Fair Trade claims the 
above studies refute the assertion that fair trade has added 
to the cost of living of the American public. The studies, 
they claim, "give the answer to those who, seeking to explain 
why fair-trade prices have risen so little during the past 
twelve years charge that fair-trade prices were too high to 
begin with (even though the advent of Fair-Trade resulted in 
an overall price decrease)." 
The National Association of Retail Druggists expres-
sed the following reason why fair trade does NOT raise prices: 
"--------The manufacturer of a product 
determines the lowest price for which it can be sold 
to the consumer, covering its cost of proQ.uction 
and yielding distributors a margin that will induce 
them to sell it." 
"A manufacturer establishing Fair-Trade 
prices must set them low enough so that he will 
not be undersold by his competitors. Inasmuch as 
the minimums set must be uniform throughout the 
state, and generally throughout the nation, he runs 
the risk of losing all his business, and being 
forced into bankruptcy if his prices are out of line. 
No manufacturer who has spent thqusands or perhaps 
millions to establish his brands would take that 
risk. He will put his prices as low as possible, 
and those prices will be in effect everywhere."* 
A mass of data has been collected by the critics 
of fair trade. Their contention is that the consumer pays 
more for fair trade commodities than he would if the same 
*6, pp. 3-5. 
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cm:n:10di t ies vier s on the "free marke t tt. 
6. 0.9' COLDlf.BIA 
BALTIMORE FJI.IR-TB...A.A&.. PRICES VS. DIST.BICT OF COLUMBIA 
a ir Trade District of 
Aspirin: 
100 Bayer 
100 Squi bb 
100 '' t. Joseph 
100 A ~c Co. 
Toothps.ste:. 
Colso.te 
Ipana. 
Pepsodent 
Phillips 
-·quibb 
Lyons 
Ammident 
Clordent 
. f co 
Pebamm.o 
Shaving cream:. 
Cole; at e 
Barba so l 
Pa l molive 
Burma shave 
vl ol le 
Noxz ema 
M:en nen 
Gillette 
"Jil liams 
Ha ir tonics: 
Wildroot 
I reml 
Vitalis 
Vaseline 
Jeris 
Lucky T i ger 
Liquid sham oo: 
dmirat ion 
Breck 
Wonder 
Drene 
Price Co l umbia 
,o . 59 
. 54 
· '19 
.3 9 
. 47 
.47 
. 47 
. 3 9 
.47 
.47 
.53 
. 69 
.47 
.49 
.53 
.39 
. 53 
. 40 
. 4 3 
. 59 
.53 
.4 3 
. 47 
.48 
.57 
. 49 
. 47 
. 49 
. 48 
. 49 
. 60 
. 48 
. 57 
Price 
~io .46 
. 47 
. 43 
. 33 
.33 
.39 
.27 
.39 
. 33 
. 4 7 
. 53 
. 39 
.39 
.47 
.33 
. 4 1 
.33 
.37 
. 47 
.43 
.37 
.37 
.4 3 
. 43 
. 33 
.39 
.39 
.39 
. 4 3 
.53 
.47 
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BA VfiiviORE .d~ IR -ri'P ..... A. :OE PRIC ES VS. DISTRICT 0 COLUl\'lBIA 
Liquid shampoo - Con. 
Kreml 
La co 
Conte Castile 
Pack e rs 
Watkins Co conut 
Richard Hudnut 
Wildroot 
Wo odbury ' s 
Ha l o 
Fitch 
Deodorants: 
Veto 
Arr i d 
Fresh 
Sanite 
Chad 
Coty 
Hush 
llurn 
Odorono 
Barz. 
Five - day-pads 
Ydoro 
Zipp 
Stoppet te 
Dyrad 
Me nn e ns 
Amo l in 
Heed 
Hand l otions: 
Hinds 
Italian :Sal m 
Cashmere Bouquet 
1' rost illa 
J ergens Lot i on 
rr rushay 
Pacquin 
(Continued) 
Fair Trade District of 
Pric e Colu.mbia 
~0.59 
.4 3 
. 4 9 
. 48 
. 48 
1.00 
. 48 
. 43 
. 57 
.59 
. 59 
. 63 
. 59 
.39 
. 43 
1. 00 
. 49 
. 59 
.48 
. 39 
. 59 
. 59 
. 50 
.60 
. 49 
. 59 
. 59 
. 59 
. 49 
. 45 
. 4 3 
.47 
. 49 
. 49 
. 49 
Price 
0 . 47 
. 39 
.33 
. 43 
.39 
. 7 9 
. 44 
. 29 
. 43 
. 47 
. 53 
. 47 
. 43 
. 38 
.39 
. 43 
. 39 
. 37 
. 33 
.4 7 
. 43 
. 47 
.47 
. 37 
. 41 
. 47 
. 47 
.39 
. 37 
. 37 
. 43 
. 31 
. 33 
. 39 
Source: Standard Drug Co., 
Washington, D. c. 
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In comparing Washington, D. c.,which has no price 
maintenance law, with prices in Baltimore, Maryland, where a 
fair trade law exists, the study showed that more than one-
third of the Washington, D. c. prices were lower and only 
one-tenth were higher than Baltimore prices. 
This study concluded that "such figures as are 
available show almost universally that price-maintained items 
sell for higher prices than non-maintained goods."--------
that prices of contractual articles rose after the law was 
passed; that prices average higher in cities where maintenance 
is legal than in comparable cities where it is not."* 
From "Fortune" magazine on the above survey in an 
article entitled "Comparison Shopping": 
"--------Perhaps Washington's exemption 
from fair-trade price regulation is explained by the 
benevolent interest that Congress has always taken 
in the cost of living in the capital. Be that as it 
may, Congressmen and lesser residents of the District 
of Columbia can lather up with a big tube of 
"Barbasol" bought for 29¢; in fair-trade Maryland, 
the same tube would cost 39¢. The Congressman can 
regenerate his blood cells with "Lilly's Lextron 
Pulvule~' (84's) for $2.29, instead of the fair-trade 
price of $3.15. A bottle of "Old Grandad" $5.45 in 
Washington, $6.65 (before state taxes) across the 
line. "B. c. Head-ache Powders" are a dime instead of 
nineteen cents.:** 
7. "St. Louis Star Times Survey" 
In checking fair traded drug items in Illinois 
(fair-traded state) a representative list of 50 i.tems cost 
* 36, p. 51. 
**24, p. 70. 
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the consumer $46.78. The same 50 items, however, cost only 
$42.00 in St. Louis, Missouri (non-fair-trade state). The 
survey claimed individual price discrepancies ranged as high 
as 47.4% in favor of prices in St. Louis. Seven of the 50 
items were selling at the same price in St. Louis as in 
Illinois, and only one was selling slightly higher in St. 
Louis than in Illinois. 
Forty-two of the fifty items were lower in St. Louis. 
111 
PRI"CE SURVEY ST . LOUIS STAR TIMES, APRIL 18, 1951 
..... '* 
- - · ' ..,Q;,_ - • , ' -
Item 
W,~i?,.5F-::= :::::::::m ·:== 
Bromo Seitter ('llklent alze) ___ _____________ ----- -- __ ____ ____ _____ __ _ 
Bunna Sbn,·c Oargel ---· · · -··- · ·---- -- --- -- -- ------------------ ---.--
Caldwell'& Syrup of Pepsin (6 ouncesl- - ---- - ---·----- - -------------
Caldwell's Syrup 'lf Pepsin (12 ounces).--- ------- - ------- -- - -- -----Caroid Bile Salts (100) ___ ______ ___ ____ __ __ _____ ______ _____ ___ ___ ___ _ 
Ertron, C~ulel! (100) _____ ___ ___ ___ ___ ___________ ___ : __ _____ _______ _ 
Eekay s euro-Piloepbate (12 OUilAleS) . _____________________________ _ 
Ex-Lax (18 tablets). : __ __ ______ ____ ·· -- ---------------- ---- . -- -- ---- ' Fleet's Phospho-Soda (16 ounce8) __________ ____ ____ ___ ______ _____ . _. 
~lr~r?:-~~::~6 ~u~':~!~:::: ::: :::: ::::::::: : ::~::: : ::: :: ::::: 
Forhan's Toothpaste (00 cent.~)._--- - --- -- -------- ----- · - --- ------- -
Olover's Mange (7 ounces) ___ __ ___ ____ __ _ ~ --- .. --- -- -- ___ ... . -- ----_ 
Hndaool (8 ounCI'S) --- ---- '------ --------------- -- - - ----- ----- -- - -- -
Hind's Honey aud Almond (13~ ounce•> ------ --- --' ----- -- ---- -- --
Iodent Oarge) •••• • ___ •• --- . _ ..... . .. -- ---- •• . --.-.-- - -- ••• • • • - -- - - --
: t£~~:i\~:nl2!~~=======:: : ::::: ::: :::::::::::::::::::: : : : ::: 
Lysol (6 ounces) .------ ----- --- ---- - - --· --- --- ---------- - --- · -- --- --
Mavis Tale (3~ ouncesl---- -- - --- ----- --- - -- ---------- -- -- --- - -- ---
~=~~~;! ~~~ ¥~~~~~:: :: :::::::::::::::::: ::: ::::::: :: :: ::: :: :: : 
~:::~.~::' ~~fs __ '~-~~-~!~~:::::::::: ::: ::::::::::::::::::::::: : 
Mlnlt-Rub (2" ounces) . ___________ __ ------ -- ·- - --- --- --- - -- -- -- -- --
Nujol (pint).-- - - - - -- -- - -- - - - --- __ --- · - ·-·· · . __ -- - - ------ . . _ .. ... . __ 
Nutrex (252s)' .. - - ------ --- - - - - -- --- -- - -- - - --- ---- - -- - -- - -------- - - -
Pacquin Hand Cream Onrgel..--- -------- ---- - ---- -- ------- ---- ----
P etrogalar (pint) . . ____ . __ .. ____ . ___ .. .. . ... . .. -- - -._ -- -- .• . ____ . . __ . 
Phillips' Milk ol Magneeia .(l pint 10 ounces) ... --- - --- ----- -- ---- -· 
Plnex Coul(h Syrup (2)-i ounresl---- --- - -------- --- -- -- -- -- - ----- - --IPolldent P late Powder Oargc) __ ___ __ _______ _____ __ ___ ____ ___ ___ ___ _ 
Pond's Cream (<"'Onomy) ___ __ __ -- -- - ----- - -- .. _. --- -- - ---· --- ·- ----
, ~~~~:~ ~e~'N~~dct-'(1~i :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
Rem (3 ounocs) - - ---- - -- ----- -- - ------- - -------- - -- --- - - ---- -- - - ---Revelation Tooth Powder (liO eento). _____ __ __ ____ __ ______ _ ·--------
=-: ~ri:~~:,><s~ ·.mnoe.r:::·::::::::::::::: :::: ::::::: ::::::::: 
Serutsn (9 ounces) ___ --- --- -- - -- -- - ---- - --- ---- --- .. .. . .. --- --- -- -- _ 
" 
_Bt. Louls 
"$0. 98 
. 37 
.49 
•• 
.811 
. 49 
. 87 
. 44 
. 88 
. 89 
11.00 
1.39 
. 111 
. 89 
. 54 
. ~9 
.« 
. 79 
1. 00 
.89 
. 39 
. 39 
. 98 
.89 
. 49 
. 21 
. Q8 
. 49 
. 49 
. 39 
. 57 
. 63 
2. 98 
. 89 
.79 
. 57 
. 69 
. 54 
1.13 
.4-f 
.79 
. 49 
. 43 
. 95 
. . 68 
. 98 
I. 16 
.39 
.. 49 
.77 
Fair tca4e ~ 
P•«''ll 
~: : 41.8 oli.4 21114 
.l'Q 14. ij 
. Ill 
--------- -- -
.a? 111.3 
. 89 2.3 
. 47 &. 8 
. IN &. 8 
. 98 10. I 
fl.llO 
----------- -1. 110 16.1 
. :M 47. 4 
1. 20 «. 9 
. 69 9. 3 
. 69 16. 9 
. 47 6. 8 
. 89 12. 7 
1. 111 11. 2 
.98 10. 1 
. 47 20.6 
.liO 28. 2" 
1.26 27. 6 
. 98 10. 1 
.55 12. 2 1 
. 26 19. 0 
. fiSt C--·-------- I 
. 49 
--------- ---
. IIQ 3) . • 
. 54 38. 6 
. 69 3.6 
.69 30. 2" 
2. M -4. 9 I 
.89 
--- ----- --- -
. Q8 24. 0 
.511 3. 6 
. 76 8. 7 
. 69 9. 3 
I. 39 23.0 
. 55 26. 0 
.89 12.7 
. 57 16. 3 
. 4.1 
--- -- ---- ---
1.00 14. 7 
.Q 18. 9 
1. 39 41. 8 
1.26 ll. 7 
. 31 6.9 
.-w 
··---- -- i5:& 
. 88 
~fcl.:'.b~~w-~~(~ ~0~~!.-.:::::::::~:: : :::: : :: : :::::::: :: :: :: 
~~ m =~.'):::: :::::::: ::::::::::::::::::::: :::::: ::~:::: : ::: 
1--------1~----~--------
Totala .. •.••.• --- •• -- .. _ --.- - ---- ------- ----- -- -- --- .. -- .. -- -- -. 42.00 46.711 11.4 
Non.- The Item designated by asterlak (')-Nutrex- was the only inslPO& amoni the liO dru« 1~. 
checked In-this list where the St. Louis retsil price was hi~her than In ll8&rby IU1nol8. Seven items out oC 
the 00 were Identical in price. All prices quoted are lor d•IIY nonsale retail trade. 
Source; St . Louis Star Times, April 18, 1951 
ST. LOUIS PRICE VS ILLINOIS PRICE 
Item 
Admiracion Shampoo 
Bayer Aspirin (100) 
Ex-Lax (18 tablets) 
Fleets' Phospho~oda 
Hadacol 
Murine 
Pond's Cream (Economy) 
Serutan 
St. Louis 
Price 
$ .98 
• 49 
.19 
• 89 
1.09 
• 39 
1.13 
.98 
112 
Illinois 
Price 
$1.39 
.59 
.28 
1.29 
1.19 
.54 
1.39 
1.39 
Source: St. Louis "Star-Times", April 18, 1951 
8. The Federal Trade Commission Survey 
The Federal Trade Commission concluded in its 
survey that: 
"--------For those nationally advertised 
brands of drug store merchandise that were covered 
in the Commission's survey the effect on consumer 
prices most often noted was that the prices of chain 
stores, department stores, and certain independent 
stores that were selling below the minimum set by 
resale price maintenance contracts in resale price 
maintenance territory were obliged to increase prices. 
Individual druggists, reporting from memory, on the 
other hand generally reported some price decreases in 
the same territory. Thus, whether a given customer 
paid a higher or a lower price under resale price 
maintenance would depend on whether he purchased from 
a store that was obliged to increase prices or from a 
store that voluntarily decreased prices after resale 
price maintenance went into effect. 
"While this was happening in resale price 
maintenance territory, the trend for the same brands 
in non-price maintenance territory was often down-
ward in all types of stores."* 
*38, p. LVII. 
9. Samuel Rosenthal Price Survey 
SAMUEL ROSENTHAL PRICE SURVEY 
fiST OF M ERCHANDISE SUBMITTED 
~ubmitted herewith is a list of 208 items, showlng-
1. The sPlling price in the 45 fair-trade States ______ ________________ _ $945.10 
2. ']~he .o;elllng price of the same items in TPxas, Missouri, Vermont, 
and the District of Columbia ___________ __ ___ _________________ _ $74().86 
38.5 8. The retailer's profit in the fair-trarle States _______________ percent 
4. The retailer's profit In 'l'exas, Missouri, Vermont, and the District 
of Columbia ______________ ___ -----.- _____________________ percent 21.5 
17 
5. Consumer !<fiVe:< in Texns , Missouri, Vermont, and the District 
of Columbi!L ____ ___ ___ - ----------- __________ _____ ______ percent. 
These figures speak for themselves and need no explanation. 
Ioh nson Glo-coo.t .. . . .. - - --·- . . -- -- ------ - ---. - - --- -- .. •. . .. .. 
~~d'S~~;;~.w"":~ _ ::::::::::::::::: : : :::: : :::::::: ::::: : :: :: 
Mentholatum .. ---- . ----------· ------- -- - - ----- ----- · . . .. ___ . . 
Mustcrole; regular . ----- --- -- ---- --- -------- - ------- · .. _. _ .. __ 
Vicks s•uve ... __ . . _ -------------- ------- -- -- ------ - -- -_ . • ____ _ 
Vicks drops . ___ ... .. . . . --- ------------·------------ -- .... . . . . . 
Berut:m granulars . ... __ ..... ------------- ----· -- ----- --- -- - -- -Scotts fl:mulslr,n ____ _________ __ _____ _______ ______ ___ __________ _ 
Creomulslon .. ____ __ ___ __ -------- __ ____ -- -- ------ - _______ ____ _ 
Pertu.osln . .. . . . : .. ___ . _. __ ______ --- ---- -- -- - -- ------ _________ _ 
Atmrol, with phenolphthaleiu . . .. __ ______ --- ------- ---- -- ____ _ 
Phillips milk of magnesia . __ - - -- -- - --- ------- - -- ---- ________ _ _ 
Bil!odol powd'lT ------- - - - - -- -- - - ----- ------ ---------- -- ---- - - _ 
Bron o Seltzer. .. ... . ___ _____ ___ _ --·- .. . ___ . .•.. . ----- - --- - · · . 
Sal HApntica ....... ___ ___ . . .. ....... . - -- - - -- --- --- - --- -- ____ __ 
Fletcher CMtoria . . _ . .. . ___ ___ .. ------------ - ---- - - - ____ ______ _ Pepto Blsmol.. ____ ________ __ _ .. . __ ____ _____ __ __ _______ __ ____ _ 
Pinkham Vpgetablt• Compound liquid _________ _______ ______ _ _ 
s. 8. s .. ----- ------- ------ -. .. ---- ------- --------- -- ---- ------ -Aiku Seltzer. . . ____ _____ .... _______________ ____ ----------- ----
Anueln tablets .. . ...... . . . __ ____ _______ -- ----- -- ------- -- --- --
Anahlst tablets ... . ... . ___ __ __ _ ------ - ____ ____ __ ___ , _______ __ _ 
~:;;;,rrN-fttf~ 1i~e-rPiiJs·.: :: :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 
C'ystex . . ... __ .. . . ... _. _. ____ . . ____ _ . _. ____ __________ . _. _____ .. 
Exlax .. . __ _____ ... . . . . --- ---- ----------------- -- -- _____ _____ _ _ 
Groves Bromo Quinine ____ - - - --- ---- - ---------- -- - - - -------- -
H eet liniment ______ ____ ___ ____ __ _ -- ------ -- --- -- - --- - -- -- •.•• . 
Baum~ llpn Gay ... ____ _ .... ---- ------ --------- -- --- - ----- --- -
Meads cod liver oil . . . . . .. _____ __ --- --- - -- -- __ -- -- ---- - -- -----
M~uds Oleum Percomorphct>m ______ __ ______ __ ------ --- -- --- -
J & J han d aids . ___ ____ . .... __ __ .. - ---- ---- --- - - -- ___ __ _____ _ 
Dayam in caps, 30 ...... . . _. __ -- - - - - - - - ___ ___ ... .. ... - - ------ --
Duyamin caps , 100 ... .. __ ____ __ _ ---- -- -- - ---- - -- -- - --- - --- ---
Vi hay lin , 00 eu l> ic cen timeters ___ ___ --- --- --------- - -- - -----
Vi Dnyliu, 8 OtlllC<'S ... -- -- -- ..... . .. ---- - --- . •• ___ --- -- ------ -
Vi Day lin , 16 oune<>s __ ________ _____ _____ _____ ----- - --- -- - ---- -
AmplftJJ'I tuhh•ts, 00 --- - - - - - -- - -- ------- - --- -- ---- - - --- - ---Amphojcl, li{l ulds, 12 ounces. ___ _____ ______ _ --- ---- - --- . ____ _ _ 
'l'yroze ts ____ __ ___ ___ __ - · - __ __ __ __ . ____ __ ______ _____ . _. ___ ___ _ 
Si bli.n. 4 ounet·,S . __ ____ ___ ___ ____ ______ ____ __ -- - -- -- ·---- - -- - __ 
Slblin, 16 ounoos . ___ __ ___ __ __ __ --- - ------ -- -- ----- -- - - ____ __ 
Alll>E C drops, 15 cubic centimeters. __ ___ ________ ___ __ ____ __ _ 
ABDEC drops, 50 cubic centimeters. ----- --- --- --- -- --- --- --Oluco FNlri!l, 1 ounce _____ _____ ___ ___ ___ ____________ ________ _ 
H eptuoa caps, 50 .. _____ __ __ ___ _______ ______ __ ... _____ ___ ___ _ _ 
H eptuna carl>', 100 ..... .. . . ... .. . .. . . . . . -- - -- -- - - - .. . . . . _____ . . 
Hcptuna Ph's caos, 100. _____ -- -- - ------ - - - -- -- - -------.- -- __ _ 
Vi-Terra caps , 100 -----. --- - - ___ ___ __ · - - -- -- ---- - - --- - - -- .. __ _ 
Vi-Penta drnpS, 15 cubic centimeters ____ _____ __________ _____ _ _ 
Vi-Pent.,. drops, 30 cubic •.'<·utlmeters . . .. . .. . . -- -- ---- - ---- ___ _ 
Vl-Penta rlrOf'S, 60 en hie c-ent imeters . . . . ... .. .. .. ..... .. -----
VI-Pent& P earls, 2.~ ... - ------ - -- - ------- -- - --- ------- - - -- - __ _ 
Vi-Penta Pearls, 100. ______ __ __ ----- -- -- ---- -- -- -- --- - -- --- __ . 
Syntro~el tllblets, 100. _____ ____ ____ __ . . __ . . _____ . __ . . .. ---- __ _ 
Syntrogel tablets, 50 .. . ____ _ .... --- -- ____ _ ------- - --- ----- --. 
EmpiTin compound tablets, 12 _______ ___ ___ ---- --- --- - -- ---- __ 
Empirln compound ta blets, 211 . ... -- ---- - -- ------- - ------ -- - - . Emplrtn compound tablets, 5(] _ ___ ___________ _ __ _ _____ _______ _ 
Cost to 
reta ilers in 
all 8tat<>s 
and District 
of Columbiu 
$0. 40 
. 46 
.33 
. 23 
.34 
. 23 
.24 
.TT 
. 39 
. 34 
.36 
. 8& 
.:ll! 
. 40 
. 36 
.22 
. 2q 
· .36 
1.10 
.80 
. 37 
.14 
.31 
. 43 
. 21 
.5ll 
. 17 
.2-1 
. 31 
. 51 
. :~~ 
.62 
.19 
l.ll 
3. 30 
.65 
1. 57 
2.fiti 
.64 
. 87 
. 38 
.81 
2. 2H 
. 84 
2. 34 
.50 
1.12 
2. 08 
3. 20 
2. 64 
, · 67 
1.24 
2. 21 
.64 
2. 12 
. 90 
. 47 
. 17 
. 29 
. 48 
FaiT-tmde 
price In 4~ 
fair-trade 
States 
$0. 59 
. 59 
. 511 
.39 
.54 
. 33 
.37 
- ~ 
.es 
.37 
_. 57 
1. :!9 
.39 
.511 
.flT 
. 33 
.36 
. 59 
1. 39 
I. 19 
.. 54 
. 19 
. 55 
. 59 
. 33 
. 89 
. 2H 
.30 
. 49 
. 79 
. 57 
. 84 
. 33 
1.6.1 
4. 95 
.08 
2. 35 
3. P7 
1.13 
1.29 
·.f\8 
1.21 
3.42 
I . 2& 
3. 50 
.73 
L fJO 
3.15 
5. 45 
3. 96 
1.19 
2. 19 
3 . g~ 
I. 13 
I. 13 
1.49 
. 82 
. 211 
45 
. 75 
Available 
prices in 
T(l..xa~, 
Mbsourl, 
Vermont, and 
the District 
of Columhl" 
where no 
!air-trade 
Jam exist 
$0. 49 
. 54 
.47 
.2\l 
.43 
.29 
. 29 
.89 
. 53 
. 47 
.47 
1.09 
.33 
.411 
.49 
.2\l 
.32 
. 46 
1.1Y 
.08 
. 47 
.17 
.42 
. 49 
.TI 
. 69 
. 22 
. 29 
.39 
. 67 
. 49 
.TT 
. .24 
1.39 
4.09 
. 89 
2.04 3.« 
. 97 
1.07 
. 57 
1.09 
2. 87 
1.08 
2. 79 
. 67 
1.49 
2.611 
4. 69 
8. go 
. 89 
1.63 
3.19 
.93 
. 93 
1.29 
. 73 
. 21 
. 37 
.59 
~~------------------- -----------------------------------~-------------~--------------------------J 
Source: "Study of Monopoly Power" 
82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 
Committee on the Judiciary, 
H.R. 
1952 
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I 
SAMUEL ROSENTHAL PRICE SURVEY 
(continued) 
Cost to 
retailers in 
-all States 
aud Dlatrict 
of Columbia 
Fair-trade 
price in to 
fair-trade 
States 
I 
Available 
prl08!!in 
Teus, 
Missouri, 
Vermont, and 
the District 
of Columbia 
where no 
!air-trade 
laws exist 
---------------------------------1--------l-------l--------
Emplrln compound tablets, UJO. ___ _____ ____ ___ _________ _____ _ 
StUarts Formula tablets, 116 ........ ... -- --- --- ---- - .. .. . .. .. .. 
Stuarts Form'Jla liquid, pint.. ... . ...... .. ............ .. .. . . . _ 
VI-Syneral droP5, 15 cubic centfmetenL ____ _____ _____ _______ .. 
Vi{!ynaral dropo, 30 cubic centimeters ... . ...... _ .. _ .... . __ .. . 
VI-Syneralllrol)l!, ~cubiC centimeters .. __________________ . . . 
~!~~EEt:~i~~~}~:-~~::::::::::: ::: : :: ::: ::: : ::::::::::: 
Moliron tllblets, 100· --- - --- -------- -- - - --- --- --- --- --·-- -- -- - -Moliron liquid, 12 ounces __ _______ ___ _____ __ ____ _ . .. ... . __ __ __ 
Crcamalln tablets, 50. ___ ------- ---- ______ __ ____ ___ ______ _ . __ . 
Creumalln tablets, 200 _ - --- --- ------- ----- -- -- -- --- ---- -------
Neosynephrine solution, l4 percent, I ounce --- -- ---- - --------N cOsynephrincsolution , I percent, I ouncc __ _________ _____ ____ 
1 ~~~!£~~····~·=··~ · ····· =···=·· ·=···········! Cllnltest tablets, 100 ........... .... .. .. . ...... ____ __ _____ __ __ . O~lusllllquids, 6 ounces .. .. . .. .. ....... ....... __ ___ ___ _____ . . 
0Plnsllliquid, 12 ounces. -- -- -- -- ------------ -- ____ .. .... . .. .. 
Oelusll tablets, 60 ... .. -- -- -- -- --- ---- - __ ----- . __ . ______ ... . . . . 
Oelnsil tablets, 100 ......... ..... -- ---- ----- -- -- -- ________ .... . 
Dti!!enex ointment, I ounce ...... . .... ... ...... . ___________ ___ _ 
D e•encx powder, 117 otutces ___________ ___ ___ _____ __ ____ ___ __ __ 
DPscnex llquid
1
_2 ounces ........ . ........ __ ______ ____ . _______ _ 
Lilly's insulin u40, 10 cubic centimeters, regular . -- ----- ----- -
Lilly's Insulin UllO, 10 cubic centimeters, re~l\r .. ......... .. . 
LtlJy's insulin U.W, protAmine dnc, 10 cuhi~ Ct! •ttimc tr r~ ~ ~· - -­
Lilly's insulin U80, protamine zinc, 10 cubic centimeters . ... . . 
Lilly's iasulin NPH U40, !0 cubic ccntimotors .. -- -------- --- -
Lilly:s Insulin NPH U801 10 cubic centimeters ___ ____ ____ __ __ _ Lilly s msulm Homiccbrm, 120 cubic centimeters . . - -- ---- -- --L1Jiy's Homicebrln, 120 cubic centimeters ___ ___ ___ __ __ _____ __ _ 
Lilly's Homlcebrin, pint . . _. ___ -- --- _. _--- ------------- - ____ _ _ Lilly's RctlcnlPx Pulnlles, JO() _______ ___ _____ __ _________ ___ __ _ 
Lilly 's l\o!ultiCtlbrin Oclseais, lOQ _____ ____ __________ ___ ______ _ _ 
Old English paate wa•-- -- --- -- -- - -- ---- ------- ----- ---- - -- -- -
~ t.i~~~~d~~~~:: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::-::::::::: 
4-Wny cold tabl<•ts-- -- -- - ------ -- ----- _ ---- --- -- -- --- - ---- -- __ 
Phillips Milk of Magnesia tablets, 30'•--------- -- -- ------- -- --Srlnn lmck powders. _---· --- -. __ . __ --------- __ ___ . ____ ___ ___ _ 
1 & J 1\rlhesive, )+inch by 6yard•- - --- - ---- - -- -- ---- -- -- - -- --1 & 1 cotton ._---- - -- -- --- - - ----- -------- ____ __ ___ ____ ______ _ _ 
1 & 1 bandage .. -- -- ----- --- - --- -- -- - ---- ----- ------- ------- --
.Amidcnt tooth paste, economy ______ _____ ___ ____ -- --- - -- -- -- --
C~lgate tooth pnsto, economY--- -- ---- -- ---- -- -- --- - -------- --
X ~~~:;';,~~~J'~o~d~~~ :::::: ; :::::: : : : ::::::::: ::::::: ::::: F~teoth, medlum .. ----- --------- ---- -- ---- - ------- ---- -- ----
r.r:t~t =~~~~:: : :: : :: : :: :: ::: : : : :: : :::::::: : : : :~ : : : :: : ::: 
~~f~~!:~~~~~';',;,~'l!'iiitir: ::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :: ~ : 
P'aimollve •bave cream, brusbleas. - ----- -- ------- --- --- --- -- --Noxr.ema shave Ql'8&m, Jar, bu~e ___________ ___________ ____ ___ _ 
Wllllamslatbo!r .lhave cream, iarle-- - __ ------- -- ---- ------ --- -
~;4~~~L~;~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~==~:~~~~~=~~~~~~~~~:~~~::~: 
IIJ.81 
1.56 
!.56 
. 61 
1.17 
!. fo6 
!. 39 
2 . .'iO 
. 75 
. fi5 
1. 10 
. 42 
!.51 
. 51 
. f.!l 
. 5.1 
. 63 
2. 07 
4. 64 
6. ~0 
. 65 
. 38 
- 52 
. 56 
.88 
. 56 
.00 
. 40 
. 40 
. 40 
. 84 
J.ij5 
. 00 
l. 81l 
.w 
1. 81l 
. . 81 
. R1 
2. 52 
3. 00 
3. 24. 
. :!9 
. 18 
. 13 
. 14 
. 14 
.13 
. 12 
. !!9 
. 16 
. (2 
. 42 
. 32 
. 2!1 
. 36 
_(12 
. 20 
. 34 
. 26 
. 37 
. 32 
.36 
.34 
. 36 
- ~ , 
: 1s 1
1 .:ll 
$1. 35 
2.60 
2. 60 
!.10 
1. 7.'1 
2. 95 
2. 50 
4. 50 
1.25 
1.10 
L fi.'i 
. 74 
2. fKI 
. 90 
1.22 
1.00 
. 0.~ 
a. 11 
~- 00 
9. 45 
-~ 
. 57 
. 00 
. 97 
I. 49 
. 97 
1.63 
. 69 
. 69 
. 60 
1.26 
2. 47 
1.48 
2. !!3 
1.48 
2. 8~ 
I. 2'2 
1. 22 
3. 7R 
,r~_ ~5 
4. 86 
. 65 
.29 
.JY 
. 23 
. 19 
.19 
. 211 
. 17 
. 'II 
. 69 
. 63 
. 47 
. 47 
. 59 
.IJS 
. 33 
. 511 
. 39 
.57 
.41 
.69 
. !1.1 
- 5Q 
l.!Ml 
.-.u 
$0. 118 
2. 29 
2. 211 
. 81l 
1. 75 
2. 47 
2.19 
4. 09 
. 98 
. R9 
!.59 
. 59 
2. 10 
. 69 
.98 
.79 
. 79 
2. 87 
~. 47 
7. 95 
. 84 
. 49 
. 78 
.87 
1.10 
.79 
1. 211 
- ~7 
. 67 
.67 
.f8 }.;g 
1.(9 
2. 19 
1.09 
2. 19 
1.05 
1. 05 
2.98 
4. 87 
3.98 
.(9 
.24 
.HI 
. 10 
.16 
. 16 
. 17 
.13 
.to 
.113 
.M 
. 30 
- 4:l 
.49 
• 79 
.'II 
.47 
. 34 
. 49 
.39 
.43 
. 39 
. 43 
.87 
. ~7 
. 19 
~t~::~.~i~~~~: .10; ~:: : : : :: : : :::: :::: ::::: : ::: :: ::::::::::. J . 2,'• • 
. ·s 1 
. 2r. I 
. ~~ . 
. 25 I 
.-Hl 
· "" ~l.. . ~ 1 /..J 
. 37 
. :1: 
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s fource: "study of Monopoly Power" 82nd Congress, 2nd Session, 
committee on the Judiciary, 
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SAMUEL ROSENTHAL PRICE SURVEY 
( Cont inued) 
J' · ··.;·· . .. ; . 
,,,;l , ' ... . ; ~ r~ ... 
Llderlne, medium ..••.••••••••••••• _. . .... ...... ............ IO.U a411 
=~~v:-~~=~::::: :.:::::::::::::::::::::::::~:::::::::: :n :: 
Zanlte, ~-----···------------------------------ -~------- --- • M . . Ill 
Arrld, large.------ --- --------------- ---- -- -----............... . 341 .Ill 
Mum, medium................................ ... . ........... . 215 . 811 
Mum,Jarie .. . . -------·--------------------- --·--------------- · . 37 . Gil 
Stoppette spray ... ------------------------------ -- -·--------- . .3& .IU ~=~~llr·:::===== ====== ============:::::::::::::::::: : . . : ~ 1J& J::t ::: =:: ~ :::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: :: .~i·;·· ::; 
Pond• vanishing cream, 35 cents.............................. ,to ..;,.. .31 
Panda vanishing cream, M cents..................... . ..... .. . ·!!: · ~ · . . M 
Breolllbampoo.. ............................. ................ .- .liD 
Breelt shampoo.------------- ----------------------- -·-------· • N · 1. 00 
Breck shampoo.............. . .............................. .. , Ill 1. 7S 
~ ~~8~-~-~==== ~:::::::::::::::::::::: : :::: ::::.:: .:: 1:: 
·1~~~·I;;~~!~~;~~;:~~li~;~:[ . . ·1. . .' ;I 
J!:l Product.o (Boquet), bex oUO .............. c ........ 2...... • · C.O • a. Ill 
~~-~~~~~~~~~tm~~~~m~m~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .: ·11 li Ef? =~~::::::::::::: :::~:::~:::~::::::::::::::::::::::: ... : . :ttm ft::l ~ lllbtw ....... ............ '................ ............. .. il 12. 2S 
~~~:=-~~~-~t~~~~~~~;~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ', :,: 1§' ·l! 
§=~£~:~~:~~-~:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ J.i !5 
~~p~~:,:~::::~::::::::::::::~:::::.:::::::::: 1 E ;, E 
. Uoivwsl ~-----•---~---- ·------·------------- --~-· 17;1111 ID-116 ltf~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~-~~~~~~~~~~ . i~ . !§ 
o .•. .-..m iron ................. ..... ................. . '....... 12.11 18.116 
I tn=~::::::::~::::::::::::~~===?~ ::.:::::::::::::: '!:~ ' l5 
~~~~=~~~;::::~::::.::::~=-=~===~:::::::::=~===~:::: . ~ll ~~ 
Ptw;to cooker --------·------------- ---------'---------•---"---- ' 11, M. 16.96 -~~m; ~:~~i~=~~;=~~~i~i:~;~;m@~=j · · ~i ~~ 
Available 
pr!CIIIn 
Teua, 
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. ll.lllal!rf, 
v~:" 
Gl OalaDibla 
where DO 
llalJ-.trade 
laws exist . 
10. 311 
. 611 
.2.1 
. 47 
.liD 
.64 
.sa 
.Ia 
•• t.Ot 
.liS 
.'rl 
. 47 
. 'ZT 
.47 
. liS 
.79 
1, till 
.47 
.79 
·"' .tiD 
•• 
• 311 
.311 
.G7 
... 
• 18 
. 43 
.41 
~­... I.Bt 
&.111 
... 
11,79 
l.: 
••• 17.79 
t: 
:n.• 
~.. e.• 2U8 
... 
11.10 
.s.• ~.  
:U.ID 
~~. .. 
17 .• 
ll. Be 
... .,. 
16.8e 
u.a 
... " u.• - ~ 
7. 16 ' 
~= t~ 
Source: "Study of Monopoly" 82nd Congress 
on Resale Price Maintenance 
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The above data was submitted for study and evidence 
at the hearings before the Anti-Trust Committee of the 
Committee of the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 82nd 
Congress, 2nd Session, 1952 on Resale Price Maintenance, by 
Samuel Rosenthal who operated both retail and wholesale drug 
businesses in Richmond, Virginia. Rosenthal submitted a list 
of merchandise which showed the difference in the selling 
price of 208 of the most popular items sold in retail drug 
stores. Rosenthal contended that 208 items comprised a large 
portion of the dollar volume of goods sold in the retail drug 
store. The list shows the prices at which these items must 
be and are sold in 45 fair trade states vs. the three non-
fair trade states and the District of Columbia. 
Rosenthal further contended from his list that 
consumers paid more for goods in drug stores in price fixed 
states than in markets allowing free competitive selling.* 
D. FAIR TRADE AND COMPETITION 
A fundamental issue presented by the fair trade 
program is the effect of fair trade on our competitive system. 
Opponents claim fair trade suppresses competition while 
advocates of fair trade deny this assertion and claim that 
fair trade strengthens competition. 
*36, pp. 430-435. 
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1. Pro Fair Trade 
The consumer remains the "price-boss", because he 
alone determines what products he will buy at what particular 
price. 
The fair trade law requires that a fair traded 
product be in free and open competition with articles of 
similar class produced by others. This fair trade require-
ment not only automatically ranges fair traded products 
against one another, but also against competing national 
brands which are not fair traded,and in an increasing number 
of cases against private brands of giant retailers. 
Evidence of the consumer's freedom to choose is 
provided by the following sample of the number of brands and 
price ranges of competing products in various lines, based 
on data from Consumer Reports Buying Guide. 
118 
CONSUMER 1 S Hi.EEDOM OP CHJ ICE 
Hand Cream Field 
Product ·-- - - ---l'llanufac turer Per Oz .• 
·-----
Pacquin 1 a Hand Cream 
Sofskin Creme 
DLillarry Hand Beauty Cream 
Revlon Aquamarine Hand Cream 
Helen Rubenstein Herbal Hand 
Cream 
Camellia (Emollient) Hand 
Cream 
Noxzema Skin Cream 
Pond r s. Hand Cream 
Pac quin Inc. 
Sofskin Co. 
Richard Hudnut 
Rev~on 
Helena Rubenstein Inc. 
Elizabeth Arden 
Noxzema Chemical Co. 
Pond 1 a Extract Go. 
Hand Lotion Field 
Product 
Jerg_en' s Lot i on 
Hinds Honey & Almond Cream 
Trushay-Beforeband Lotion 
Tussy Wind & Weather 
Lotion 
Chen Yu Hand Lotion 
Revlon Aquamarine Lotion 
Blue Grass Hand Lotion 
Helen Rubenstein Silk 
Velvet Lotion 
Manufacturer 
Andrew Jergen's Go. 
Lehn & Fink Prod. Gorp . 
Bristol-My ers Co. 
Lehn & Fink Prod . Gorp. 
Chen Yu (Hicb.ard Hudnut) 
Revlon 
Elizabeth Arden 
Helena Rubenstein 
S.ource: 1952 Consumer Reports Buying Guide. 
~p 0. 20 
.28 
.30 
.34 
.40 
.78 
.12 
.19 
Per Oz.. 
~ 0.09 
.10 
.12 
.15 
.24 
.24 
.38 
.20 
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CONSU1i'IER t S FR:Sl:i' DO:':I OF CHOICE 
(Cont inu ed ) 
Numbe r 
Commodity of Price Range 
Br a nds 
Sunburn Preventit lves 14 ,·. 0 . 15 to ( 60 . 00 an oz . 
Toilet ~. ater & Colognes 
Plora. l Odors 22 .30 to 1 . 88 an oz . 
Amber 7 .53 to 1. 95 an oz . 
Al derhydes (Synthetic Jdor) 2 . 75 to 1. 88 an o z . 
Chypre - Crepe - de - Ch l ne (Pl ora l 
<3: Fragrant resins) 4 1.05 to 3. 00 an oz . 
Mis c e llaneous 
Inks 
Permanent Inks 20 .04 to . 25 an o z . 
·~·Jashabl e Inks 12 . 04 t o 1. 25 a n oz. 
Lighters 
Pocket 31 . 69 to 20.00 each 
Table 1 9 3. 95 t o 33 . 00 each 
Pens 24 . 25 to 15 .00 each 
Cameras 15 39 . 95 to 269 . 50 ea ch 
Fa c e Powder 5 6 . 09 to 1.20 an oz . 
T.a l curn & Dusting Povvders 5 7 .19 to 1. 08 a n oz. . 
Cl eansing Creams 
Co l d Cream 45 .04 to . 60 an o z • 
Emollient Cr eam 1 9 • 05 t o . 75 an o z .. 
Liquefying Creams 17 . 07 to . 60 an oz . 
Toothpaste 93 . 04_ t o . 2 6 c?.D oz . 
Source: Consumer He ports 1 952 Buy int_; G,J_ide. 
r.!:he Con snmer under Fa i r Tra de has COnlJ! l et e fr eedo.:n 
of choice i n the drug store . Pr ice will v e_ry , qual ity will 
vary , an . va l ue to tbe consumer ·will also va ry. 
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Under fair trade price competition between retailers 
is eliminated, competition between manufacturers for the 
consumer's preference still exists. 
National brands compete with each other and they 
all compete with the private brands. 
Fair trade is purely voluntary and for this very 
reason fair trade is not a price fixing measure. A manufac-
turer does not have to fair trade his products if for any 
reason he prefers not to. 
In its 1936 decision upholding the constitutional-
ity of the State of Illinois Fair Trade Act, the u. S. Supreme 
Court said on "Price Fixing": 
"--------It is clear that this section does 
not attempt to fix prices, nor does it delegate such 
power to private persons. It permits the designated 
private persons to contract with respect thereto. 
It contains no element of compulsion but simply 
legalizes their acts leaving them free to enter into 
the authorized contract or not as they see fit."* 
The seller usually establishes his prices in an 
atmosphere of competition and relates his price to other 
factors: cost of production, administration and distribution. 
So long as there is competition, prices whether established 
unilaterally or through negotiation must reflect the con-
sumer's mind and pocketbook as well as manufacturing and 
distribution costs. Advocates of fair trade conclude that 
*39. 
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fair trade is NOT a price-fixing measure because you cannot 
fix prices where you find competition with every other pro-
ducer of the same article, and where by law horizontal price 
fixing is prohibited. 
Fair traders point out that their program is a 
positive deterrent to monopolistic practices. By preventing 
price cutting and loss-leader selling, price maintenance be-
comes a strong barrier to price discrimination and hence 
monopoly as well. 
The Bureau of Education on Fair Trade expressed the 
above argument as follows: 
"--------The public has never hesitated 
to put curbs on competition which it regards as 
unfair and monopolistic. The Anti-Trust Laws, The 
Robinson-Patman Act and other statutes curb unfair 
competition . So do the Fair Trade Laws. They are 
intended to curb bold, relentless, predatory 
commercial behavior. They restrain the unfair 
competition of retailers who engage in pricing 
practices that be-dazzle the consumer without bene-
fit to her pocketbook and lend inevitably to the 
concentration of retailing in few hands - to 
monopoly. 
"Under Fair-Trade American consumers can 
shop with confidence in getting fair value in big 
and little stores, in villages as well as in great 
cities; in neighborhoods as well as on Main Street. 
Without Fair Trade, they lose their freedom to 
shop where they please, for most retailers cannot 
exist in a jungle of unrestrained price wars. Few 
people would care to argue that retail monopoly 
would be good for the buying public or for the 
country."* 
*12, 4th Reason. 
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"When the big distributors lose the weapon 
they have used to put their smaller competitors out 
of business - the deceptive loss-leader - the trend 
toward concentration of ownership and control in 
distribution will end."* 
George H. Frates, Washington representative of the 
National Association of Retail Druggists, before the Senate 
.Anti-Trust and Monopoly Committee said: 
"--------Unquestionably, Fair Trade is 
designed to give the small businessman a chance to 
compete fairly with and on equal terms with large 
distributors; and thereby to preserve for small 
enterprise the field in which they can function most 
efficiently - that of distribution. 
"--------One of these advantages is the 
ability of massed capital to drive out competitors 
by selling below cost temporarily in one community 
and thereafter to raise prices to the consumer and 
to use the profits so gained in carrying the process 
of extermination into other communities. That has 
always been the method of monopoly and monopoly is 
the goal of those who are using that method today."** 
No thesis on Fair Trade would be complete without 
Judge Brandeis' famous quotation on the monopolistic effect 
of price-cutting: 
"Americans should be under no illusions 
as to the value or effect of price cutting. It 
has been said to be the most potent weapon of 
monopoly - a means of killing the small rival to 
which the great trusts have resorted most frequently. 
It is so simple, so effective. Far-seeing organized 
capital secures by this means the cooperation of 
the short-sighted unorganized consumer to his own 
undoing. Thoughtless or weak he yields to the 
*6, p. 16. 
*-lC·ll, p. 4. 
temptation of trifling immediate gain; and 
selling his birth right for a mess of pottage, 
becomes himself an instrument of monopoly."* 
2. Against Fair Trade 
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Opponents of fair trade charge that fair trade 
means the elimination of price competition among manufactur-
ers and among retailers. 
In testimony before the Committee on Resale Price 
Maintenance, 82nd Congress, 1952, Mr. Samuel Rosenthal 
testified: 
"--------The proponents point out that 
there are several makers of Insulin in the United 
States, and therefore it is in free and open com-
petition with other makers of this drug. The 
proponents fail to tell us that the fair-trade 
contracts of other manufacturers are exactly the 
same as Eli Lilly and Company." 
The following price lists were submitted: 
*28, p. 12. 
PRICE COMPARISONS OF INSULIN 
Sharpe & Dohme 
I NSULIN, N. P . H. 
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Part F. T. M. Price 
Product No .23.76 : 40 units per cc. 
in a 10 cc. v i al (400 units)---
Product No.2377:. 80 units per cc . 
in a 10 cc. vial (800 units)---
INSULIN 
2 
2 
$1 .65 
3.15 
Part Price 
Product No •. 2171:. 40 units per cc. in a 
10 cc. vial (4oo : uni ts.)------------- - - · 
Product No . 2172: 80 units per cc . in a 
10 cc. via l (BOO_units;)-------------
Product No . 2173;:, 100 units per cc. in a 
10 cc. vial (1,000 units)-----------
INSULU; MADE FROM ZINC -INSULIN CRYSTALS 
Product No . 2238: 40 units per cc. in a 
10 cc. vial (400 units)-------------
Product No.2281: 80 units per c c . in a 
10 cc. vial (800 units)-------------
INSULIN, PROTAMINE ZINC 
Product No.2174~ 40 units pe r cc. in a 
10 cc. vial (400 units)-------------
Product No.2175· 80 units per cc. in a 
10 c c. vial ( 800 Lmits )------------ -
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
!lji l.40. 
2.75.-
3 . 45 
~~1.40 
2.75 
~· 1.65 
3 . 15 
PRICE COh PARI SONS OF I NSULIN 
(Cont inued}· 
Lilly 
ILLET I N (INSULIN !! LILLY ) 
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Net Trade List 
U-40-F orty un i ts pe r cc. in 10-cc 
vials (400 units) , each--------
U-80-Eighty units pe r cc. in 1 0 -cc 
.' vials (800 units), each-------
U-100-0ne hundred units per cc. in 
10-cc vials (1,000 units), each 
~0 . 84 . 01.40 
1. 65 2 .75 
2.07 3.45 
ILLE'I' I N {INSULIN l LILLY ) MADE :B'ROM ZI NC-INSULIN CRYSTALS 
U -40-Forty units per cc. in 10-cc 
vials ( 400 units), each-------
U- 80-Ei ghty units per cc . in 10-cc 
vials (800- un its), each----- - - -
NPH I LE'l' IN ( INSULIN, LILLY) 
$0.84 
1. 65 2.75 
Ne.t F . T. M. 
Trade List (list less 
1 0 p ercent) 
U-40-Forty un ~-c;s per cc. in 10 -cc 
v i als (400 units ), each------- ~0 . 99 ~ 1. 65 ~1. 48 
U-80 - Eighty units per cc . in 10-c c 
via ls ( 800 uni ts ), each- - ----- 1.89 3.15 ---- -
PROTAMI :N""E. ZI NC & lLETIN (INSULIN , LILLY ) 
Net Trade List 
In 1 0-cc. vials onl y , 40 un its per cc, eacb ~i O . 99 
In 10-cc . via l s only , 80 units per cc, each 1. 89 
~;; 1. 65 
3.15 
PRICE C0GPARISONS j ~ I NSULIN 
(Continued ) 
• Squibb & Co. 
I NSULIN SQUIBB 
Pric.:e to Oon smner 
Mi ni -
Container and Size Regu l ar mum 
Price Res a l e 
4.664: 40 units per cc ~· ' 10·-CC • vial-~1.40 .-1.26 4676• 80 units p er cc., 10 cc. vial- 2.75 2 . 47 
4688:. 100 units per cc.' 1 0 cc . vial- 3 . 45 3 . 10 
INSULIN-GLOBIN I NSULIN WITH ZI NG SQUI BB 
4694: 
40 unit s per cc ., 10 cc. vial- - -- ~1. 67 '1.50 
12 via l s, ~ r vial---~---------- 1. 62 -----
4706: 
80 units ~ e r ., 10 cc. vial- - - --- 3 . 17 2 . 85 
12 via ls, per via l ---------- ---- 3 . 07 - ----
I NSULin , NPH SQUIBB 
4876: 40 units er cc., 10 cc . vial--~1 . 6 5 ~ 1. 4 8 
4886 ~ 80 u nits pe r cc., 10 cc. via l- - 3.15 2 . 83 
I NS'CLIN) PROTAMI NE ZI NC SQUI BB 
4734: 40 unit s per cc., 10 cc. 
4756: 80 units per c c . , 1 0 cc . 
;1. 48 
2 . 83 
INSULIN - F~ OH ZINC I NSULIN CRYSTALS SQUIBB 
4794: 40 units per cc., 16 cc. vlal ---~1.40 f l.26 
4806:. 80 units per cc ., 10 cc. vial--- 2.75 2.47 
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Pri c e to 
Retailer 
$ 0.84. 
1.65 
2 .07 
~1.00 
. 9 7 
1.90 
1. 84. 
~,0 . 99 
1.89 
~"o. 99 
1.89 
~0.84 
1.65 
Source: n'Study of ~:Tonopoly Ppwer" - U . S . Gov ernment 
Printing Office , Wa shington , D. c., 1952 
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Rosenthal continued in his testimony: 
"--------the drug that keeps alive 
thousands of diabetics is sold under fair-trade 
contracts in 45 states having this law. Eli Lilly 
and Company, one of the largest makers of Insulin 
makes a single contract with one retailer in each 
of the 45 states having this law, compelling every 
retailer within that state to sell Insulin at 
exactly the same price. 
"--------the above illustration holds 
true for many otherproducts sold by the average 
retail store. There are thousands of communities, 
large and small where the consumer can buy only 
one type of amateur film, aspirin, milk of 
magnesia, baby foods, shaving cream, toothpaste, 
surgical dressings, cigars, etc.; and this list 
may be considerably enlarged."* 
Corwin D. Edwards, Economic Consultant to the 
Justice Department, maintains that although manufacturers 
cannot agree with each other about prices, without violating 
the Sherman Anti~Trust Law, they have found a ready means of 
evasion: each of the manufacturers makes an identical price 
agreement with a retailer. 
"--------Consequently, horizontal collu-
sion in violation of the law has been an indispensable 
part of the movement for resale price maintenance 
because: It is always impossible in practice for 
one manufacturer to establish a system of vertical 
price fixing unless he can be sure that his competi-
tors will do likewise; and a single price-fixed com-
modity is exposed to the inroads of competing com-
modities when these articles can be sold for less 
than the fixed price.·"** 
*36, pp. 432-435. 
**36, p. 440. 
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Opponents of fair trade maintain that the drive for 
price fixing by law comes from a group of retailers who want 
to sell in their local markets under monopolistic conditions 
- that is free of price competition. If retailers engaged 
in business were to meet~ agree that they would sell a par-
ticular identifiable item in their drug stores only at a 
particular fixed price~ the agreement would be unlawful under 
the Federal anti-trust statutes, and often unlawful under 
similar state statutes. But the same result is obtained by a 
fair trade contract with one retailer binding all retailers 
and making a conspirational meeting of retailers unnecessary. 
The Department of Justice has publicly stated that 
if it had the money and staff to investigate every fair trade 
contract and to proceed with legal action where the arrange-
ment goes beyond the statutory authorization - 11 therewould 
be no resale problem for there would practically be no resale 
price contracts".* 
The Federal Trade Commission feels that the sub-
stance of fair trade is control of price competition. "Lack 
of adequate enforcement of the anti-trust laws leaves a broad 
field for the activities of organized trade groups to utilize 
it for their own advantage and to the detriment of consumers 11 ~ 
11Resale price ~aintenance, legalized to correct abuses of 
*3, p. 72 (footnote 49). 
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extreme price competition is subject to use as a means of 
effecting enhancement of prices by secret agreements and 
restraint of competition by coercive action on the part of 
interested cooperating trade groups of manufacturers, whole-
salers · and retailers in such ways and to such an extent as to 
make it economically unsound and undesireable in a competi-
tive economy."* 
The Federal Trade Commission believes that the con-
sumer is not only entitled to competition between rival prod-
ucts, but to competition between retailers of a single 
product. * 
E. TRADING STAMPS AND THE CONSUMER 
At the present time retailers are faced with a 
growing "trading stamp hysteria". In the competitive strug-
gle to maintain and increase their business, supermarkets, 
department stores, retail chain groups, and independent re-
tailers have set in motion a cycle of trading stamps, cash 
discount receipts, store coupons, and other plans of giving 
away store profits. 
The Fair Trade Commission of Massachusetts has 
repeatedly stated that it believes that the giving away of 
trading stamps with merchandisesold at fair trade minimum 
prices is a violation of the Fair Trade Law. In some states 
*38, pp. LXI-LXIV. 
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trading stamps have been outlawed while in others the Courts 
have held that the giving away of trading stamps is a proper 
advertising scheme or a discount for cash. 
In the retail drug field, certain drug store 
owners to meet supermarket competition are doing the same 
thing - namely "giving away 2.6% of their profits in stamps". 
Each druggist watches his competitor and soon the vicious 
circle is on its path.* 
The ro l e of the consumer in the trading stamp 
hysteria is revealed in an article in "Time" magazine. 
To subscribe to a stamp plan a retailer may sign up 
with one of a dozen of companies in the business of supplying 
stamps and premiums. If. he buys the services of "S & H", 
Sperry and Hutchinson, largest trading-stamp dealer, he will 
pay about $3.00 per 1,000 stamps, one of which the retailer 
will give to the consumer with each 10-cent purchase. In 
return "S & H" supplies the books for collecting stamps, helps 
with local advertising and promotion and usually opens a con-
venient premium store. To cover the cost of the plan (2% to 
3% of the yearly gross") a retailer must boost sales an 
average of about 20%. This is usually easy for the first 
retailer in the neighborhood with stamps. But as each of the 
retailer's competitors buys a rival stamp plan in self-defense, 
*29, p. 20. 
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the initial advantage to the first retailer wears off. Re-
tailers resume to compete on standards of service, quality, 
and price - except that they are now "stuck with paying for 
the stamps". 
The consumer pays for the painless stamp plan. 
Although retailers may deny that they raise prices to cover 
the cost of the stamp plan, the price of the stamps ultimately 
finds its way into the store's mark-up. The University of 
New Mexico, Bureau of Business Research, in its study of 
western retailers and stamp plans discovered that most re-
tailers in their study increased prices about 4% to take care 
of all extra expenses incurred in the stamp plan. 
Thus, if a shopper filled four books of stamps by 
spending $480 for merchandise, and redeemed her stamps for a 
$13 chafing dish, the consumer would get nothing free. The 
consumer would pay about $20 in inflated mark-ups. 
In 1916 the u.S. Supreme Court recognized the dan~r 
of trading stamps and referred to them as an "appeal to 
stupidity" and gave states authority to declare them illegal~ 
In many respects the trading stamps are analogous 
to the practices of the price-cutter and the loss-leader 
merchant. Both cast "baits" to lure consumers in search of a 
"bargain" and in both instances "phony bargains" are the 
*30, p. 92. 
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result. 
Retail druggists in highly competitive areas are 
desparate to stop the increasing flow of consumer traffic to 
supermarkets for drug items. If the druggist decides to 
give his profits away, he unwittingly in some case supports 
the cause of the supermarket. Some of the stamp companies 
are owned by supermarkets who recoup some of their losses by 
the profits made by the trading stamp company of which they 
are part owners. 
If the trading stamp war becomes more intense, and 
if many supermarkets decide to have "double" or "treble" stamp 
days, can the retail druggist afford to keep up with this 
competitive "racket"? 
In any event, the consumer will ultimately become 
aware· of the fact that some retailers with stamp plans are 
imposing increased prices on many "blind" items to salvage 
s orne of the loss. 
F • S UMI>1ARY 
1. Advantages of Fair Trade 
The consumer benefits from fair trade in the 
following ways: 
(a) Extensive statistics prove that fair trade 
results in lower prices. 
(b) Fair trade helps to preserve efficient 
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neighborhood drug stores, thus saving the consumer shopping 
time and insuring continuous prescription service in the 
community. 
(c) Fair trade protects the consumer from the 
deliberate deception of price cutters who use loss-leaders 
to build up a "phony" bargain psychology and charge high 
prices on unknown merchandise for which the consumer has no 
yardstick of value. 
(d) Fair trade helps to keep the consumer's 
favorite brand products of high quality easily accessible. 
2. Disadvantages of Fair Trade 
(a) Prices are higher in fair trade areas. 
(b) Fair trade creates a rigid structure of prices 
that does not yield either to general or specific changes in 
business and economic conditions. 
(c) jair trade allows manufacturers to over-price 
to maintain inefficient and unnecessary retailers. Revoca-
tion of fair trade would eliminate this payment of an indirect 
subsidy by consumers. 
(d) "Free trade" enables non-service streamlined 
stores to pass on their economies to the consumer, yet allows 
the consumer to patronize the higher priced store if he wants 
to pay for these services. 
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Lo"'t of' th e manufacturere L the dru:_; industry 
are we l l aware that their very surviva l de· ends l'-pon re -
s earch and 1.:roo· ct development. 'l'he very f'a te of any 
company in the d r u g ind.ustrs-- is det ermin e d by the \'Wr t h 
of its - roduc ts . 
hlanufacturers mey deve l op products with the 
asstn~ance thnt f·-ir tre..cle protects their J)roperty rie;ht s 
in the deve l opnent of trade - r.10.rks nd sood vii 11 . 
Under fair traCe there has been a tremendous 
e x-·ansion of d~us manufacturing in the past fifteen ~ears . 
'.'lit::t f a i r trade drv.g manufRct-u.r ers al~e providec. ;Ji th t h e 
order l y ois tribution of their trade -marked proprie t a r y 
medi c ines . Eanufs.ctur e r s are free to deve l or- product s 
·.--i thout th e threat of eventv.Pl 11 l oss - le aderinc_, 11 of U:e ir 
1_.:·roducts . 
The service drug who l esa l er is the ac;;:;ressiv 
fore~ ·.n th e drug industry . Ee is the distributor of over 
1 70 , 000 produc t;s , - r educed by more than 6 , 000 r:-tenufa ctv.rers 
rri thin tbe dru~ industr•·· . 'rhe drug who l esa l er is the foca l 
)O int for the services performed by the drug indus t ry . 
rrhe drn~~ Hbo l esa ler t S service s .for the retail e r 
lil8.'J' inc l u:::1e: 
a) Store design, 
(b) Merchandising and display, 
(c) Re t a il financial manag ement, 
(d) Surveys for potential drug store 
locations, and 
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complete guidance to the ret a iler - geared to make the drug 
retailer's business successful and thus a better customer 
for the service drug wholesaler. 
Fair trade a nd its price stability make the above 
s ervices possible. Otherwise the service wholesal er may be 
re duce d to the role of a speculator in the market place. 
He would also be forced to comp ete for the retailer's bus-· 
iness on the basis of pr ice rather than service. His t ime 
would be spent defending pri ces and discounts. 
Fair trade allows the service wholesaler to render 
a comprehensive and ec onomical service. He does so by for.m-
i ng a link vh ich bring s the retailer and manufacturer to-
g ether, by making available life-g iving drugs to const~ers 
throughout the country. 
How many manufacturers fair-trade their products? 
In this respect, too, there is a difference of op inion and 
numerous studies on the subject have been made. The follow-
ing study was prepared by the American Fair Trade .Council. 
The 11 Standard Advertising Register" lists over 
11,842 manufacturers of nationally advertised brand-name 
products. Listed below are the number of manufacturers 
included by the nstandard Advertising Registern· in 43 
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industrial classifications, and in the adjoining column 
is listed the number o.f mru u.facturers known by the 
American Fair Trade Council to be fair-trading one or 
more products in that cla.ssifica tion. 
PERCSNTAGE OF FAIR-TRADING :MANUFACTURERS IN EACH 
INDUSTRIAL CLASSIJ:i'lCA TI ON OF THE "STANDARD 
ADVERT l S ING REG I srrER tt • 
Industrial classification 
Heating 
VLighting 
Radio and television 
Number of 
manufac ;.;. 
turers 
listed by 
standard 
Advertising 
Register 
244 
150 
158 
Furniture, floor covering, decora-
tions, and upholstery 
t/Hardware 
330 
337 
142 
553 
213 
110 
Household a ppliances 
Housefurnishings 
Cleansers 
~Smokers' requisites 
Flour and cereals 
v' Sweets 
Coffee and tea 
Food products 
v/Wines and liquors 
VBeer, ale, and soft drinks 
Women's clothing and furnishings 
Fancy goods and notions, etc 
Knit goods and underwear 
Men's c lothing and furnishings 
~hoes 
vJewelry, silverware, etc 
~oilet requisites 
76 
137 
59 
861 
165 
251 
741 
335 
230 
295 
250 
248 
402 
Number of 
f air-trad-
ing manu-
facturers 
11 
7 
8 
16 
33 
18 
82 
53 
46 
6 
3 
4 
44 
13 
7 
5 
16 
13 
9 
5 
37 
61 
Percent 
of fair-
trading 
manufac-
turers 
4 . 51 
4 . 67 
5.06 
4.85 
9.79 
12.68 
14.83 
24.88 
41.82 
7.89 
2.19 
6.78 
5.11 
7.88 
2 .79 
0.67 
4.78 
0.57 
3.05· 
2.0 
14.92 
15.17 
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P~~RCENTAGE OF FAI~ -THADING MANUFACTURERS IN :b-:A CH 
I NUUSTRIAL CLASSIFICA TI ON OF THE "STAND.fl:RD 
ADVBR'l'ISHTG REGISTER if. 
(Continued) 
Industrial classification 
Number of 
manufac-
turers 
listed by 
standard 
Advertising 
Reg ister 
Number of Percent 
fair-trad- of f a ir-
ing manu- trad ing 
facturers manufac-
viProprietary medicines, drugs, 
chemicals, etc 
Musical instrmnent s , amusements, 
etc 
Sporting g oods 
Watercraft, b icycles , and motor-
/ cycles 
V Games, toys, etc 
Pu b lishers , engravers, etc 
Airp lanes and a ccessories 
Aut omob iles and trucks 
Tr a ile r s , plea sure 
r ire s and tubes 
Gasoline and lubricants 
Automob ile accessori e s 
Building construction and material 
Paints, var n i shes, and enamel s 
Iachiner y and supplies 
Office equipment 
~ail-order houses 
Farm equipment 
Seeds, plants an d f ertilizers 
/Livestock, poultry, and supplies 
v lVi iscellaneous 
~ot a l, 43 classifications 
620 
104 
345 
86 
88 
493 
72 
59 
29 
25 
109 
354 
601 
175 
684 
225 
36 
338 
287 
204 
621 
11,842 
174 
6 
65 
2 
5 
48 
4 
2 
-----0 
5 
13 
78 
12 
17 
19 
51 
0 
3 
9 
10 
ll 
1,031 
Sour7: American Fair Trade Council 
Indicates Manufacturers who retail 
one or more of their products in 
drug stores. 
turers 
28.06 
5.77 
18.84 
2.33 
5.68 
9 .72 
5.56 
3.39 
20 .0 
11.,93 
22 .03 
2.0 
9 . 71 
2.78 
22.67 
.89 
3 .14 
4.9 
1.77 
8.71 
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It is significant to note that 174 manufacturers 
of proprietary medicines of 620 listed fair trade, one or 
more of their products, or 28.6%, are listed fair trade 
products. This is the highest p e rcentag e of the 43 class-
ifications lis ted . 174 manufacturers of toilet requisites 
of 402 listed, or 15 .175& fair trad e their products. 
Of 11,842 manufac turers 1, 031 fair ., trade one or 
more of their pr oducts vmicb. means that 8.71% of manufac-
turers listed fair trade products. 
A . MANUFA CTURER 1 S TRADEMARK 
1. Trademark vs. Tangible Goods 
rrhe accepted concept is that a man has the right 
to do what he pleases with the tangible goods he owns. It 
is inherent in the position fair trade critics take in ma in-
taining that a retailer has a right to sell any product at 
any price aft er he has taken title to the product. 
In the 110ld Dearborn Case" in 1936 the U. S . 
Supreme Court held that the manufacturer retains title to 
his trademark even after the retailer acquires title to 
the product which the mark identifies. During the past 
half century, the American economy has become · a brand name 
economy. In today's marketing processes a manufacturer's 
trademark may actually be his most important single asset. 
In the final analysis the manufacturer has the greatest 
stake in his trademark. His product has beendeveloped 
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through years of hard work, research, investment,advert ising, 
and merchandising, to the point vd1 ere it wins wide customer 
acceptance. It is the good will in his trademark ~b ich 
makes tomorrow's business more than an accident for the 
manufacturer, as well as for the Wholesalers and retailers 
who choose to handle tl1. e raam.;ifacturer' s trademarked product. 
In the distributi on of trademarked or branded merchand-
ise, the distributor is not merely handlin g a cormnodity alone; 
he is handling a commodity plus a trademark or brand. The 
commodity is one thing and the trademark or brand is another 
thing. The value of the trademark or brand is value repre~ -
.sented by go od will, ownership of which is not transferred 
when the commodity bearing such trademark is sold. The good 
will of the manufacturer is a property which the o•mer has a 
right to protect. "The comrnodity itself' is pr operty 'hich 
may be dealt in without restraint by anyone, providing the 
aid of the trademark, brand or good will, is not utilized". 
The product may be separated from the trademark and sold 
without reference to the trademark it formerly bore. Owner-
ship of a commodi ty itself may change hands many times. 
Ownership of trademarks or brands very infrequently or 
never change hands .-li-
The U. S . Supreme Court in nold Dearborn" 
~n, p. 13. 
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Distributing Co. vs. Distillers Corp. (299 U. S. 183) sai d : 
"--------and good wi 11 is property in a 
very real sense, injury to which, like injury to 
any species of property , is a propEr subject for 
legislation. Good wi 11 is a valuable contributing 
aid to business - sorr~times the most valuable con-
tributing asset of the producer or distributor of 
commodities . And dist:i.nctive trad emarks, l abels, 
and bre.nds are legi tiir.a t e aids to the creation or 
enlargement of such g ood will . It is well settled 
that the p roprietor of the g ood will is entitled 
to protection as against on e who attempts to de-
prive him of the benefits resulting from the same, 
by using his labels and trademark without his con-
sent or authority. 
" ·--------courts afford redress or relief 
upon the ground that a p a rty has a valuable inter-
est in the good wi 11 of his trade, or busines s and 
in the trademark adop ted to maintain and extend it. 
"--------It proceeds u p on th e theory that 
the sale of i dentified g oods at less than the price 
fixed by the owner o f th e mark or brand is an assault 
upon the g ood \fill, and constitutes what the sta tute 
d enominates "unfair competition". 
"--------'rhe primary aim of the law is to 
protect the property, namely the g ood will -of the 
p roducer vvhich he still owns. The p rice restricti on 
i s adopted a s an appropria te me a ns to that p erfectly 
l eg itimate end, and not as an end in itself". ~~ 
2. Value of Trademark 
It is only n a tu.r a:l thc. t products sold as lost-·l eaders, 
without excepti on are products of known value produced by man-
ufacturers who expend much time and energy in "pre-sellingtt 
their pro ducts by la r g e expendit1.1res for advertising . The 
g reat increHse in national advertising given products by the 
-l~39. 
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nedi a of radio, televis ion, ne \ls papers, and maga zines bas 
materially enhance d the attractiveness of th e se it ems f or 
use as lo s s-leaders by retailers . The pri c e cutter con -
siders the l oss taken on the loss-leader as an advertis-
ing cos t or a promotiona l device. HovJ ever , t be use of' the 
manufacturer ' s good wil l constitutes a serious diminution 
in v a l ue of the product of the manufacturer. 
On e of the major pur poses and effects of fair 
trade is to make ·it p ossible for the manufa cturer to: 
1. Make a quality pro duct 
2. Constantly strive to maintain 
or i mprove that quality 
3. Price it at its true v a lue 
4. l'ilake it readily availab l e 
5. Advertise t ruthfully and in 
good taste 
6 . Advertise consistent ly 
7. Adverti se to th e right people 
n1.Vi t hout mounting exposures to piratic a l practic es 
of predatory rese llers a n d without inviting pressures t oward 
reduced qua l i t y , and reduced val ue wi tb re l at ion to price n. 
ttFa ir 'I' r ade prevent s the resultant populaJ•ity of 
your product from b eing perverted t o the purpos es of pre-
datory pr:l ce re t ailers - with damage to the public and wi th 
certain depre cia tion and poss i b l e des truct i on of goo d - will 
va l ues created by your inv e stme nt in a dvert is ing " • .;:. 
~~5, p . 11. 
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The followlng charts i llustrate the substantia l 
investment the manufacturer has made in advertisin~ his 
0 
p roduct. 
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In the abov e survey fifty - one of these " 100 
l eading national advertisers" fair trade one or more 
products. 
l'.Ianufacturers uh o appear on this li st who fair -
trade one or more products ho.ve an asterisk . 
I.Ianufacturers whose product s are sold in retai l 
drug stores have been check- mE',rked . 
To revent distortion of the sign ificance of this 
survey, the follov.rj_n[:; f actors must be considered: 
( 1) The perce nt a · e of gross vohune represented 
by the s a les of fair - trade p r oducts is very small in many 
ct..ses . 
(2) A subsid i ary of the rnanufac tux•er l isted n:ay 
be f a i r-trading and for tha t rea son the parent compa~y has 
b e en inc luded i n the list of those checked . 
(3) The r,1anufacturer rr..ay b e f ah"" tradi ng on l y 
i n a limited nu .. mbeJ." or~ s t nt es . 
( 4) ~\1anu.facturers who bave ceas ed f <:'1.ir trading 
are n ot includ e d in t he above survey .. 
REC.APITULP.'EION OF J,NA LYS I S lllA DE J N ADV:~r-t'J:ISING SPACE 
IN l\1AGP;LJ L J t s ·YE•' NA'r iJHAL CIHC~UL?~TI15 1r 
Magazi ne 
News paper: Rot o Section: 
American Weekly 
l!Iagazine: 
Better Homes & Garden s 
Col l ier t s 
Cosmopolitan 
Ladies Home Journa l 
Life 
Lo ok 
Phot oolay 
Satur aay Evening Post 
True 
Women ' s Home Companion 
- - -
Is sue 
April 22 , 1951 
March , 
April 21, 
May, 
Iviar ch, 
March 9 , 
Apr il 24, 
March, 
I;lar ch 17, 
May , 
March, 
1 951 
1 951 
1 951 
1951 
1951 
1951 
1951 
1951 
1951 
1951 
Tot a l 
Advert is :Lng 
pace 
Tota l Spa ce 
Paid for by 
Manufacturers 
'.-nw Fs. ir Trs.de 
Pages 
17 . 0 
107 . 95 
45 . 37 
29 . 48 
88 . 63 
70 . 38 
67. 49 
31 . 375 
91. 81 
26 . 755 
65 . 90 
Pages 
11 . 375 
58.08 
14 . 44 
13 . 30 
58 . 25 
37 . 13 
32 .31 
19 . 625 
43 . 5 6 
6 . 45 
42.25 
Amount 
66 . 91 
53 . 8 
33 . 3 
45 .11 
65 . 75 
52.74 
47 . 87 
62 .5 
47 . 4 
24.11 
64 .1 
Source : Amer1can Fair Tre.de Cm ... mcil, Gary, Ind . 
1-' 
-l=="" 
\.Jl 
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SATURDAY EVENING POST SURVEY OF ADVER'l'IS _ -~:HS 
Company 
Eastman Kodak 
Me nnen Co. 
Parker Pen 
Colgate-Palmolive 
Lambert (Prophylactic Brush) 
J. B. William Co. 
American Safety Razor 
Bristol-Myers 
Amer i can Home Products 
u. s. Rubber Co. 
Olin Industri es 
\'Jhi tman & Sons, Inc. 
DuPont de Nemours 
P . Lorrilard 
U . S . T ir,1e 
Westclox 
Gillette Safety Razor 
Bauer & Bl a ck 
American Thermos, Bottle 
Reynolds Tobacco 
American Tobacco 
Lambert Pharmacal Co •. 
Lever Bros. ( Pepsodent Division) 
Scholl Mfg . Co. 
Armour & Co. 
Larus 8c Bros. 
General Aniline (Anaco) 
E. R. Squibb & Sons 
Johnson & Johnson 
McKesson & Robbins Inc. 
Cheesborough 
Kaywoodie & Co. 
H. exall Drug Co. 
Sheaffer Pen Co. 
American Optical 
Luden' s Inc. 
Norwich Pharmacal Co . 
Brown & Wi lliamson Tobacco 
H.ayonac, 
Number of Years 
Advertising 
51 
50 
50 
49 
49 
49 
47 
44. 
43 
42 
41 
41 
40 
40 
40 
40 
39 
38 
37 
37 
36 
36 
32 
34 
33 
32 
30 
29 
26 
25 
23 
23 
23 
23 
22 
22 
22 
21 
21 
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SATURDAY EVENH:"Cf PC!S'r URVEY OF ADVERTISERS 
(Continued) 
Company 
Corn Product s Sale s Co. 
Parke - Dav is Co . 
Imeric a n Chicle 
Ster l ing Drug Inc. 
Wildroot Inc. 
Phill ip Morris & Co. 
Schick Inc. 
Vick Chemical 
Zonite 
Eversha rp Inc. 
Dennison Mfg. Co. 
The Murine Co. 
Script a Mfg . 
International Cellucotton Products 
Bl ock .ur u g Co. 
Tek-Hughes 
The Barbasol Co. 
Chap tick 
Shulton Inc. 
Union Pharmac eutical Co. 
Source: Saturday Evening Post 
Number of Years 
Advertising 
20 
20 
19 
19 
1 9 
18 
18 
1 8 
18 
17 
1 6 
J6 
16 
15 
14 
J2 
10 
10 
10 
10 
The above list is a partial list of a dvertisers 
whose products are sold i n drug stores. The above listed 
companies have a ppeared in the "Saturday Evening Posttt ten 
or more years and have s p ent a minimum of ;jp lO,OOO during 
1948 or ~~5,000 during the first six months of 1 949. 
Fair t rad e permits the manufacturer to extend his 
national advertising consistently ( as shown above ) without 
fear that the resulting increase in the product's p opularity 
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will so increase its value as a store-traffic lure as to 
induce predatory retailers to use the advertised products as 
"loss-leaders". The manufacturer can continue to advertise 
without fear that predatory retailers will stiffle the prod ~ 
uct's distribution by making its sale unattractive to 
straightforward retailers. National advertising promotes 
good wil~and fair trade protects the good will of the 
producer. Without fair trade the loss-leader technique could 
destroy - and has destroyed product prestige for manufac-
turers . 
In discussing good will, Harry D. Nims, author of 
"Unfair Competition and Trademarks" said: 
"There is nothing marvelous or mysterious 
about it. When an individual or a firm or a cor-
poration has gone on for an unbroken -series of years 
conducting a particular business, and has been so 
scrupulous in fulfilling every obligation, so careful 
in maintaining the standard of the goods dealt in, 
so absolutely honest and fair in all business deal-
ings that customers of the concern have become con-
vinced that their experience in the future will be 
as satisfactory as it has been in the past, while 
such customers' good report of their own experience 
tends to continually bring new customers to the 
same concern, there has been produced an element 
of value quite as important - in some cases, 
perhaps far more important - than the plant or 
machinery, with which the business is carried on. 
That it is property is abundantly settled by 
authority and indeed is not disputed."--------
"--------Good will cannot be seen or felt, 
measured or weighed. Yet, since it has value and 
is bought and sold, it must be and is represented, 
recognized, and identified by symbols. Names are 
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such symbols; brand and trade insignia also. The 
friendship and affection of the public for a public 
servant is expressed by the use of his name. So 
also of the popularity and good will of a business 
house; it is expressed by reference to, or use of 
its name, its trademarks and its trade symbols." 
U. s. Supreme Court Justice Holmes said: "Good 
will -------- deals with a delicate matter that may be of 
great value but that is easily destroyed, and therefore 
should be protected with corresponding care."* 
In a study, "Economic Aspects of Resale Price 
Maintenance", Dr. Gordon Siefkin, Professor of Economics 
Dean of the Emory School of Business Administration made the 
following observation: 
*40. 
"Our entire modern market structure and 
system of mass production and distribution is 
closely related to the good will and reputation 
which firms establish and to the confidence which 
consumers come to place in the trademark as 
evidence of the quality and worth of products. 
"Many popular consumer items are produced 
by modern techniques and complicated processes. 
In many cases, it is impossible for the consumer 
himself to obtain understandable product informa-
tion concerning the quality of the goods he buys. 
The consumer finds himself at a complete loss with-
out some knowledge of the producer or the product, 
or some confiden~e in the trademark or retailer. 
"Uniformity and stability in the price of 
a branded item may be as important as the level of 
the price.itself in giving the consumer confidence 
that he has made a good buy."** 
**44, pp. 134-135. 
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3. Critics of Fair Trade and the Good Will Argument 
Critics assert that after more than a generation of 
exhaustive official and private investigations, there is a 
notable lack of dependable evidence to support the allega-
tion that the property right in the good will of a manufac-
turer was said to have been damaged or destroyed. Opponents 
of fair trade say that many of the outstanding branded prod-
ucts of our day have been freely and competitively priced 
over a long period of years not only without injury to the 
producer's good will but with actual "accrual to it", because 
free pricing has made possible larger markets for more 
satisfied users. 
Opponents question the right of a manufacturer 
merely because he puts a brand name on a tube of toothpaste 
or a tin of aspirin to fix the price all the way down the 
line to the consumer. 
They claim that fair trade laws prevent the true 
function of a trade-mark. Unlike a patent or copyright, there 
is no monopoly privilege in a trade-mark. The proper and 
sole function of the trade-mark is simply to identify the 
origin of the goods. 
In the "Wentling Decision" the United States 
Circuit Court of Appeals stated: "--------it is perfectly 
true that a trademark is entitled to protection. Nor does it 
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require any Fair Trade act to give such protection. · --------" 
"A ~atentee is given a monopo l y by legal 
grant. But even a patentee, who can exclude everyone 
else from making his patented article, cannot control 
the price at which others may sell his articles to 
consumers. The protection given to the owner of a 
trade-mark certainly should not be greater than that 
given to the holder of a legal monopoly - the 
patentee."* 
Finally, some critics deny that fair trade does or 
can protect the good will of the owner of a trade-mark in 
the proper , sense of the word. They claim that good will is 
NOT entitled to the protection against the economic effects 
of honest competition among retailers. They claim good will 
is entitled to protection against "passing off" and "counter-
feiting" and nothing more. Laws, without fair trade, grant . 
this protection. They claim that in reality fair trade 
prices destroy the good will of retailers who are anxious to 
establish a reputation for low prices. Opponents conclude 
that what manufacturers are trying to protect is not good will 
but a semi-monopolistic position. 
Critics maintain that in many instances, lower 
prices on products have increased the volume of manufactur-
ers' sales without injury to the manufacturers' good will. 
Many manufacturers have actually benefited from price cutting 
and some have advocated the use of their products as loss-
*41, pp. 8-9. 
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leaders. An example of this attitude by manufacturers is 
found in the Federal Trade Commission's report. One drug 
manufacturer in outlining his reasons for not placing his 
products under fair trade price schedules made the following 
statement to the Commission: 
"---------Furthermore, inasmuch as a consid-
erable . part of our volume is sold as loss-leaders, 
the effect of adopting resale price maintenance upon 
our business would likely be very much greater than 
in most other businesses, and we are necessarily 
cautious, therefore, and wish to have time to observe 
the operation of these contracts, and the experience 
of other large companies in using them." 
B. ADVANTAGES OF FAIR TRADE TO MANUFACTURER 
1. Fair Trade Improves Quality 
Fair trade allows a manufacturer to take this 
position: "I shall make as good an article as my capacity 
and business judgment will dictate or permit. I shall place 
my name trade-mark op it, and determine the minimum price at 
which it shall be resold to the consumer so that the largest 
number of distributors will be encouraged to stock and sell 
it. fl 
Manufacturers who fair trade products build in the 
products a high standard of value sufficient to justify the 
expense of national advertising. Manufacturers stake their 
business reputations and their good will on the superiority 
of their products. 
There is frequently found in fair traded products 
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high value with relation to price resulting from a long-range 
pricing policy that the manufacturer has established. 
"Fair Trade gives a manufacturer assurance 
that temporary high costs of production, with re-
lation to selling price, may be recovered over a 
long period through reduction in overhead costs 
resulting from increased sales volume. 
"Without fair-trade a manufacturer's 
volume may be slaughtered almost overnight by an 
epidemic of loss leader pricing resulting directly 
from public recognition of the increased value 
the manufacturer has built into his product, ex-
pecting that volume increases will accommodate 
deliberate increases in prime costs of manufac-
ture."* 
If the manufacturer is confident that he is con-
sistently protected by fair trade against predatory price 
cutting on his product, he more confidently looks forward to 
expending funds for research and development toward quality 
that better serves the consumer. 
When a product in a given area is advertised as a 
store-traffic lure, the straightforward smaller retailer 
understandably discontinues the sale of the product. Often 
up to 80 per cent of a manufacturer's total sales volume comes 
from such straightforward retailers. 
The result of such loss-leader selling is that the 
manufacturer's total sales may go down. His production costs 
go up as overhead expenses must be piled up on lowered 
*36, pp. 732-733. 
154 
volume. Thus is put into motion what is called "the cut 
price spiral" which in turn produces the so-called "quality 
squeeze". 
The "cut price spiral" results in diminishing 
retailer good will - and decreasing consumer buying, and 
results in what is known as the "quality squeeze". 
"The 'quality squeeze' results from compulsions 
upon the manufacturer to reduce his costs, so as to meet the 
demand of retail monopolists for still further reductions in 
their cost of acquisition, to support continuing downward 
spiraling of retail prices."* 
An arbitrary reduction of as much as five or ten 
per cent in the prime factory cost of a product may reduce 
the value of that product t o the consumer by half or more 
without in some cases making any change in the product's 
appearance. 
Thus fair trade prevents the so-called "quality 
squeeze" created by the "cut price spiral" and assures the 
consumer of better quality products. · 
Eli Lilly and Company and other pharmaceutical 
companies also recognize the threat of the "quality squeeze" 
in the drug industry. 
Fair trade promotes the manufacture of high-quality 
*5, p. 11. 
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pharmaceutical products. Without fair trade there would be 
tremendous pressure upon drug manufacturers to lower their 
prices so the druggist could realize a greater margin of 
profit. 
Eli !:;illy and Company observe that 11manufacturers 
must have profits too"; and while most pharmaceutical manu-
facturers would not consider lowering the quality and purity 
of their products, under any set of circumstances, some 
companies might, nevertheless, find the pressure so great 
they would lower their prices at the expense of using quality 
ingredients and maintaining high-quality laboratory controls. 
When the drug manufacturer is forced to cut costs, 
one of the principal ways he can cut costs is by lowering the 
quality of the product itself. If this were allowed to 
happen in the pharmaceutical industry, certain:)..y the consumer 
would suffer qualitywise and certainly the nation's health 
would suffer.* 
"Djer-Kiss Face Powder" is a product many retail 
druggists recall as having once been a famous product and 
lost much of its market because of indiscriminate and pred-
atory price cutting in the pre-fair-trade days of the 1930's. 
"Anthony and Cleopatra" cigars were price cut so 
much that few retailers had any interest in handling them as 
*8, p.lO. 
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a profitless item. 
The manufacturer then developed a new line of 
"Anthony and Cleopatras ", called "TVF", the distribution of 
which he controlled. When fair trade became effective in the 
1930's, even the retailers who formerly cut the price of the 
"Anthony and Cleopatra" brand were anxious to sell the new 
brand. They found, according to the information received by 
the manufacturer, that the buying public would no longer buy 
the regular line because it had come to have little value for 
"Anthony and Cleopatras" due to price cutting. 
Fair trade protects the manufacturer from trade-
mark damage,and he can be confident that retailers will not 
"under the counter" his product or stop handling it because 
of it becoming a profitless item. The manufacturer has a 
high stake in his national brand. Years of hard work and 
heavy financial investments in research, manufacturing, sales 
and promotion may be wiped out when his valuable trade-mark 
is caught in the cross-fire of a price war. 
The present of Doeskin Products, Inc., Mr. Emanuel 
Katz, expressed his thought on the damaging effects of price-
cutting in an article entitled "Enforced Fair-Trade Is Best 
For All". 
"Deep price cutting of the leading brands makes it 
impossible for the secondary brands to compete, and tends 
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toward the undue concentration of business in the hands of a 
few toward the creation of bigness as against medium and 
smaller firms." 
Mr. Katz also points out that there is "nothing 
deader" than a brand which has been "footballed" and no 
longer yields a profit to any retailer. 
In price slashing, retailers limit the number of 
loss-leaders upon which they as dealers are willing to accept 
losses. The result, Mr. Katz concludes, is the survival of 
the leading brand or even the number two brand. However, the 
secondary brands cannot survive under loss-leader selling 
because the secondary brands are eventually replaced (by 
similar products) by private labels. Mr. Katz concludes that 
loss-leader selling ruins adverti~ing and the "entire concept 
of brand marketing".* 
Mr. Charles s. Beardsley, Chairman of the Board, 
Miles Laboratories, cites an illustration of loss-leader 
s~ling, in an address at the NARD convention in 1947. 
2. Prevents Damaging Effects of Loss-Leader Selling 
In a price war in 1952, Bayer Aspirin with a fair 
trade list price of 59 cents was driven down to 4 cents. 
Consumers were confused and arrived at the most damaging and 
unfounded conclusions in regard to Bayer's quality. One 
*32, p. 80 
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customer telephoned the manufacturer to question whether the 
Bayer Aspirin that was being "price footballed" was not really 
"Bayer" seconds. Another customer told the manufacturer that 
she and her friends had a wager as to whether the Bayer 
Aspirin advertised was really old aspirin that the store could 
not sell. 
The following is a statement from the manufacturer 
of Bayer Aspirin: 
"The exploitation of the good name of 
Bayer Aspirin by price-warring stores, is in our 
opinion, jungle tactics and not in the interest of 
fair play in the market. 
"The stores which are advertising Bayer 
Aspirin at a price considerably below their cost are 
not philanthropists. It is our belief that they 
hope to give customers the impression that other goods 
are sold at similar bargain prices - to encourage 
them to buy other items on which the stores will make 
up their losses from the sale of Bayer Aspirin at 
these ridiculous prices. We have discontinued the 
sale of our merchandise to stores which have adopted 
these practices-------~ 
"The Bayer Co. Division of 
Sterling Drug Inc., 
Jame.s Hill Jr., President." 
Other products have lost prestige in the opinion of 
consumers because of loss-leader selling. The illustration 
in Part II of "Ingersoll Watches" is an example of a manufac-
turer who lost both prestige and marke·ts in the absence of 
fair trade to prevent sharp practices. 
In 1927 Miles Laboratories sold in the City of 
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Elkhart on direct orders to the small retail druggists a 
total of $1,543. In 1928 sales increased to $1,624. In 1929 
sales went up to $1,702. 
In 1930 their business in the entire U.S. showed 
an increase of 11%, while in the same year the City of 
Elkhart amounted to $400 - or a decrease of 25%. 
In 1930 a cut-rate store was opened by one of the 
drug chains and sales in Elkhart were only $1,318 as against 
$1,702 in 1929. Sales for 1930 were $1,318: 6 direct orders 
from the cut-rate store of $600 - the direct orders for the 
other stores in town were a total of $600 - the other $100 was 
made upon miscellaneou~ orders. 
The independent stores of Elkhart sold "Mile's 
Nervine" at 91 cents or 89 cents while the cut-rate drug 
store would sell the item for 69 cents. The independent 
druggist made no attempt to substitute nor would he compete 
in the price with the cut-price drug store. In refusing to 
meet the price, customers walked out, gave up the idea of 
satisfying his or her wants on that day, and Miles Labora-
tories also lost a sale. 
In other words, Miles Laboratories experienced a 
decrease of 25% of their business in the City of Elkhart, 
while the rest of the U. S. showed an increasd of 11% in 
business. 
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Mr. E . B. '~Neis s of the Gr•ey Advert sing Agency , 
N . Y ., has expresse d the advantage s of Fair Trade to manu-
facturers in terms of nevv retail developments. 'l'here are 
t hree (3) important retail developments which have g iven 
new and even g reater i mportance to Fair r rade and the 
manufacturer. 
( 1) The growi ng concentl"'a tion of ret s. il volume 
in the hands of a smal l g roup of g i a nt retailer organizat i ons. 
S ome 400 g i a nt re t ai l er s c ontrol over half of the nover the 
counter" volume. 
(2) The secon d fundamental retai l trend in re-
t a iling is towar d " robot retailing~ or ielf s ervice and 
self selection. 
(3) The third i s the fundamental trend among 
most larg e ret a ilers to develop their own controlled brands -
brands which are today becoming more and more strongly ad-
vertised . 
The a bov e three developments relat e to Fair •rrade 
in t he followL1g way: 
( a ) Lart;;e retai lers tend to be ric e promo-
tional. They want to establish r eputat ions for low prices. 
If it were not for Fair Trade the g iant retailers woul d see 
t o it that we would h av e few manufactur ers' adv ertised 
brands - the g iant retailers Uwould hav e cut the very heart 
out of them ." 
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(b) La r ge r etai lers are al l broadening 
their inventories and adding new merchan dise ca tegories . 
{ c . g . drug dep t:'.rtments in department stores, drug departments 
and b eau ty aids in supermarkets ). "Inventory wi s e they are 
t a king in each other's wasbn - most ly the same nat i ona lly 
advertised brands . To convince the publ ic that t hey are 
abl e to sell merchandise at lower prices, these retaile rs 
would c ertainly have price-footballed these nationally 
advertised brands were it no t for the f a ct that f a ir trade 
r estrains them. 
(c) Large retailers never fo r get net profit -
and without f air trade a manufacturer 's brand woul d be cut 
to the point where i t no l ong er was profitable and that brand 
would be dropped. 
(d) As retailing g oes more se l f service and 
self selection , the l arge retai l er realizes that i t is no 
l onger comp lete l y necessary to kill the sale of a brand by 
putting it out of s ight . In supermarket s, for example, it 
is necessary only to put a brand a t ankle height in order to 
cut its volume by as much as 50 per cent. The large retailer 
g ive s p oor shelf pos ition to i tems yielding a poor mark up . 
~ith t h e effects of lo s s-leader selling and no f a ir trade, 
most manufacturers ' brands would be ri ght down at "toe l eve ln 
on the shelves of many l a r ge retailers. 
(e) Large retai lers are usually interested in 
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promoting private brands wh ich ;y-ie l d a substantial profit 
margin . The more the l arge r etai l e r cuts the profit out 
of the m.anu.facturers' brands , the more he tends to feature 
his own private brands . I nasmuch a s l a r ge retai l e r s tend 
to l oca lly advertise their private bran ds , togethe r with 
l es s -leader selling he h as a powerful competi tive we apon . 
Added to this he c an j ugr; l e the shelf position to s uit his 
own needs . 
Bu s ic merchandising trends t oday at th e retail level 
a dd nn ew hazards 11 to the manufacturer in bui l ding a "consumer 
franchise " ' or go od wil l built through a dvertising a qua lity 
product. 
~rr . Weis s claims th::..t the above hazards to the man-
ufacturer can only be countered w-ith fair trade . The mo s t 
valuab le property right a manufacturer may have - is today 
"actually more exposed to multip l e dangers as a result of 
g iant retailing and ttr ob ot retailinr;tt than ever before in 
the bistory of advertising ." 
1!Vere it n ot for Fair Trade i t is doubtful whether 
nationa l advertising could exi st under the new merchandis-
in g ord er . 
If g i ant r etailers ere to play the ~arne l o s s-
l eader sellj_ng a nd price football nat ional l y adve:c•tised 
bra n d s , there wou l d be litt l e or no profit f or retaile rs 
in most manufa ctur ers ' "brands ., 
163 
'l1he g i ant r eto. i l e r in many cases O\'es his exi s t -
ence, his g rowth, an d is ne t p r ofit to the turnov e r r a te 
created for manuf ac turers ' brands by a dvertis ing - and to 
t h e g u aranteed profits that g o h a nd i n h and with t hese 
b r a n d s a s a resul t of f a ir trade. 
Ym.1 c a n 1 t have urobot retai l ::i.ng 11 u n l e s s you h ave 
pr e sold b r a n d s - and tha t me a ns advertised b rands . You 
c an' t h ave r e t ail prof i ts un l e ss you h av e ma i ntaine d .p ric e s -
a n d that means ~'Fair Trade" . -:~ 
By crea tin g a stron g d emand for certain t ype s of 
pro ducts, nat i onal bra nds of manufacturer s provi de a ready -
ma ,~ e ma r k et for the big retailers ' p rivate b r a nds.. Th e b i g 
r et a iler s d o not nec e ss a r i l y rely hea vi l y on the reputation 
of t he nation a l b r a n d s . \'Ji th amp le cs.p i t a l a t t he ir d i s-
p o s a l fo r promotion they a r e a b l e t o sell the i r priva te 
bra nd s on t he i r own r eputation . Some private brands se ll 
more wi de l y than le adin G nat i onal brands in the s ame g e n -
e r a l class . The b i g l oss-leader re ta i l er, therefor e , has 
no conscience in k illi n g a manufactur e r ' s n2. t i ona l b r a nd by 
us i ns it as ba i t sin ce h is rea l motiv e is t o s e ll hi s p rivate 
bra n d s ( g en e r al l y at higher ma r g ins) . After h e is finished 
on one n a tiona l br a n d , he s i mpl y star ts on an another. 
(This, however, is n ot true of a ll big r e tailers . Some 
-:~36, PP • 714 - 715 
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biG retailers do not enga g e in l oss - leader sell i ng . They 
merchandis e vig orously and very· e ffec ti ve l y . They a lso 
sell t he ir own private bra nds . 'l'hey have int en s ified 
competition, fair competi t:Lon in the marke t p lac e . Fa ir 
trade will not t ake any t h ing fro~ t~em. ) 
~tabillty 
i't .. ir trade offers t he d rug Planufac t urer i n the 
drug industry the advs.nta;_:; e of s t a •J ili ty . The cons lmler 
be comes accustomed to pay- i ns a g ive n pri ce , especially on 
:fins. l con~urr.ption c;ood s s u ch a .3 •.:1rus store products . 
·rh e who l esaler l1and.l ine; the manufactur ers 1 
product is- a ls o ,suaranteed a steady marc_;in o:f return fo r 
h s.nd line; these .. --o ods , and in return cooper ates with the :r:Jan -
ufacturer . 
Sta r) ili t-:r o f fer s the manufactu rer a fa irl·y- c;ood 
estiri:1" t e of the mon e tar:,.r r evenues thr> t hi s productive oper -
ation s wil l -ie l d and he p l ans i s f utu r e o~ erat io_s a c c ord-
in2_;l y . 
llanufacturers 1 sa l e smen can cone .ntrate o_ s e ll i n s 
\".· i tbcut hav in t; to spend time de fen ~ti n[·. pri css and d is c ounts. 
~r ice s 0~ ~~w materia ls ris e an d fall, wage s 
f l uc t uate 8.d.v:::- l•tis :...ng an d marke t i nc, ex )e nd i tures undere,o 
chanbe an~ tax bur· e· s · nders o revis l c ns. Despite these 
chs>.nc e ln c c.st ~ the niar;mfa cturer under f9.ir t rade can ms. i n -
-a i n a stated f i xed pr i ce on his product. T_e fric~ policy 
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of _ e. ir t r ade a ll c vvs the manafacturer to pro c eed easily 
\Ii th a satisfactory ;)rice adjustment - satisfac tory to the 
dl"ug who l e s a l er , and sat i sfactory to the r etai l drugc ist . 
I~ the d rug industry ther e would be litt l e troub l e in 
securin s the c ohl l ete cooferation of ~11 ffiarketin : &~encies 
in the enforc ement of new pri c e olicies . 
In smnmary a price cut ·cins system tends t o demoral -
ize tb e comp le te market; it dest roys p r o f it n1...arsins for t he 
wholesaler and leads to r e ques ts by retailers fo r l ower 
vh o l esal er prices; it for ces dru6 6 ist s to look for-sub -
stitute produc ts with resu l t that tbey ce 2.s e to ush the 
sale of cut - priced products. ?rice cuttint;, undermines 
lYub l ic c onfidence in the manufacturer ' s quality e.nd in 
t he £ a irn e ss of · revai l inG prices . 
c. 
1. Pressure Tactic s and Boy c otts 
Op.t)onents of fair tra d e cont end t hc<t it j _s not 
price cuttint:, that in j ttres the manufacturer, but t he il l 
wi ll or retai l ers an J. wholesal ..::. rs occasioned by the ref'usa l 
of' the manuf'acturer to f a ir-trad e h is produc ts. \1any l!.an -
ufacturers , t h ey con tend , do not t1vo l untari l y !t fa ir-trc. 'e 
~_,heir p r oduc ts . They have d one so with extreme re l uctance 
~nd only upon the ~ers ist ent insistence o.f ret a i l er s and 
whol esalers and their associa tions . 'l'he fol l owing exampl e 
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is cited in the Federal Trade Commission's report: 
"During the year 1935 the Pepsodent 
Company upon advice of counsel, withdrew its prod-
ucts from resale price maintenance in California. 
As a result of this action, the organized retail 
druggists of the State waged such an aggressive 
fight against the company that it again placed its 
products under resale price -maintenance contracts 
in that state. The methods used by the California 
Druggists Association were described by the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Northern California Reta1.1 
Drug Association at the thirty-seventh annual Con -
vention of the National Association of Retail 
Druggists, held in Cincinnati, in September, 1935 
as follows: 
"'Mr. chairman, fellow druggists. The 
Pepsodent Company was operating in the State of 
California under the Ca~ifornia Fair Trade Act. 
They made no attempt to enforce their contract 
and like a bolt of lightning from the blue sky, 
they informed us that their California fair-trade 
contract was cancelled, and the general sales 
manager, Mr. Kermott, came out to California, 
called upon me to make excuses, and he had with 
him one of the California salesmen. 
"'I expressed my heartfelt sympathy to the 
two young men who were in my office because I told 
them they would have the toughest time any sales-
men had had in any territory. We passed a resolu-
tion at our meeting, and we published that resolu-
tion in our journal, and we sent that resolution 
to every member in California, in which we urged 
and advised them to discontinue the sale of any prod-
uct that had cancelled their fair-trade contract. 
"'Brothers, it was a slap in the face of 
our Fair Trade Act. It makes no difference what 
firm it was - it was unwarranted. It was the 
first cancellation. And to my great delight and 
the great delight of our executive committee, all 
the druggists in California refused to sell 
Pepsodent toothpaste or Pepsodent products. They 
put them in the basement. Some were enthusiastic 
enough to throw them in the ash can. I wouldn't 
bring this out except that I want you to really 
understand how the sales of Pepsodent Products 
in all of California dropped off. 
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"'About this time, the Pepsodent 
Company donated $25,000 to the National Associa-
tion of Retail Druggists to be used in behalf of 
resale price 'maintenance legislation. The 
Pepsodent Company gave wide publicity to this 
donation. Following this gesture on the part of 
the Pepsodent Company, several other manufacturers 
. of drugs and pharmaceuticals contributed to the 
fund while still others were solicited for dona-
tions to further the enactment of resale price 
maintenance. '"* 
Other manufacturers claim that similar pressure was 
put on them by independent retail druggists, State Drug 
Associations, and drug wholesalers and their associations. 
Dr. Corwin Edwards, economic adviser to the Anti-
Trust Division in a special memorandum on February 10, 1941, 
cites the example of an aspirin manufacturer in California 
who was forced · to issue resale price contracts against his 
Will. 
Another manufacturer of products sold through 
retail drug stores reported that in order to get drug whole-
salers' and retailers' co-operation, and to cause his retail-
ers and wholesalers from discriminating against him in favor 
of competitors who had either voluntaril~ or at the coercion 
of retailers and wholesalers, already entered into fair-trade 
contracts, . he too made fair-trade agreements. 
*38, pp. 143-145. 
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The editorial in the June 20, 1955, edition of 
"Life" stated dramatically: "Fair-Trade is dying and few 
will weep for it--------". In many communities retail drug 
associations asked member druggists to remove the issue of 
"Life'' from their stands and magazine racks. Many retail 
druggists complied with this request for the "boycott" of 
"Life". 
The following also illustrates an example cited by 
fair trade critics to illustrate an example of an organized 
boycott on the part of retail druggists to force manufacturers 
to fair-trade their products. 
In the .April 17th, 1950 edition .the NARD Journal 
printed a letter to Seeman Bros., Inc. from a wholesaler 
under the heading ".Airwick Goes Off Fair Trade", "Wholesaler 
Criticizes Move". In the previous issue, the NARD Journal 
had commented in an editorial without mentioning brand name or 
manufacturer and warned in its article the manufacturer of the 
outcome of his action. In 1951 the manufacturer resumed its 
fair-trade prices for both sizes of "Airwick". 
More recently the International Cellucotton Prod-
ucts Company, manufacturers of "Kleenex" tissues decided to 
no longer fair-trade "Kleenex". The above manufacturer had 
to weigh several considerations in reaching the above deci-
sion. If he fair-traded his product, he tended to gain the 
volume of business of the so-called non-aggressive retailers 
who might not handle his product without fair trade. On 
the other hand, the manufacturer tended to lose the benefit 
of the greater volume of sales made by the more aggressive 
distributors who would like to use his product as a means of 
attracting people into their stores, and who would, for that 
' 
purpose sell his product at a relatively low price. Such 
was the case of International Cellucotton products. 
"Kleenex" had almost become a generic name for 
cleansing tissues. The manufacturer concluded that the in-
creased volume of the supermarkets would more than compensate 
for the volume lost with retailers who objected to the new 
"free" trade prices of "Kleenex". Moreover, the manufactur-
er depended on consumer demand for the "Kleenex" brand. 
The drug wholesalers and drug retailers resorted 
immediately to coercion and boycott. Wholesalers went out 
on sales promotions with discounts to the retail druggist on 
competitive brands of tissues. Retailers were urged to hide 
"Kleenex" under the counter and prominently display only 
competitive brands of tissues. Retailers were urged not to 
display other products of International Gellucotton as 
evidence of their protest to the manufacturer for abandoning 
fair trade. 
Many retailers complied and proceeded to substitute 
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whenever possible when customers ncalled" for "Kleenex". 
However, the above forms of coercion and boycott were unsuc-
cessful, and to date, "Kleenex" tissues are not fair trade by 
the manufacturer. 
Under the fair trade pricing system there are other 
forms of pressure on manufacturers from retailers and whole-
salers. Many independent retailers and drug .chains pressure 
manufacturers for "private labels" or "imprint" merchandise 
to compete with the national brand. usually, unable to cut 
the price of the fair-traded product, the private brand or 
"imprint" is offered to the consumer at the same or lower 
retail price than the manufacturerrs original branded product. 
The private labels generally y!ield a higher profit margin to 
the retailer. 
There is an instance where a national drug chain 
refused to handle a manufacturer's national brand in its 
retail storessimply because the manufacturer refused to make 
any private labels or imprint brands. 
Drug wholesalers are a vital part in the marketing 
of products sold in drug stores. Many manufacturers need the 
marketing services and sales effort of drug "service" whole-
salers for the distribution of their products to retail 
pharmacies. 
There is an instance of wholesalers refusing to handle a 
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manufacturer's drug line because they could not agree with 
the manufacturer on a satisfactory price adjustment in 
handling the line. This boycott, in one area where the 
manufacturer had no warehouse facilities, and an inadequate 
organization to handle small direct orders, proved costly to 
the manufacturer. 
2. Fair Trade Fosters Violation of the Anti-Trust Laws 
Critics of fair trade point out that fair trade 
contracts serve as incentives for boycotts, intimidation, 
discrimination, and other collective measures which are 
fo r bidden by the anti-trust laws. They cite numerous pro-
ceedings in which it was charged that fair trade contrapts 
had served as a guise for illegal activities in restraint of 
trade. Thus, fair-trade legislation serves as a cloak to con-
ceal price fixing and other undesireable practices in re-
straint of trade. 
In 1947 the National Association of Retail Drug-
gists, the loudest advocate for fair-trade legislation, was 
fined on a plea of "nolo contendere'' to an indictment charg-
ing them with havlng engaged "in a conspiracy to fix retail 
and wholesale prices of drug items, to eliminate price com-
petition among retail druggists, and to restrain competition~. 
The NARD's methods to achieve their objectives were sum-
marized by the Anti-Trust Division, Department of Justice as 
follows: 
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"They threatened to refuse to handle, or 
to boycott, or to urge, their customers and pre-
scribing physicians to accept substitutes for drug 
store items, where margins of profits had not been 
approved, and refused to carry in stock, boycotted 
and urged their customers to accept substitutes 
for such drug store items; agreed to sell drug 
store items whose retail prices nad been established 
by producers at prices not below those so established; 
persuaded, induced, and compelled producers of drug 
store items to establish wholesale prices in rela-
tion to the retail prices demanded by defendants; 
threatened producers with lack of cooperation in the 
sales of drug store items on which the wholesale 
prices were not established at levels bearing the 
relation to retail prices demanded by defendants 
and refused to cooperate in the sale of such drug 
store items." 
The National Wholesale Druggists Association was 
similarly indicted under the Sherman Act for "conspiring, to 
raise, fix, and stabilize wholesale selling prices of drug 
store items". Their tactics and alleged practices included 
lack of co-operation with defiant manufacturers, "boycotts" 
and "refusal to sell from or carry in stock". As in the case 
of the NARD the NWDA filed pleas of "nolo contendere" and 
fines were levied against them. 
Critics of fair trade also cite the illustration 
of Uni t ed States vs. New York State Pharmaceutical Associa-
tion. The NARD was again indicted in conjunction with the 
above association. Here again the charges involved "fixing~ , 
stabilizing, and maintaining the retail and wholesale prices 
of drug store items through the adoption of uniform prices 
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and methods of sale, boycotts, interchange of information, 
and blacklists 11 • 
Here again pleas of "nolo contendere 11 and fines 
levied against the defendants ended the litigation. 
D. ADVANTAGES OF FAIR TRADE TO THE WHOLESALER 
1. Price Stability 
The drug wholesaler is primarily a service whole-
saler. He stocks thousands of items. The wholesaler's 
inventory includes the different size packages of pharma -
ceuticals, proprietaries, toiletries, and sundries. 
One of the drug wholesaler's functions is to 
service the daily requirements of their retail accounts. 
Many drug store products (depending, of course, upon the rate 
of turnover) are ordered in quantities of "twelfths" and 
11sixths" . The retail druggist rates the wholesaler's effi-
ciency by the wholesaler's ability to fill his requirements 
without too many "outs". "Outs" represent items which the 
wholesaler cannot ship when ordered. "Outs 11 often mean lost 
sales to the retailer until replacement can be made. 
Fair trade plays an important role in this picture. 
Fair trade allows the wholesaler to maintain adequate stocks 
and inventories at more stable prices. Price stability 
enables the wholesaler to concentrate on adequate inventories 
without fear of fluctuations of price. Fair trade allows him 
to be a ''service wholesaler" - and not a speculator. 
2 . Improved Selling Methods 
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A drug wholesaler salesman on his weekly retail 
contact sells and renders service. The wholesaler salesman 
may introduce new products, present special deals, adjust 
complaints, issue credits, collect money and alert retailers 
to price changes. 
Vertical price fixing under fair trade eliminates 
competition on the basis of price and discount. Therefore 
wholesaler men can compete on fair trade products on the 
basis of service, sales pres~ntation, and personality. The 
wholesaler man does not have to spend time defending prices 
and discounts but can concentrate on selling alone. 
The drug wholesalers' success or failure is predi-
cated · on the drug retailers' prosperity or failure. There-
fore, drug wholesalers .are ardent supporters of fair trade. 
E. DISADVANTAGES OF FAIR TRADE TO THE DRUG WHOLESALER 
1. Injures Competitive Status 
Part II section B of this study illustrated how 
fair trade and fair trade prices were, in a measure, res-
ponsible for the growth of distribution of beauty aids, 
toiletries, and drug items in leading foo d stores and super-
markets . 
Supermarkets either buy their drug department needs 
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direct from the manufacturer , from their own chain warehouses, 
or are serviced by "rack jobbers" . This loss of business to 
the drug wholesaler is reflected in t he following table: 
-PROPORTION OF DRUGS BOUGHT FROM EACH MAJOR SOURCE 
OF SUPPLY~. FEBRUARY~_ 1952 
Super- Super- Smaller All 
markets ettes Stores Stores 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Grocery Wholesaler 29 42 44 40 
Rack Jobber 41 31 33 33 
Drug Wholesaler 15 19 20 19 
Direct From Mfg. 
_l2 8 _3 8 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: "Progressive Grocer" , Feb. 1952 
Note: "Grocery wholesaler is leading 
supplier of drugs and toiletries according to 
supermarket, superette , and smaller store opera-
tors surveyed . Grocery wholesaler, together with 
rack jobber (service wholesaler) supply 73 per 
cent of all drugs and toiletries. However, now 
that leading drug and toiletry brands are readily 
and openly available from several sources in most 
communities, most stores buy from 2 or 3 suppliers. 
Operators report that grocery wholesalers are en-
larging drug inventories and improving their 
merchandising services . Dealers also report an 
increasing trend to direct buying in many of the 
best selling items."* · 
2. Fosters Unfair Competition 
In a recent personal interview with Mr . Dan Kelly, 
*22, p. 52. 
176 
Sales Manager~ McKesson and Robbins~ Inc.~ Boston~ Massachu-
setts~ Mr. Kelly expressed the following opinion on a fair 
trade problem threatening the drug wholesaler. Mr. Kelly 
commented on the fact that "retail druggists would like to 
sell fair trade~ but do not want to buy fair trade". 
In Part I the study noted "- -------vertically 
controlling the pricing of the commodity as it descends from 
the plant through successive levels of distribution to the 
consumer". Fair traded products are fair traded on the whole-
saler level to the retailer as well as on the retailer level 
to the consumer. 
Vertical price fixing allows the "full l in e "~ 
(wholesalers who carry all major lines) service drug whole-
saler to compete on the basis of services rendered and not on 
the basis of price and discounts. 
There are "short line" (wholesalers who do not 
carry every major line) wholesalers~ t obacco jobbers handling 
drug store items~ and sundry jobbers who do not compete on 
the basis of service but offer illegal~ ··extra discounts · and 
cut prices to druggists on fair-traded items. These whole-
salers are called the "ten per cent houses". They break down 
the very price structure of fair trade. 
Recently~ a tobacco jobber formed a so-called 
~a-operative" with a small group of retail druggists. In 
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order to increase the jobber's tobacco and sundry business, 
druggists were able (under the legal guise of a co-operative) 
to bypass the wholesale fair trade price structure and pur-
chase items two and one half per cent above the wholesaler's 
cost. 
Mr. Kelly felt that drug retailers who ardently 
support fair trade oh the retail level should carry over 
their support to the wholesale level as well. When retailers 
need wholesaler support on fair trade problems and issues, it 
is the "full line", service drug wholesaler who is on the 
firing line.* 
The above sentiment is confirmed by Yahr Lange, In~, 
"full line~ drug wholesaler in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. 
The following is a reprint from "Tomorrow 11 , a ne\'TS-
letter distributed by Yahr Lange, Inc. to their retail drug 
accounts. 
"Fair Trade Avenue is Paved With 
Good Intentions · 
"Wholesale fair-trade contracts are just 
as necessary as retail fair-trade contracts. Both 
were created for the same purpose. 
"Manufacturers alone cannot do a perfect 
job of enforcement any more than our government 
alone could make price controls stick. - Retailers 
and wholesalers must make contributions, too. 
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"There must be - a willingness of merchants 
to respect the wholesale and retail minimum prices 
and discount policies. 
"A refusal of retailers to connive with 
wholesalers who are fair-trade violators. 
"Remember, there can be no violators or 
chizeling without customers - he who patronizes 
fair-trade violators helps defeat the common effort, 
and in the long run, defeats his own interests. 
"Just in case you don't know it, here is 
a partial list of manufacturers whose products are 
covered by their stabilized distribution policies, 
at both the retail and wholesale level~ 
Eli Lilly & Co. 
International Cellucotton 
Products 
Mead Johnson Co. 
Johnson & Johnson 
Smith Kline & French 
Bauer & Black 
Miles Laboratories 
Coty, Inc. 
Bristol Myers Co. 
Gillette Safety Razor Co. 
Toni, Inc. 
E. R. Squibb & Sons 
Burrough Welcome Co. 
Wyeth, Inc. 
G. D. Searle Co. 
Led.erle Labs. 
Mennen Co. 
The Bayer co. 
Pepsodent Co. 
Personal Prod. 
Hudnut Sales Co. 
Hoffman-LaRoche 
Colgate-Palmolive Pe~t 
coco Cola Sales Co. 
Anahist Co. 
Washburn Prod. Co. 
Barbasol co. 
American Safety Razor 
Winthrop-Stearns 
Abbott Laboratory 
Upjohn Co. 
Weco Products 
Procter & Gamble 
Whitehall Pharmacal 
Charles Phillips 
Schering Corp. 
Wildroot Co. 
Ciba Phar. Prod. Inc. 
Prophylactic Brush 
Lambert Pharmacal 
Davol Rubber 
White Labs. 
Youngs Rubber Corp. 
Amity Leather 
Pharma Craft Corp. 
Dr. Pierce Med. Co. 
Pin ex 
Lydia Pinkham 
Lamont Corliss Co. 
Potter Drug & Chemical 
Ritchie Janvier 
Vick Chemical 
E. W. Fitch Co. 
H. c. Glover Co. 
Lehn & Fink 
Lavoris 
Lucky Tiger Mfg. Co. 
Becton-Dickinson Co. 
Block Drug 
Grove Labs. 
Mentholatum 
Miller Forge Co. 
Murine 
Musterole 
Noxema 
Pearson Phar. Co. 
Remington Rand 
Schick, Inc. 
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Union Pharmacal 
Minnesota Mining Co. 
H. K. Wampole & Co. 
Blue Jay Prod. Co. 
Boujois, Inc. 
Centaur-Caldwell 
Campana Sales 
Chamberlain Sales 
Chilcott Labs 
Clean Home Prod. 
J. B. \'lilliams 
Creomulsion 
DeVilbiss 
. Wm. R. Warner & Co . 
Emerson Drug 
Consumer Prod. 
Pyramid Rubber 
Ex-Lax Corp. 
Sales Builders (Max 
Factor) 
Westingho~se Electric 
Norwich Chemical 
R. B. Semlar Co. 
Tek-Hughes 
R. L. Watkins 
Zonite Sales 
Pharmaco, Inc. 
"If you find any whoesaler offering you 
extra discounts or special quantity prices on the 
above lines - he is a violator - he is not a 
builder- he's a ·member of the wrecking crew." 
F. WHOLESALER AND THE NON-SIGNER CLAUSE 
In Part II, section H of the study the importance 
of the non-signer clause to the effective operation of fair 
trade and the retailer was noted. 
What is the effect of the non-signer clause and the 
wholesaler? 
Manufacturers who sell on a direct basis can refuse 
to sell predatory price-cutting retailers who refuse to sign 
f air trade contracts with the manufacturer. 
Most manufacturers sell through wholesalers as well 
as direct. These manufacturers may refuse to sell retailers 
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who refuse to sign fair trade contracts, but they may not, 
under the penalty of law, require wholesalers to refuse to 
sell retailers who will not sign fair trade contracts. Such 
requirements on the part of manufacturers would constitute a 
conspiracy and violate the anti-trust laws. Thus, in the 
absence of legislation validating non-signer .clauses, a 
retailer could refuse to sign a fair trade contract, obtain 
the merchandise of any manufacturer who distributed through 
wholesalers and sell the merchandise below minimum fair trade 
prices - provided only that interstate commerce is involved. 
The following is an example of what happens: 
Schick razors priced at $27.50 were being sold 
(after the Schwegmann Decision, May, 1951) in the New York 
area for as little as $6.99. Small retailers were no longer 
able to accept the losses which such prices involved and put 
Schick Razors under the counter. 
The Schick Company was hurt and took action. The 
company notified wholesalers that it would not distribute 
through them in that area. Schick had decided that it would 
sell directly to retailers who would sign fair trade contracts. 
Unfortunately, Schick had neither the distribution facilities 
nor the sales organization to service all its distributors in 
the New York area, and was forced to concentrate on the large 
retailers. Ironically, these were the very same big, 
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predatory-pricing retailers who had originally cut the prices 
of Schick products. In effect the little retailer who may 
have respected fa ir t rade could not buy Schick Razors, anq 
the big retailers who sold more and more volume as a result 
now sold at fair trade prices. In the process, no fault of 
Schick's, the wholesaler's function had been eliminated.* 
The great majority of manufacturers have sold 
throu-gh wholesalers because it was more economical for them, 
their retailers, and the consumer. The wholesaler serves a 
useful and important marketing function in the nature of the 
American economy. The above illustration demonstrates how 
piece, by piece, the manuf acturer would eliminate wholesalers 
and sell only to retailers who would sign fair trade contracts. 
The non-signer clause allows the wholesaler to 
function and makes every retailer who stocks fair trade 
merchandise responsible. 
*4, pp. 55-56. 
182 
CONCLUSI 01iJS 
1955 was a critical ye a r for Fa ir-Trade. 'l'he 
Attorney General and his co~~ittee recommended the repea l 
of the Ivi iller-Tydings an d McGuire Acts. 
In several of the states, the State Supreme 
Courts reversed their former positions and declared the 
State Fair Tra de Laws unconstitutional. 
Vell known opponents of Fair Trade such as "Life" 
and "TL-rnen magazines continued their subjective assaults on 
Fair 'I'rade. 
Yet, despite all this opposition, Fair Tr ade sur-
vived, and as the study disclosed in Part I, became some·wh a t 
stronger. The principal decision was in the "Hoffman LaRocre 
vs. Schwet:,l!lann" case in \1\h ich the Supreme Court of the U. S. 
sustained the ·lower court in holding that prescript~ons call-
ing for Fair Trade medication could not be sold at a price in 
violation of the Fair Tr ade minimura prices established by the 
manuf'acturer. 
The Congress failed to follow the recommendation 
of the Attorney General's Comraittee and did nothing to harm 
Fa ir Trade. 
Reviewing the "Drug Store Sales 'I' rends u and sales 
forecasts for 1956 as set forth in Part II of the study, it 
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is recogn ized that the Retail Druggist must have Fair 
Trade to survive. If Fair TI•ade were taken away from them, 
they woul d be compelled t o return to the 11 dog - eat-d og 11 days 
of the pre-Fair Tr ade era , and many retail dr-Llg st ores 
viould fall by the wayside . Without Fair 'rrade , retail drug-
gists wou:}..d not be a b le to c ompete viTi th the modern b u sines s 
octopus, the suve rmarket. 
The t hesis highli@~ts a strange paradox in Part I I. 
F'a ir 'l'ra d e , in part , is re sponsible f or the grovvth of drug 
bus iness in supermarkets. With the advent and advance of 
"rob ot reta iling " it was inevitable fo r supermarkets to 
stock na t i onal bra nds with g ood turn over. Fair Tr ade 
r estrain s s u permarkets, d e pa rtment stores , ncut-rate" 
stores, and 0 f ac tory outlet price cuttersn, f r om predat ory 
price cutting, price j11ggling and loss -leader sell in • 
In 1 955 the sal es of dentifrice s i n drug stores 
tota lled ,.51,238 , 000 a s compared with ~: · 52 , 945,000 ~-in 1 954 , 
and ~53, 421,000 in 1950. 
The drug store share of t he tot a l t h us dropp ed 
from 37% in 1 954 t o 34.6% in 1 955 . 
Vii thou t Fai r Tra cJ e the dru g store 1 s share of the 
tota l dentifr ice market may have drop ·ed even more . 
n anufacturers ' advert ising pre-s e lls toothpast e 
.to such a n extent th&t self servi ce d isplay is a highly 
effe ctive me t hod of moving toothpaste. Food stores have 
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been quick to capital ize on th ese factors in t heir f avor •. 
It' s a question of traffic and d isp lay . Super _; 
market s pull heavy traffic , but dr1..1g stores draw a lot of 
customers , t oo . 
Fa i r Trade a llows druggi sts t o c ompete on the 
basis of d i splay and servic e r ath er than cu t prices a n d 
"phony bargains 11 • 
Fair Trade Laws hav e been operating for 24 years . 
'I'his period in which Fair Trade has developed ha s witnessed 
an unpre c edented g r o vth of chain stores and supermarkets. 
At the s ame time , s ma ll busines s has increased and p ros pered . 
r.rhis hardly indicates that Fair Tra de curtai l s ind ividua l 
initiative an d fre e enterprise. 
Fair Trade constitut es on l y on e form of l egally 
a ccepted resale price ma intenance under which the pro ducer 
of a t rade - marked it em es t abli shes the consumer price for 
that item . Oth e r forms of resale price maintenance more 
wide l y used than Fair Trade include consig nment selling , and 
dealer franch ises. Every news paper and . ma ga zine , for examp H1, 
is sol d through the r e sale price maintenance of consignment 
sel ling. At every newsst a nd in Americ a , t h e consumer pays 
20 c ents f or a 20 cent magazine and 5 cents for a nickel 
news pa er . 
'I'he study concluded that sin ce the consumer is 
free to cho ose among compe ting products , Fair Trade prices 
must vvin the consumer's favor or the manufacturers respons-
ible for the prices vnll lose their market . 
There is comprehensive evidence from the price 
surveys in Part III of the thesis tha t Fair Trade rices in 
drug stores resisted inflationary pressures better tha n other 
prices in the economy. 
The price surveys submitted by Fair Trade crit ics 
have definite weaknesses. The surveys comparing BaJ:t imore 
Fair Trade prices vs. the District of Columbia and n'rhe 
Rosenthal Survey" in Part III are based on advertised 
prices, and not on products actually purchased. Whether or 
not the advertised bargains were actually availabl e to all 
consumers is not knovm . 
These sv.rveys do prove that certain stores sell 
some fair-traded items for le s s a t certain times to attract 
cus tomers into their stores. They do not prove tba t all 
stores could or would sell these same fair-traded items at 
these s ame prices with out Fair Trade . 
Such surveys would provide valid findings only if 
they: 
1. Obtained the storewide margin over the year 
showing how low- profit items or no-profit items together 
with high-profit items combine to put the re·tai ler in the 
black . 
2. Compared the store wide margins of reta ilers 
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in non-fair trade areas with the store wide margins of 
their opposite numbers in Fair Trad e areas • . 
'l'he study concluded that Fair Trade is not and 
never was intended to be a crutch for the inefficient 
retail druggist, small or large. Fair Trade does allow 
the small efficient businessman a chance to compete against 
those with superior dollar p ower. 
Fair Trade opponents claim tha t eff icient retailers 
who do not offer services to the constuner should be allowed 
to pass on these saving s of econom~es to the consumer. The 
_logical conclusion, however, is a "pushcart economy"- for 
a ttpushcartttpeddler has less overhead and offers less services 
than any other merchant. Is there any place for a upushcarttt 
economy? 
Fair Trade does not hinder retailing efficiency. 
Ev e ry store has an overall gross margin vmich it needs to 
cover operating costs and make a profit. The store-wid e 
pricing system of any retailer must average out to give 
the retailer a profit or he will not be in business for 
very long . 
The study c onclude d i n Part I I tha t i::h e re t a il 
drugg i s t i s e ff ic i ent in :his retail oper a ti on. 
The t h esis concluded t h a t F'a ir Tra de Laws d o not 
p romote monopolist i c pract i ce s . 
Th e mos t ardent supporters of Fai~ Tr ade a re 
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independent druge_:,ists of the corner drug store type. They 
are l:be l e ast l i k ely group to fa v or l et:;is la tion whi ch en-
courages the growth of monopolies in their field . On the 
other . hand~ it has been clearly demon strated in the thes is 
that loss-leader selling deceives the public - and benefits 
t he compet itive p os ition of g iant retaj_l ers a t the expense 
of the small bus ine s sman . 
The study r ec ognizes in Part I V that the trade -
mark is the ma nufacturer ' s property ~ tbe .precious symbol 
of his go od will. Property rights or ownership includ e 
the right to exclude others from u sing one's property a n d 
t;he r ig:b t to specify the condit i on s un der which others may 
be pe rmit ted to use one's property. Fair Trade Laws are 
mer e ly one legally ac c eptable of putting t hi s r i ght of 
ownership into e f fect. 
'rh e t he sis conclude s tha t lo s s-lead e r selling 
and cut-rate merchandising of nationally advertised and 
branded consumer products can impair manufacturers ' sub-
sta ntial investments in business good wi ll . Such nmrket-
ing t a c t ics a lso alienate established~ straightforward, 
retailers in regular distribution channels. 
The study clearly establishes that Fair 'l,rade 
prevents unwelcome promotional selling and thereby protects 
"quality items" from deb a sement in the consumer's mind. 
If Congress repealed the Fair Trad e Acts they 
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would be forc e d to i mmedia tely con s ider l egislation f or 
treating problems l i ke l oss - leader sales and debasement 
of wi d e l y a dvertised trade-mark and busine ss good will. 
Consumers need the convenient profess i onal 
services of their neighborhood retail drug stores . 
•ro real i ze this end Fair Trade produces bene-
ficial results for the independent retail drugg ists 
when it operates to eliminate loss-lead er selling and 
irresponsible deceit ful price cutting. 
Fair Trade achieves and maintain s a healthy 
price structure for the manufacturer, the wholesa l er , 
a nd the consumer . 
189 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
I. BOOKS 
1. New York, The National Wholesale Druggists' Associa-
tion, 330 West 42nd Street, New York. "The Basis 
and Development of Fair Trade", Second Edition, 
August, 1950. 
2. Chicago Druggists' Research Bureau, 205 West Wacker 
Drive, H. J. Ostlund and c. R. Vickland, "Fair Trade 
and the Retail Drug Store", 1940. 
3. New York, McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc., Edwards, 
Corwin, D., "Maintaining Competition", 1949. 
II. BOOKLETS AND PAMPHLETS 
4. "Fair Trade in 1953", Bureau of Education on Fair 
Trade, n.d., 205 East 42nd Street, New York. 
5. "Interview on Voluntary Fair Trade", between John 
Crichton, Executive Editor, "Advertising Age" and 
John W. Anderson, President, American Fair Trade 
Council, Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, November 16, 
1949; American Fair Trade Council, Inc., 11 East 
44th Street, New York. 
6. "What About Fair Trade", National Association of 
Retail Druggists, n.d., 205 West Walker Drive, 
Chicago 6, Illinois. 
7. "Mr. and Mrs. Consumer, Which Do You Want ..•.. 
Fair Trade or Phony Bargains?", NARD, n.d., 205 West 
Walker Drive, Chicago 6, Illinois. 
8. "Fair Trade on Trial", A. 0. Clutter, Eli Lilly & 
Co., May 1, 1954, Indianapolis, Indiana. 
9. Release, Bureau of Education on Fair Trade, undated 
release, 205 East 42nd Street, New York 17, New York. 
10. Release, Bureau of Education on Fair Trade, Decem-
ber 13, 1954, 205 East 42nd Street, New York 17, New 
York. 
190 
11. Statement of George H. Frates, NARD, before the 
Senate Anti-Trust and Monopoly Committee, August 3~ 
1955, 11Fair Trade and Monopoly 11 , . NARD, 205 West 
Walker Drive, Chicago 6, Illinois. 
12. "A Dozen Reasons Why Your Congressman Should Vote 
for Fair Trade", n.d., Bureau of Education on Fair 
Trade, 205 East 42nd Street, New York 17 , New York. 
13. "The Anti-Trust Bulletin" Fair Trade: "The 
Fundamental Issues", Maurice Mermey, Bureau of 
Education on Fair Trade, Vol. 1 #2, May, 1955, 
Federal Legal Publications, Inc., 18 Rose Street, 
New York 38, New York. 
III. NE~SPAPERS AND PERIODICALS 
14. Fair Trade Newsletter, dated March 21, 1955, 
Published by Bureau of Education on Fair Trade, 
205 East 42nd Street, New York 17, New York. 
15. "Consumer Reports:; July, 1955, Vol. 20, pp. 339-
42. 
16. C. Day, "Fair Trade Victories Outnumber Setbacks 
in First Year of McGuire Act", "Printer's Ink", 
July 7, 1953, p. 36. · 
17. "Oil;,··Paint, and Drug Reporter", June 14 , 195·4, 
p. 41. 
18. "American Druggist", August 15~ 1955, p. 17. 
19. "This is the Retail Drug Store", "Drug Topics", 
February 26, 1951. 
20. "American D~uggist", January 2, 1946, p • . 4. 
21. "NARD Journal", November 5, 1951, p. 1786 . 
22. "Fair Trade· Laws ,. - Whom Do They Serve?", The "New 
Leader", June ·6, 1955, pp. s3-s5. 
23. "Progressive Grocer", "Food Stores Make Sensational 
Gain in Drug and To:;t.letry Sales", February 1952, 
pp. 50-55. 
191 
24. "Vote on Resale Price . Maintenance", "Modern 
Industry", January 15, 1942. 
25. "Fortune", "The Not· So Fair Trade Laws", January, 
1949, p. 70. 
26. "Printer's Ink", October 17, 1953, p. 70. 
27. "Fortune", April, 1949, p. 76. 
28. "The Apothecary", December, 1954, p. 11. 
29. "Harper's Weekly", November 5, 1913, p. 12 . 
30. "Apothecary~', October, 1955, p. 11. 
31. "Time", November 28, 1955, p. 92. 
32. "Printer's Ink", August 11, 1950, p. 72. 
33. E. Katz , "Encorced Fair Trade Best For All", 
"Sales Management", September 20, 1954, p. 80. 
IV. PUBLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, ASSOCIATIONS 
34. "Fair Trade: The Problems and The Issues", Report 
of the Select Committee on Small Business, House 
of Representatives, 82nd Congress , U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1952. 
35 . "Congressional Record", Provision 4, July 2, 1952, 
p. 9123 and p. 9138. 
36. Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representa-
tives, 75th Congress, 1st session, Hearings on 
H.R. #1611 , p. 4. 
37. "Study of Monopoly Power", Hearings before the Anti-
Trust Committee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
House of Represer.tatives , 82nd Congress, 2nd ses-
sion, on "Resale Price Maintenance", U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1952. 
38. TNEC - Temporary National Economic Committee, 
"Problems of Small Business", Monograph #17, p. 195. 
192 
39 . Federal Trade Commission, "Resale Price Maintenance", 
"Summary and Conclusion", December 13, 1945. 
V. LEGAL DEC IS IONS 
40. Old Dearborn Distributing Company vs. Seagram 
Distillers Corporation, 299 U.S. 183. 
41. "Bourjois vs . Katzel", 260 U.S. 689, 692. 
42. Sunbeam Corporation vs. Wentling, 192 F (2d) 7 
(CA 3d) 1951 (pp. 8, 9). 
IV. PERSONAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION 
43. Personal Interviews with Retail Druggists. 
44 . Personal Interview with Mr. Dan Kelly, Sales 
Manager, McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Boston .Division. 
